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CHAPTER I
THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
CIVIL LIBERTIES PROBLEMS
Statement of Purpose
Introduction
Analysis of the standards and concepts which a
community invokes to solve civil liberties problems are
usually found in the works of normative political
theorists, who in some fashion must deal with the
general problem of the relationship between the indivi-
dual and the state? and in the works of legal scholars
who scrutinize the practical resolution of these pro-
blems in courts of law. Concern with liberty is cer-
tainly not new, but it is a concern which is not given
uniform consideration. There are, for example, literally
hundreds of academic works written on various aspects
of civil liberties problems in the United States,
indeed, the enormous amount of scholarly attention
given to specific words and phrases, such as
2"establishment of religion" or "abridging the freedom of
speech" in one particular amendment to the U. S.
Constitution, makes for an almost distinct category in
the academic study of public law in America, writings
on the same problems in other nations, however, are not
plentiful. Presumably the reason for this is not because
other nations either lack the desire to protect individual
liberty or that they offer perfect solutions to all civil
liberties problems. Explanation is to be found rather in
the fact that civil liberties questions in most societies
do not emerge in the same legally-structured manner as
in the United States. Another important reason for the
emphasis on civil liberties in the U. S. is that because
the problems are legally structured, resolution tends to
take place in courts; and American courts have a more
pronounced, or at least more visible, role in the poli-
tical process than do most. All the various factors which
make American courts, especially the Supreme Court, so
intrinsically enmeshed in politics have also acted as
forces which help codify problems of what is essentially
democratic political theory in legal vernacular. Attention
to civil liberties problems, therefore, has frequently
3taken the form of an auxiliary category in American
constitutional law, in which civil liberties issues are
analyzed as a type of problem that besets a particular
legal institution, usually, the Supreme Court.
The libertarian tradition in the United States
has gained much, at least since 1937, from being so closely
identified with the Supreme Court. But because the pre-
cise balance between liberty and order is the most
challenging and delicate normative problem facing any
democratic society, it would appear fruitful to look at
the ways in which other nations and institutions settle
such questions. Since other nations have civil liber-
ties problems but not in the same codified form as in
the U. S., a comparative analysis must shift the focus
of attention from the context of a particular legal
institution to civil liberties problems as they are
dealt with in the total political process. The most
convenient focus for comparative analysis of such problems
falls, therefore, on certain statutes in different poli-
tical systems which cause concern among libertarians.
In the hope that by broadening the context of
civil liberties controversies we can perhaps gain further
4insight into the problem of protecting individual liberty,
an attempt will be made here to analyze the judicial and
administrative uses of certain sedition and obscenity
statutes in Great Britain and the United States. Our
objective will not be to describe the nature, amount and
source of either espionage or pornography in each society
definitively but rather to ascertain what concepts,
institutions, customs and public attitudes in each
society enhance or detract from a libertarian solution
2
to those problems.
There is a popular tendency to approach such
problems as sedition and obscenity either with a sense of
fear, wherein the major concern is to protect government
and society from great evil; or with a sense of outrage
at the lack of flexibility and sophistication of the
established order and public opinion. The former is an
attitude which only compounds the problem, and the latter
is, at its best, an over-statement of the libertarian
case; at its worst the pursuit of ant i- libertarian goals
through the use of libertarian means. In any case we
shall presume that the problems warrant something more
useful than simple indignation.
5Utility of a Coroparat ive
Analya is
An analysis of social conflict over the issues of
sedition and obscenity in two different societies has the
potential of providing three different types of useful
information.
Nortnat ive Standards
It could first yield some of the normative for-
mulas that individuals and institutions in other societies
use as a criteria for deciding the proper sphere of
individual liberty. Inquiry into the beliefs of men in
differing legal structures and political systems would
appear justifiable, because this is one of the junctures
in politics where ideas clearly have consequences. Even
before that Athenian court decided to sentence Socrates
to death for "corrupting the youth of Athens" with his
impious teachings, men were putting their intelligence
to the task of deciding when an individual's behavior was
dangerous to the community and when individual behavior
should be left unhampered in the name of liberty. The
Athenian "court," which was really an admixture of a jury
and a town meeting, by a vote of 281 to 220 found Socrates
63guilty. If 31 citizens had chosen a different standard
for defining the liberties of a citizen, things might
have turned out differently for Socrates. The concepts
Athenians used to dispose of this problem were of obvious
importance to Socrates, but they were also important for
other Greeks who might someday find themselves in the same
awkward position. We shall in one sense be analyzing the
same types of concepts in Britain and the U. 8. which can
have the same awesome repercussions, but in a more compli-
cated setting.
There is a temptation, succumbed to by many who
concern themselves with judicial concepts, to make ideas
an explanation for all behavior in a society—as a cause
of behavior. Ideas emerge as both a cause and effect of
behavior. To explain political behavior only by
emphasizing the way men think tends to imply that all pro-
blems can be traced to a philosophical mistake—which
seems to contradict common sense. On the other hand, to
disregard all ideas as simply rationalizations for ulterior
motives has the difficulty Robert Dahl has labeled the
"problem of mis- identification.""^ When, for example, a
worker in Britain votes for a Conservative Party program
7because he believes that the "upper classes Icnow best/*
the "mis- identification" of material self-interest and the
worker's apparent incorrect perception of his social
position must be explained by Materialists as "bad
philosophy."
No attempt will be made here to weave a theory
about the precise relationship between ideas and institu-
tions. It should suffice to say that our concern with
ideas about civil liberties is simply one way to explore
certain kinds of conflict in society, not an attempt to
prescribe a greater role for ideas than they deserve.
It is also important to note that civil liberties
"doctrines" usually have arisen to meet the needs of
specific situations, and that a comparative analysis could
be useful in gaining not only new doctrine but old doctrine
as it is applied to new situations. Because these questions
must inevitably be resolved in the fluid history of highly
differing circumstances, the addition of "new" cases and
situations can also help an analyst to anticipate what
may be some future civil liberties problems in the
respective societies.
8Institut ional influences
Secondly, comparative analysis could aid in
ascertaining the effects of certain institutional arrange-
ments and the resolution of these issues. What, for
instance, of written and unwritten guarantees of liberty?
How important are judicial review and the courts? What
role do political parties play? obviously no total
assessment of the political system and civil liberties
can be given from an examination of particular problems.
But, the structure of civil liberties conflict as it
occurs in these controversies can tell us what kinds of
institutional devices may lead to a certain type of govern-
mental stance toward other civil liberties questions.
Cultural Aspects
Thirdly, such a comparative approach could give
information about factors in the general political culture
which may influence civil liberties. Since normative
decisions do not take place in a vacuum, but instead are
influenced by other non-normative factors as well as
normative attitudes on non-political matters, it is impor-
tant to ascertain which forces are present that create
a
9certain response to civil liberties problems in one
society that are not found in another.
A problera peculiar to those who deal with civil
liberties issues, as we have already mentioned, is the
tendency to treat them solely as legal problems. In this
vein, it would be well to heed the warning of John P.
Roche, who states,
. . . what is important ... to note (is) the
danger in an excessively legalistic approach to
civil liberties which treats the issue as though
the only deprivations that occur are those which
get litigated in court. Long ago, Socrates was
invited by a friend to worship at the temple of
the sea god and see the wonderful gifts which had
been provided by those sailors saved from drowning
by the god's intervention. Socrates, who knew a
bad sample when he saw one, inquired, 'Where are
the gifts from those who drowned? •
^
Most conflicts which would be construed as civil
liberties questions in a juridical context in fact never
enter a juridical situation, and depend on public opinion
and social sanctions for the way in which they are resolved.
Because of this, a study of civil liberties problems must
attempt to ascertain the social norms which influence
behavior on particular issues. Our primary goal will be
to look at the norms used to solve these problems in a
legal context, but the political culture of a society has
10
much to do in the formulation and solution of such issues.
To a certain extent the legal dialogue is only a barometer
of the general conflict in the society, and an attempt to
point out the relevant influences of the political culture,
where possible, will take cognizance of the fact that
courts are only one technique for the protection of
individual liberty and perhaps not always the most
efficient.
Great Britain and
the United States
Comparison of the same problems as found in Britain
and the United States has several advantages which warrant
mention. First, an especially important factor for com-
parison of civil liberties, both societies are highly
developed and, by most definitions, "democratic." There
are cultural differences between the United States and
Britain, but these differences are not so great as to
become a juxtaposition of polar opposites. In one sense,
both nations are part of the same "general" political
tradition, i.e.. Western-democratic, and have, relatively
speaking, similar political institutions. The fact that
both nations have the same language and that much comparative
11
woric on factors other than civil liberties exists also
adds to the practicality of using these two societies.
Also, since World W»r II, both nations have played roles
as major world powers, and both have had during this same
period a concern for internal security which necessitated
some introspection of the subject of individual rights
and national security.
Another reason for comparing Britain and the
United States is that there seems to exist a usually
unstated, but none-the-less firm conviction on the part
of American (and British) political scientists that Britain
is somehow "better on civil liberties questions.' Whether
or not a more libertarian atmosphere prevails in England
is something we shall leave until later, but such a facile
conviction would appear to be at least a little over-
stated, if not incorrect, given the amount of evidence
that is usually cited. The truly important question,
however, would seem to be not which nation offers greater
protection of civil liberty, but why it offers greater
protection.
The operative definition of civil liberty in two
such highly developed societies might seem a tangential
12
concern in a world where the most immediate problems are
military and economic. The developing nations are a
constant reminder that bookish concerns for such subtleties
in Western democratic theory as freedom of speech and due
process of law do not offer solutions to all major problems.
In nations which have no tradition placing great value on
protection of civil liberties, the procurement of liberty
obviously depends upon the founding of such a tradition.
In such circumstances the task is to create the necessary
social and economic prerequisites for a democratic nation.^
In dealing with highly industrialized, complex societies
which are committed to democratic values, discussion of
liberty becomes more subtle and refined? and in certain
ways it is a credit to the society in which it takes
place because it can afford the luxury of precise inquiry
into ways of becoming a more democratic community. Con-
cern with such delicate chains of logic about liberty are
important for several reasons. The first is that even
though a certain stage of historical development is
usually thought necessary before democratic attitudes can
prevail, such a relationship is only a general correlation;
the existence of "modernized" conditions does not guarantee
1>3
7democratic sentiment. Thus underdeveloped nations have
something to gain from the comparative study of civil
liberties because it can indicate which aspects of moderni-
zation are hostile to individual freedom.
Secondly, analysis of civil liberties issues in
England and America is important precisely because these
are the two nations most closely associated historically
with the legal protection of liberty. Libertarian ideals
have been part of an accepted political heritage of both
nations, but historical acceptance of certain principles
can also be a great burden for those principles. Robert
Cordis, writing on the development of individual rights in
antiquity, has noted that, "in proportion as . . . words
and ideas have become the accepted heritage of the race,
later generations find them self-evident, if not . . .
platitudinous." This drift from viable principle to
meaningless platitude occurs on both sides of civil liber-
ties conflict. The reaction of the general public,
interested in establishing sufficient order to guarantee
them personal security, at times grants a rather relaxed
acceptance to dissent and opposition as part of the demo-
cratic political process. Then new groups and new issues
14
make government or the community feel threatened. Those
who are overzealoue in their desire to bring about social
change get equally impatient with libertarian slogans.
The reconciliation of freedom and order is difficult when
government, as has frequently been the case in the past,
equates order with lack of opposition. It will not be
easier if, in the future, opposition to governmental policy
takes on some of the characteristics of the New Left's
critique of tolerance. In both England and the United
States, although it is a somewhat older phenomenon in
England, there exist political forces which express a
view of the democratic process, as some student demon-
strators did recently at Columbia, in the strident rallying
cry, "Up against the wall Mother-fucker 1" In both of the
democratic nations we will be dealing with, this slogan
expresses an attitude about political conflict held by a
much larger and politically diverse element in society
9
than just radical students in New York City.
Joseph A. Schumpeter has perhaps best isolated the
cause of this fleeting nature of the democratic commitment
when he observed,
There are ultimate ideals and interests which
the most ardent democrat will put above democracy. . . .
15
The reason why this is so is not far to seek.
Democracy is a political method, that is to say,
a certain type of institutional arrangement for
arriving at . . . decisions . . . and hence
incapable of being an end in itself, irrespective
of what decisions it will produce,
. . .
Definit ions and Assumptions
Civil Liberty
Conflict and Process
Ronald F. Bunn, in the introduction to his
Politics and Civil Libert ies in Europe recommends that
civil liberties problems be viewed as one manifestation of
"the two cultural tugs found in any political community:
11
consensus and cleavage." Such a theoretical model has
the advantage of promising a functional analysis of such
problems, which "transcend, without necessarily rejecting..."
such traditional categories as democratic and "authoritarian,"
and can thus be applied to any society. The model is also
useful in identifying the problems as types of conflict
situations. Bunn states that, "Consensus represents the
agreement upon which order and authority must ultimately
rest; cleavage refers to the disagreement that exists within
the consensual framework. " But, civil liberties conflicts
are more than simply disagreements within a consensus. A
16
better formulation would view civil liberties problems
as sometimes disagreement about consensus. Or, to turn
the formula around, certain civil liberties problems, such
as the tension between sedition and freedom of political
expression, force a society to arrive at a consensus about
c leavaqe .
The phrase "civil liberty" is used in many different
ways, both in law and political science. A strict legal
construction sometimes distinguishes civil liberty on the
basis of who is imposing the actual restraint on an
individual. Edwin S. Corwin, for instance, claims, "We
enjoy civil liberty because of the restraints which govern-
ment imposes upon our neighbors in our behalf, and con-
stitutional liberty because of the constitutional restraints
13
under which government itself operates." Politically,
civil liberties is frequently used as synonomous with
14
guarantees of the democratic process. For comparative
purposes, we shall use civil liberties to refer to
guaranteed protection of the democratic process from
infringements on the part of both government and society.
To facilitate comparative analysis, it will be use-
ful to distinguish between general conflict and conflict
17
over democratic guarantees. What makes a problem of
interest to us is not the conflict per se but the rela-
tionship between that conflict and normative dictates about
rights and liberties. Freedom of press, religion, assembly,
the right to a fair trial, etc., are all normative concerns
similar to the concern for universal suffrage? that is,
they are all attempts to keep the roajoritarian political
process "open." This conception of civil liberty, which
owes much of its formulation to the American Supreme Court
Chief Justice, Harlan F. Stone, we shall not interpret
as a list of absolutes, but rather as the democratic
"interests" of a society which must, to be sure, be
balanced against society's interest in public order.
Libertarian Solutions
When we speak of "libertarian solutions" to a
problem, we shall simply mean that the decision about the
conflict has accommodated as much of this democratic
interest as is reasonably possible. What is reasonable in
each case is not easy to determine and roust ultimately
rest on the application of norms to a factual situation.
The most fundamental underlying sentiment supporting the
commitment to an open process is probably the notion of
18
"self-responsibility." it is because John Stuart Mill
gave " self-responsibility, " along with individual
excellence, such high priority that his Essay on Liberty
remains a classic defense of an open society. Contemporary
political theorists such as Harold Lasswell have the same
pivotal value when they define civil liberty as the desire
to, " . . . respect practices with regard to which there
is self-responsibility. The individual has certain rights
and immunities; the power process relegates to him alone
17the making of decisions with regard to certain practices."
Thus, a libertarian belief is almost a theory of what law
should be in a democratic system. As a theory of law it
stipulates that only behavior which is demonstrably harm-
ful to others is within the proper sphere of social control.
As applied to civil liberties conflicts, a decision is
libertarian to the degree that the maximum amount of
individual or group action is assumed to be as important a
factor as society's interest in order. Such a definition
hopefully avoids some of the normative ambiguity which
surrounds attempts to define libertarian in terras of
"natural rights" or some type of metaphysical fact.
19
Rights
When we speak of "rights" in connection with either
the general society or courts of law we shall adopt the
Holmes ian notion that a " . . . right is only the hypo-
stasis of a prophecy—the imagination of a substance
supporting the fact that the public force will be brought
18to bear upon those who do things said to contravene it."
Such a notion of rights is more useful for the descriptive
purpose of deciding what is actually talcing place when such
words are invoked and is more useful for normative purposes
in that it does not presuppose that a "duty" corresponds
19
to every "right." In the words of Justice Holmes,
No doubt behind . . . legal rights is the
fighting will of the subject to maintain them,
and the spread of his emotions to the general
rules by with they are maintained; but that
does not seem to me to be the same thing as the
supposed a priori discernment of a duty or the
assertion of a pre-existing right. A dog will
fight for his bone.^O
political Culture
Sociology and anthropology use the notion of
"culture" in a variety of ways, but the general meaning of
culture is usually the way in with a community solves its
problems. Given a primary need of society, such as the
20
biological need for food, the means for the satisfaction
of this need are partially due to geographic and climatic
factors. Physical and economic factors determine the
general range of food that can be eaten. Such things,
however, as the choice of a particular food, how it is pre-
pared, and whether it is eaten with a fork or chopsticks
are cultural phenomena.
Political scientists, such as Samuel Beer and
Gabriel Almond, use the concept culture in the narrower
context of "political culture." For Beer political culture
is that aspect of a general culture that is concerned with
how a government ought to be conducted and what it should
do. It is the values, beliefs, and emotional attitudes
that are components of a society's conception of authority
and purpose. This use of political culture emphasizes
the rraative ideas system of a given society about govern-
ment and comes close to what others might call the pre-
vailing "ideology" of a society. Political culture for
Almond, on the other hand, refers to the "... patterns
of individual attitudes and orientations toward politics
23
among members of a political system." For Almond a poli-
tical culture can be subdivided into several categories.
21
but it is essentially the "psychological orientation
24toward social objects," Such an emphasis makes for a
difference in the way Almond and Beer use the same label.
But, while disputes in anthropology and political science
25
over the definition of culture will continue, in the
interest of arriving at an operational concept, we will
stipulate that the social and cultural configuration forming
the bacl^ground for civil liberties issues is made up of
conceptions . That is, the ideas, beliefs, and attitudes
(both psychological and ideological) about what is and
what should be the process for resolving conflicts between
the individual and society. Such a definition would
include both normative and existential propositions about
civil liberties as well as psychological reactions to
26
certain types of conflict situations. Under the heading
of political culture we shall include such diverse things
as attitude studies of the populations in Britain and the
United States, and important differences in the historical
development of constitutional guarantees of liberty in
each society, to help ascertain the way each nation per-
ceives its conflicts over "rights."
It is important to realize the usefulness of
22
"culture" as a tool for explaining the background of civil
liberties issues, but it is also equally important to
realize its limitations. Almond is correct in cautioning
that "... a careful analysis of political culture still
provides no sure guide . . . for prediction of individual
27behavior in a given case." An analysis of the cultural
background of civil liberties will not lend itself to pre-
dicting the reaction of a particular judge, official, or
crowd to a specific civil liberties issue, but it can per-
form a service equally as valuable in helping to explain
why particular issues are issues. Much civil liberties
analysis, for instance, takes the form of an input-output
model, wherein the focal point is usually courts of law
and the output is a chain of decisions. Political culture
would rarely determine, although it may influence, the
output of this system, but it can have much to do with
determining the input.
Seditious and Obscene
Speech
General prescriptions about liberty can have meaning,
however, only if they are related to concrete problems.
The category of "free speech" and the response of both
government and public to "free speech" issues would seem
to be the best single index of a society's commitment to
civil liberties « if for no other reason than that "free
speech" can be made almost synonomous with "civij. liberty,"
Conflicts over publishing, assembly, association, religion,
etc., as opposed to civil liberties problems relating to
criminal due process, for example, all necessitate some
general prescriptive standards, which are much the same
regardless of the specific nature of the issue. The cate-
gories about freedom of expression which have developed in
American constitutional law because of enumeration in the
First Amendment are useful in the American context, but
for purposes of cross-national analysis it would appear
wise to divide free speech problems into categories
according to the rationale given for limitation of speech
This rationale could be, for example, invasion of a
person's privacy (right of privacy v. free expression) or
injury to a person's character (libel). Since we are
interested in speech as a social problem, it is important,
also, to determine vrtio, i.e., government or private groups
articulates the demand that speech be curbed. With these
considerations in mind, two categories (or rationales)
24
which would appear to be good indices to a society's civil
liberties coniroitment are 1) seditious speech and
2) obscenity.
Seditious speech, or speech which is viewed as a
threat to national security or public order, raises ques-
tions in areas which have great consequences for both
social stability and the general climate of civil liberties.
Theories of civil liberty, i.e., general statements about
what constitutes permissible expression of opinion, are
most clearly and directly approached when the immediate
problem is security and/or order. Sedition is a crucial
substantive problem in and of itself, but it is also impor-
tant because many of the standards used to solve this pro-
blem carry over into the solution of other civil liberties
problems; and thus it is the most convenient font of liber-
tarian doctrine. Seditious speech and the right of assembly,
although sometimes different problems requiring different
criteria of judgement, can, for our purposes, be treated
as the general problem of seditious speech if we presume
that assembly can be, although is not always, an "organized"
and "symbolic" expression of speech. Both are problems
where there is a demand from government (usually) to inhibit
25
speech on a rationale related to public order . Conflicts
between the individual and the social and political order
always rank as serious, but when the conflict takes on a
group dimension, as in the case of assembly, the "problem"
can become a crisis.
Obscenity, on the other hand, is a demand for
restraint of individual free expression with a rationale
related to sexual impropriety . The demand for such
restraint frequently comes from government, but also comes
from private associations. Obscenity as a problem should
be much more subject to the dictates of public opinion and
the general social fabric than the rather technical dis-
tinctions that surround the problem of sedition, obscenity
as a civil liberties issue, in this writer's view, borders
on the frivolous. It is a type of problem, however, which,
because it lacks the gravity of questions such as sedition,
gives us a substantially different manifestation of the
problem of free speech, and in a different, and more
" cuIturaV context
.
We shall have to approach these two problems
through their statutory bases, which are the most obvious
source of governmental rationale, but this can sometimes be
26
deceptive. For the problem of seditious speech, as an
example, there is a cogent list of statutes which will be
our concern. Such famous statutes as the Smith Act, the
Internal Security Act, and the Communist Control Act, are
relevant to our purpose, but so are some aspects of the
Selective Service Act, and the "burning" statutes con-
cerned with the destruction of draft cards and flags. In
Britain the problem of sedition and free speech are found
in the application of the Incitement to Mutiny Act, but
also in the official Secrets Act and the Public order Act.
The problem of obscenity in the U. S. will necessitate
looking at some postal regulations. It should be remembered
that in employing such categories as sedition and obscenity
the problem is defined not in terms of the form of speech,
e.g.
,
press, cinema, etc., but the rationale given for the
curtailing of speech. Thus "D" notices (a form of press
censorship used by the British Government) will be
approached in this paper from the perspective of "seditious
speech" since the stated criteria of the government is a
concern for national security. This is not to imply that
other forms of organizing these problems are not useful,
simply that for our limited purposes, the above-mentioned
27
framework is advantageous. Such a schema, because it
deals both with a critical problem and a rather frivolous
one, and the response of both government and private
associations, should be a generally reliable index to the
ideas and problems of civil liberties in a society without
necessitating a catalogue of every confrontation between
the individual and society.
CHAPTER II
AMERICA Am> ENGLAND! THE LEGAL AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND
OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY IN TWO CULTURES
General Factors Influenc ing
Civil Liberties
In this chapter we shall look at some o£ the major
differences in the English and American political cultures
which have had a bearing on perceptions of civil liberties
in the two societies. Many of the similarities between
the United States and Britain are, of course, obvious?
English is spoken in both nations, both are highly committed
to a democratic process when compared to most other nations,
they share the essentials of the common law system, and
historically one is the off-shoot of the other rather than
a nation with a distinctly different course of historical
development. These similarities are important to bear in
mind, but in our treatment of the social and legal back-
ground of individual rights in the two cultures we shall
emphasize differences rather than similarities in order to
ascertain the way in which divergent cultural patterns can
29
create different environments for the civil liberties
tradit ion.
Before describing the particular political culture
as it relates to civil liberties issues in each nation, it
might be valuable to indicate some of the more obvious
social factors which have been found by a variety of
authors to influence civil liberties in a "horizontal"
manner; that is, factors which are influential regardless
of particular circumstances, although the degree of influ-
ence may depend on the components of a particular political
culture. These factors overlap, and no attempt will be
made to find any "causal" connection between them and
specific responses to civil liberties issues, but it is
important to separate the factors that condition civil
liberties in all societies so that they are not mistaken
for unique situations in either Britain or the United States,
Educational Factors
The degree and kind of education an individual
receives appears to have a significant bearing on the atti-
tudes toward civil liberties, with the general correlation
being that those with higher education exhibit more
tolerant attitudes toward unconventional opinion.^ It
has
30
also been found that those with a technical education
usually express less interest in, and a more restrictive
view toward, civil liberties problems than those with a
"liberal" education. While the "Student Left" in both
the United States and Britain offers some obvious examples
that tolerance is not a necessary by-product of higher
education for all people, it would still seem that for
most a "liberal" education has "liberal" effects. It is
important to note, however, that the liberal reaction to
education is simply a shorthand equation for young people's
response to a wide array of stimuli, of which curricula
and exposure to norms of toleration are only a small part.
Even with the Student Left the "tolerance for the uncon-
ventional" exists (sometimes to a point of total witless-
ness) . But the discovery of alternatives to parental
modes of thinking sometimes leads to unbounded feelings of
rectitude. Thus tolerance for the unconventional becomes
the same, for some, as intolerance and disdain for all
things conventional. This is different, analytically at
least, from an aversion to things new and different simply
because they are new. This is a contempt for the familiar
because it is familiar, and has probably always been a part
of the " intellegentsia's" desire for a belief system that
distinctly sets it apart from the common man. There has
always been a tension in intellectual communities between
the norms of toleration and the norms of rectitude. We
are viewing education as a horizontal factor which has
increased tolerance in both nations, and still does; but
it is equally important to realize that this relationship
is changing in both nations, perhaps more rapidly in the
United States, and, should rectitude prevail, education
may not be a factor increasing tolerance in the future.
Ecological Factors
Of much less certainty, but still a possible
horizontal influence on civil liberties, would be whether
a person lives in an urban or rural area. Some would
claim, for instance, that the very isolation of rural
groups creates greater ethnocentricism which, together
with less contact with ideological, ethnic and other forms
of conflict, creates a more restrictive view of legitimate
social conflict.^ Urbanization, on the other hand, is
usually thought to lead to the development of less restric
tive norms about legitimate conflict because conflict is
more an accepted part of life than in a rural environment.
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While the impersonality which some feel characterizes
urban life could conceivably cause frustration which in
turn could increase conflict, this increase in
"differences," whatever their source, leads to rules about
interaction. According to Gerhard Lenski, for example,
attitudes of tolerance and secularism "inevitably arise in
urban situations," because of the close association which
necessitates cooperation. "Eventually what began as a
modus Vivendi or temporary arrangement for specific situa-
tions," says Lenski, 'becomes generalized into a basic
value applicable to all kinds of situations. ..."
Economic Factors
Closely allied with, but ultimately not the same
as, an educational index is a person's economic position.
Economic standing, or at least an individual's perception
of his economic and social standing, have been shown to
have an influence on attitudes toward individual liberty.
Speaking on the phenomenon of "working-class" authori-
tarianism, Seymour Lipset claims:
The poorer strata everywhere are more liberal or
leftist on economic issues; they favor more
welfare state measures, higher wages, graduated
income taxes, support of trade unions, and so forth.
But when liberalism is defined in non-economic
terms—as support of civil liberties, inter-
nationalism, etc. T-the correlation is reversed.
The TOOre well-to-do are more liberal, the
poorer are more intolerant.^
Contemporary student movements, both black and white, are
of course strewn with examples of upper-middle class
activism and intolerance. The upperclass has always been
a spawning ground for "noblesse oblige" radicalism as
well as liberalism, and while there may be evidence showing
that such radicalism is more strident, it would be diffi-
cult to establish that it is more frequent than in the
past. Even if upperclass rectitude is on the increase,
this does not destroy the utility of Lipset's notion of
working class authoritarianism, it simply establishes
that there can be more than one source of "ego insecurity,"
i.e., being young and from a "successful" family. The
qualifications that the "Student Left" forces on Lipset's
explanation, while not destroying it, do demonstrate that
the relationship between any given value and a given socio-
economic status are determinations made at a particular
point in time and are therefore subject to change. What
Lipset succeeds in doing is showing a difference in
response based on class. Such a difference need not con-
tinue until the end of time, nor, more importantly, need
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the content of that difference remain the same, especially
since a sense of class distinction is in part a recogni-
tion of different attitudes. Attitudes which demonstrate
that one belongs to the better portion of society may in
time include a claim to understand the "Third World"
better than others. Our only point is that it is not the
case yet, and that for purposes of cross-national analysis
one can expect libertarian attitudes to correspond to
higher socio-economic status.
These intolerant attitudes are not only the pro-
duct of low income and the lack of education, but also,
according to Lipset, are reflections of "lower-class
perceptions of reality."
. . . emphasis on the immediately perceivable
and concern with the personal and concrete is
part and parcel of the short time perspective
and the inability to perceive the complex possi-
bilities and consequences of actions which often
result in a general readiness to support
extremist political and religious movements, and
a generally lower level of liberalism on non-
economic questions.^
Political ideology, in the sense of a rigid devotion to a
rather narrow political credo as well as extreme religious
fervor, is construed by Lipset as a product of this
working class mentality and the "ego insecurity" that makes
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members of lower economic groups "over-react" to
intellectual abstractions.
A British psychologist, H. J. Eysenck, found
significant relationships between those who were "tough-
minded" and those who were "tender-minded" in general
social outlook and their economic background. The group
Eysenck classified as "tough-minded" tended to be intolerant
of deviations from the standard moral or religious codes,
to be anti-Negro, anti-Semitic, and xenophobic? while the
"tender-minded" were tolerant of deviation, unprejudiced,
and Internationalistic in outlook. Eysenck, who did this
study in the context of political party identification,
found the correlation to be that middle class Conservatives,
Labourites, and Liberals tended to be more "tender-minded"
than their working class counterparts inside their own
party.
^
Similarly, a Gallup Poll index of anti-Semitism
in Britain revealed ant i-Jewish sentiment to be highest
among those who identified with the Labour Party, lowest
among those who identified with the Liberal party, with
the Conservatives falling in between, but with considerably
less anti-Semitic sentiment than the Labour. Almost all
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Jewish members of Parliament are, however, in the Labour
Party, and are supported by constituencies which are not
predominantly Jewish, which would seem to imply that the
leadership of the Labour party and the ideology of the
Labour Party are egalitarian in sentiment and hence there
is more mobility for Jewish politicians. The polling of
the ant i-Jewish sentiment of the rank and file of the
Labour Party would seem to demonstrate that working class
ethnocentric ism is not simply a product of one country or
culture, but can be found among people of similar economic
and social backgrounds in all count ires and cultures.
Religious Factors
Although religion as a factor which influences
civil liberties is probably more conditioned by its parti-
cular cultural environment than any of the other "horizontal
factors" mentioned so far, there have been suggestions
from some scholars, such as Lipset, that all things such
as social and economic class being equal, religious belief
can be a variable which influences attitudes toward civil
liberties. Given the same middle class environment, for
instance, Protestants tend to take a more libertarian view
toward dissent and free speech than do Catholics; and
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Catholics, generally speaking, take a more libertarian
attitude toward race relations than do Protestants. One
of the explanations for this can be found in the
"Weltanschauung" of these religions. Lipset notes that
the absolutism of the Catholic church on matters of faith
and morals and such doctrines as the infallibility of the
Pope could make Catholics more conscious of "heresy," and
thus lead them to view unorthodox speech with more disdain
than Protestants. On the other hand, the implicit
"universalism" of Catholicism may perhaps make Catholics
less conscious of "race" than Protestants. Protestants,
perhaps because of their development as religious "sects,"
tend to be dissenting but also "exclusive" in social out-
look. This relationship between a non-exclusive view of
the world and racial attitudes is so enmeshed with class,
religion, and other social variables as to be almost
impossible to substantiate. The relationship is probably
less one of the particular religious doctrine and more of
the individual's relationship to his religious group. The
more highly involved an individual is in his church, for
example, the more likely he is to favor integration, and
the more a person is involved in his subcomraunity the more
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likely he is to favor segregation. Communal involvement,
according to Gerhard Lenski, seems to stimulate a "provin-
cial" response—that is, one which indicates a lack of con-
cern with problems with groups other than one's own.^
The relationship between certain religions and
civil liberties is, however, more pronounced, in fact, in
a doctrinal sense, it is only on the subject of the Bill
of Rights in the United States that there seems to be a
relationship between religious "liberalism" in the sense
of doctrinal heterodoxy and political liberalism. After
noting the distinct lack of any connection between liberal
creeds and liberality in foreign policy, race relations,
or welfare policy, Lenski says, "The one exception to this
general pattern occurs on the issue of free speech. Here
there appears to be a modest relationship between poli-
tical liberalism and religious liberalism.
"
Lenski found that in the United States Catholic
involvement in both the church and the subcomraunity was
linked with a very restrictive interpretation of the prin-
ciple of freedom of speech. On each of four questions
dealing with criticism of presidential actions, speeches
attacking religion, and speeches espousing Fascism or
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Communism, these Catholics who were "more active in their
church more often expressed doubt that the Bill of Rights
permits these actions than did marginal members of the
group. "^^ Similarly those who were more involved in the
Catholic subcommunity (the less devout) were in favor of a
more strict interpretation of the Bill of Rights more often
than "those who had more extensive primary relations with
. .
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members of other subcommunities . " Among Protestants
there was a more liberal interpretation of the Bill of
Rights which was strengthened by the involvement of the
13
person in the subcommunity.
In both the United States and Britain there seems
to be a relationship between "religious orthodoxy" and
conservative political attitudes, especially on racial
segregation.^^ The "devout," according to Lenski, think
in terms of the "oneness of life" and therefore apply
religious values to contemporary problems? the "orthodox"
on the other hand create a "compartmentalized type of
belief" where religion doesn't get confused with the non-
15
spiritual world.
Lenski also found Jews to be the most consistently
"liberal" in political attitudes on foreign policy, civil
liberties, economics and race relations, and it would
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seem that this also is probably a horizontal factor opera-
ting in varying degrees regardless of the particular system
and culture.
Liberty as a
Constitutional
Guarantee
The constitutions of the United States and Great
Britain are usually cited as classic examples of two
archetypes: constitutions which outline basic political
principles that define the locus, distribution, and legi-
timate use of political power in a written document; and
those which achieve the same ends byzielying on customs and
precedents. Such a distinction is easily exaggerated
since the American Constitution, for all except the most
literal, is an evolving set of judicial interpretations,
customs, and precedents. But since the British Constitution
consists of historic charters, judicial decisions. Acts
of parliament, common law, social convention, established
custom, and just plain quirks of the 900 years of Anglo-
Saxon experience, the constitutional protection of liberty
becomes, theoretically, more complex; and institutionally
enumerating the constitutional protections to civil liberty
becomes more difficult than with the American Constitution.
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The British Constitution, frequently called "flexible"
when compared to the "rigid" American Constitution, is
committed to the protection of individual liberty, but
such a commitment goes through an endless maze of subtle-
ties before it emerges in practice.
In the ultimate sense the notion of individual
17
liberty emerges in both Great Britain and the United
States as a corollary to the notion that governmental
power should be in some sense limited. In America, with
the ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791, part of
the written constitution of the land became a list of
things the federal government could not do. This list,
phrased as a set of immunities held by citizens against
political power, contained very similar phraseology to the
English Bill of Rights of 1688, but the common vernacular
tends, according to John A. Krout, to obscure the fact
that the two documents rest upon somewhat different
assumptions.
Both to be sure are concerned with specific
potential threats to human liberty and with the
practical means of thwarting them. For the
English, however, the source of danger was the
unrestrained prerogative of the Crown; and the
defense was sought in the power exercised by a
majority in parliament. For Americans, the
danger seemed to lie in the will of the majority,
as expressed through its representatives in
Congress assembled. ^8
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Because the defense of liberty was viewed as more
complicated in America, institutional protection became
more complicated. The Bill of Rights, the federal system,
and separation of powers can all be interpreted as devices
to hinder government, be it democratic or autocratic;
this is why the American Bill of Rights often appears as
an exercise in "constitutional negativism."
American constitutional framers felt it necessary
to institutionalize conflict so that power could not be
used arbitraurily, and in the process seemed to assume that
the polar opposite of arbitrary power was a fragmented
political system which made the execution of any type of
power difficult.
The liberties of English citizens, on the other
hand, developed not from a concentration on the locus of
power, but from the organized administration of that power.
The long historical process of imposing a certain routine
on subjects, which the monarch called law, was also to act
as an eventual check on the monarchy itself. About this
subtle process of the routinization of power, Jhering was
to say.
Form is the sworn enemy of caprice, the twin sister
of liberty. . . . Fixed forms are the school of
discipline and order, and thereby liberty itself.
43
It was the imposition of such form upon the ministers of
the crown and finally upon the Crown that was to establish
the supremacy of law—the most important ingredient in the
English "Constitution."^^
Constitutional commands in the United States cer-
tainly incorporate the general assumption that what is not
declared illegal is legal, but much of the constitutional
dialogue as well as the specific language of the constitu-
tion is concerned with ascertaining whether or not a citizen
has a "right" as constitutionally enumerated or understood.
In Britain, on the other hand, defense of liberty stems
from the principle that while no law guarantees the
liberty to write or print what one likes, it is assumed
that what is not specifically proscribed is permitted.
Lord Halsbury once used such a principle as the touchstone
of English Constitutionalism:
The so-called liberties of the subject are really
implications drawn from the two principles that the
subject may say or do what he pleases, provided
that he does not transgress the substantive law, or
infringe the legal rights of others, whereas public
authorities (including the Crown) may do nothing but
what they are authorized to do by some rule of
common law or statute. Where public authorities are
not authorized to interfere with the subject, he has
liberties. 2^
For Halsbury, a British subject could not possess
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••guaranteed" rights such as those enumerated in the written
Constitution of the U. S. because the ultimate principle
of the British Constitution is that Parliament is sovereign
But, "It is well understood that certain liberties are
highly prized by the people, and that in consequence
parliament is unlikely, except in emergencies, to pass
legislation constituting a serious interference with them."
As inviolate as the principle that Parliament is
sovereign is another fundaunental principle of British
constitutionalism—the rule of law. While not defined by
statute, it is recognized by Crown, Parliament and the
courts as a pervading principle of the Constitution.
A. V. Dicey, the most distinguished commentator on the
British Constitution, has claimed that the rule of law
means that no arbitrary power is legitimate, that every
man regardless of rank is subject to the law, and that
24
individual rights of the common law must be protected.
English constitutional ideas always opposed the
Continental and American propensity for written elabora-
tions as mere "paper affirmations." The liberties of
Englishmen were viewed as common law liberties that
resulted as the natural consequences of ordinary decisions
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25in ordinary courts. As such, English liberties are
clearly subject to abridgement by parliamentary actions,
but more recent scholastic interpretations of the English
Constitution place much less emphasis on common law basis
of liberties.
Goodhart claims, for instance, that, "... under
the unwritten constitution there are certain established
principles which limit the scope of Parliament. "^^
It is true that the courts cannot enforce these
principles as they can under the Federal system
in the United States, but this does not mean that
these principles are any the less binding and
effective. For that matter some of them receive
greater protection today in England than they do
in the United States.
This view of the Constitution almost imposes a "natural
law' over statutory law, common law and equity, but that
is perhaps what most constitutional scholars do when
trying to explain the "essence" of the constitutional
system. When Lord Justice Denning of the English Court
of Appeals described "the spirit of the British Constitution,"
he said it rests upon three main "instincts." First,
there is the "instinct for justice," by which he means an
independent judiciary. Secondly, there exists an "instinct
for liberty," which consists of commitment to freedom of
discussion and association. What Denning labels as the
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third "instinct" of British constitutionalism is a
qualification which pulls the first two instincts down
from the realm of pure abstraction—the "practical
instinct which leads to the balancing of 'rights' with
•duties, • powers with safeguards, so that neither rights
28
nor powers shall be exceeded or abused." "Throughout
all this," says Denning, "runs the Christian instinct and
with it a sense of the supreme importance of the individual
and refusal to allow his personality to be submerged in
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an omnipotent State." This seems to be another way of
saying that power must be exercised in a reasonable
manner, and that part of the definition of "reasonable"
is that proper consideration is given to the individual
interest as opposed to collective interest.
In the final analysis, English law and the
Constitution fall back on an appeal to the common sense
of the people and the "reasonableness" of governmental
action. Rights emerge from the British Constitution as
the consensus of what is reasonable in the situation.
Michael Stewart says.
In a trial, the prisoner's guilt must be proved
•beyond a reasonable doubt? • it is illegal to say
in public things so provocative that a 'reasonable'
man may fear they will cause a disturbance. To
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translate this idea into law such as courts can
declare and citizens obey is not easy and the
Constitution often appears a tangled maze; but
the clue to it is the idea of reasonableness
.
The written American Constitution is much more a
document outlining jurisdiction, rather than assessments
of "reasonableness per se. Even though doctrines ra2iking
use of the "reasonableness" rule are frequently used to
determine the judicial presumption of constitutionality
or unconstitutionality, American judges have tended to
view the Constitution as grants and restraints on politi-
cal power. The American Constitution is primarily con-
cerned with whether government should be given particular
powers. The English constitution, being much more inexact
and pliable, is concerned more with the way in which
power is used than the existence of that power.
Separation of Powers
and the Judicial Role
Some writers, such as Labor's Michael Stewart, who
has experience with the British system both as a political
analyst and practicing politician, claim that the ultimate
defense for British liberty lies in the separation of
powers in the organization of a government itself. Legis-
lative, executive, and judicial functions, while certainly
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less distinct than in the United States are still clear
enough to create checks on power. The development of dis-
ciplined parties means that the separation between legis-
lature and executive has been, in terms of ultimate power,
bridged; but, as Stewart reminds us, "the bridge rests on
good relations between the Government and the majority in
31Parliament." As such, "Separation of these two powers. . . .
is no longer a permanent principle of the Constitution;
it is a possibility, kept in the background and available
for use against a Government which fails to recognize the
Sovereignty of Parliament.
"
Separation of the judiciary from the other
branches of government is wider and more obvious, but
still not complete. Since the seventeenth century judges
cannot be removed by the government of the day in England
and can pass down rulings which block governmental action
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without the threat of immediate removal. But the head
of the judiciary, the Lord Chancellor, as a cabinet
minister belongs to both the executive and the legislature.
The United States Supreme Court, for example, can exercise
the power of judicial review anddeclare an Act of Congress
or a state or municipal statute "unconstitutional." No
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British court can so boldly overrule a legislature. How
then does something become unconstitutional? if, for
example, the Prime Minister compelled a judge to resign,
such an action would be "unconstitutional" because it is
proscribed by the Act of Settlement. To this extent the
British usage is no different than the American usage of
the term "unconstitutional" would be if the executive
branch violated the form enumerated in the U. S.
Constitution by not having judicial appointments approved
by the Senate. If in Britain, however. Parliament chose
to dispose of the Act of Settlement, it could do so, and
the Prime Minister's action would then be constitutional,
whereas the constitutional procedures cannot be so
easily rearranged in the United States.
An act of Parliament can be unconstitutional in
two different ways. The first is by open declaration of
the people that such action goes against their wishes
because "... the one really important part of the
unwritten Constitution (is) . . . the assumption that the
purpose of the Constitution is to give effect to the will
of the peoples democracy is the unwritten basis of the
34Const itut ion .
"
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The second way an act of Parliament becomes
"unconstitutional" is more indirect, but more often used.
Even though the courts cannot strike an act of Parliament
as unconstitutional on its face (a power which while
spectacular is not even used too frequently in the United
States)
,
it can discover that the application of the law
contravenes "natural justice."
Since Parliament legally can do no wrong, it is
only good sense for the British to assume that if a
"wrong" results from an act of Parliament, the act must
have been misunderstood by those who applied it. Because
Parliament can do no wrong it is only logical that they
would not offend natural justice. The concept of "natural
justice" has been used in such a way as to achieve some of
the same results that are achieved by the Bill of Rights
in the United States. As A. L. Goodhart explains.
What parliament says is binding on all judges,
and there is nothing more to be said about it.
Judges, however, usually manage to get their own
way. ... By a convenient fiction it assumes
that parliament always intends that its statutes
will accord with natural justice; no statute will
therefore be construed to be retrospective or to
deprive a person of a fair hearing or to prevent
freedom of speech unless Parliament has so pro-
vided in the most specific terms.
Generally speaking, the concept of natural justice has been
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applied by the courts in Britain to insure that in
administrative conflicts, the subject is given a fair
hearing, or in criminal cases that the defendant receive
a fair trial. "In many ways," says David Fellman, "the
concept of natural justice is comparable to the American
37doctrine of due process of law."
The necessity of courts to interpret statutes and
the application of the concept "natural justice," along
with the courts' control and interpretation of common law
rules, create in England a type of de facto judicial review.
Edward McWhinney makes a distinction between 'direct
judicial review" and its "concomitant, the presence of a
rigid constitution changeable only by some extraordinary
process," and "indirect judicial review" or what is some-
times known as "judicial braking," which characterize
countrias with, "... flexible, uncontrolled constitu-
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tions like the United Kingdom. ..." English law
appears almost irrevocably "positivist" in the sense that
parliament is sovereign, and courts cannot overrule any
statute on its face, judicial discretion is further
checked by the mechanics of stare decisis . However, the
nature of the judicial function itself creates, if judges
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are sufficiently imaginative, a role in expounding the
fundamental principles of a society. The English judicial
attitude on the binding force of precedents is more
stringent than in the United States; until 1966, the
House of Lords was bound by its own decisions. But, as
McWhinney has noted, even before the Law Lords declared
that too rigid adherence to precedent could lead to
39Injustice, "... the House of Lords itself had
developed to such a fine art the practice of "distinguishing"
as distinct from overruling, prior decisions, as to make
the limits of this rule rather amorphous in practice.
The nature and scope of judicial power is certainly
augmented by the acceptance of judicial review in the
United States. But in a sense, even though it arose out
of judicial interpretation, it remains only a tradition
specifying the locus of power; not the use of that power.
The essential point for the legal protection of basic
liberties has less to do with the formal power to nullify
legislation than with the ability to censure, if only by
implication, the existing political authority. As
McWhinney states,
... it may not always, in terms of end result,
matter too much whether or not a power of direct
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judicial review exists under a given constitution,
so long, at any rate, as the courts are conscious
of the possibilities of requiring legislative
majorities to give second thoughts to legislation
by harsh judicial construction in the process of
statutory interpretation.'*^
Legal and Social
Pluralism
The effect of such things as homogeneity and
cultural pluralism on civil liberties attitudes is a
subject about which there is little agreement. For
instance, in a country like Britain, where political
leadership generally tends to have a higher educational
level than political leadership in the United States, we
might perhaps expect a more favorable climate for the
civil liberties tradition, since there is a correlation
between education and libertarian attitudes, and in
Britain "deference" would be to this educated elite, or,
to phrase it differently, if "democracy" in Britain is
construed as less a matter of "mandate" than it is in the
United States, we might find more protection of individual
rights, since frequently such rights conflict with the
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"populist" demands of the community.
While "homogeneity" is certainly a relative terra
which can have little meaning unless it is used with a
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comparative referent, England is a more homogeneous
culture than the United States. This homogeneity has per-
haps been over-used as a factor to explain all of those
phenomena which are indigenously English, which frequently
means the degree of English homogeneity is overstated.
But England, excluding Scotland and Northern Ireland which
are not part of this analysis, is a territory about the
size of New York State and as such has much less cultural
diversity than the United States. Even if one underscores
that ancient antagonism between Welshmen and Englishmen
and the contemporary intensity of Welsh nationalism,
England has not had two factors which are usually used as
the base definition of a pluralistic culture; significant
differences in religion and color. Economic situations
in the Commonwealth since World War II have of course
created an increase in racial and religious differences
along with increased consciousness and reaction to "color."
Immigrants from the West Indies and the Indian subcontinent
brought England's non-white population to 800,000 in 1965,
and with an alleged high birth rate projections indicate a
non-white population of well over a million. Restriction
to immigration, competition for jobs and housing have of
course created white reactions, but the English reaction to
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color is in many ways a reflection of its homogeneity.
The non-white population is still only about two percent
of the total population, and the reaction, including race
riots as intense, if not as large, as any in the United
States, can be viewed as a homogeneous culture reacting to
"differences." Even as a culture defined by a common
language, England is much more homogeneous than the United
States, and this, together with the fact of a long common
historical experience and centralization of political
power, makes English society an insular archtype when
compared with the American "melting pot."
Lipset has remarked on the phenomenon of a homo-
geneous culture's ability to accommodate peaceful political
change within the context of its existing institutions.
In noting the importance of historical continuity, Lipset
observes that 10 out of 13 nations which he would label
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"stable democracies" developed as constitutional monarchies.
Others make the argument that a homogeneous culture creates
a type of "psychic security" which enables people to be
less concerned with diversion from cultural norms. This
could be offered as a partial explanation, for instance, of
why there apparently has been more of a conception of
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"un-American- than the notion of "un-British" (if we
leave out color)
.
American ethnic pluralism, some would
maintain, has enabled deraogogues to define "American" as
a belief system, or ideology, rather than a network of
historical experiences common to the entire racial and
religious group, and immigrant groups have responded by
"over-identifying" with this ideological construction of
nationalism. From this point of view, cultural pluralism
because of its divisive effect tends to create a hostile
environment for ideological conflicts and hence a hostile
environment for civil liberties.
Other scholars, such as Carl Friedrich, claim that
a homogeneous culture helps to create an authoritarian
44
outlook. While a society of any significant size
probably could not be authoritarian simply because of its
homogeneity, some argue that homogeneity is related to
intolerance. The argument is that a pluralistic society
has a functional need for tolerance, whereas such an
attitude is not necessary in a group with a great deal of
homogeneity. The diverse ethnic groups in the United
States, so the argument goes, may not "like" each other,
but the necessities of day-to-day living demand that they
57
cooperate, a plurality of groups and interests can help
to instill a spirit of compromise in a political culture
that may otherwise be lacking. Tolerance, in this type
of situation, comes not from a belief system, but from
the mere fact of physical proximity, and the functional
necessity for groups to cooperate on certain levels. An
example of this type of "functional tolerance," even though
there may be a great deal of verbally expressed ethno-
centricism, would be the lack of an established church in
the United States, which some scholars maintain is not due
to the lack of sentiment on the part of the founding
fathers for a national religion, but rather the fact that
there were numerous rival religious sects that wished to
be the established church, and the functional solution to
the problem was to have none. This view of homogeneity
implies that a political culture with a great deal of
fundamental consensus can create a hostile environment for
the civil liberties tradition, and that ultimately a cul-
ture which experiences group conflict is more "tolerant"
than one which has limited exposure to cultural diversity.
From this perspective, pluralism enhances civil liberties
because it structures and institutionalizes social conflict.
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The existence of a federal system in the United
States is perhaps the single greatest institutional
reflection of American pluralism, and the existence of the
51 interconnecting legal and administrative networks that
characterize government in America has perhaps had great
effect on stability, but has not historically been advan-
tageous to the application of libertarian principles. The
statutes we shall be analyzing in reference to sedition
and obscenity have a more universal application in Britain
than in the United States. Sedition and obscenity statu-
tes exist in almost all of the separate states and are
usually framed and applied in a more restrictive manner
than federal approaches to these problems.
The pluralistic character of American law is pri-
marily due to the division of political power on the basis
of geography, a system which was adopted out of the fear of
centralized authority exemplified by the English monarchy,
and out of the necessities of compromise among the thirteen
colonies. It was also due in some measure to the original
colonial status of America and the legal pluralism of
Great Britain.
Mark De Wolfe Howe, speaking of the "pluralistic
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character of the lav/s of England," says that even though
Lord Mansfield was to utter from the King's Bench in
1772 that, "The state of slavery is so odious, that
nothing can be suffered to support it, but positive law,"
imperial Britain was quite willing to encourage slave
trade between Africa and her American plantations. English
courts found that although the "... common law of
England and the law of nature condemn slavery, positive
law and the law of nations sustain it.""*^
This pluralistic inheritance has, i believe, a
greater significance in American constitutional
history than has commonly been recognized.
. , .
What the Nation needed . . . was what the Nation
inherited—a tolerance sufficiently generous to
allow slavery in the South and permit abolition
in the North.
For Howe the essential fact of legality in the United States
is that it contains only those elements provided by the
Constitution and by the statutes enacted by Congress,
which before the Civil War preserved a "deep and silent
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neutrality with respect to slavery." The refusal of
English judges to apply common law to British colonies,
and the American federal system, combined to deny, according
to Howe, federal judges the capacity of curcumventing
slavery by applying the common law. The effect of the
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"pluralisnv" which is partly the result of the federal
system and partly of the English assumption that common
law applied only to England, was to remove the national
government from crucial struggles over rights.
This Nation's commitment to silence on the largest
issue that confronted the American people was at
once a distinctive and a startling contribution to
the art of government. Though war, constitutional
amendments, and economic revolution have vastly
altered the structure and the content of American
law, the old commitment to national silence and
national disability still serves to make American
federalism a significant impediment to the ful-
fillment of civil rights.^®
As large an impediment to the application of the
Bill of Rights as federalism was and perhaps still is in
th« United States, it must yet be understood that it is
also the existence of a federal system that has given the
federal judiciary such an important role in the govern-
mental process. Generally speaking the Supreme Court has
enunciated a pro-nationalist sentiment with regard to
states, and has construed the Constitution as a compact
between the federal government and the people of the nation,
rather than a simple agreement among the several states
and the national government. In the process of enunciating
a nationalist conception of the Constitution, the Supreme
Court also carved out a unique role for itself in the
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political process. Federalism, checks and balances and
the separation of powers, and the other divisive struc-
tures so popular with the architects of the American
Constitution, were attempts to keep power responsible by
keeping it divided and in conflict. But such division
and the conflict that such divisions are supposed to
engender necessitate an arbiter, and in the United States
this role of arbiter of the federal system was played by
49the federal judiciary. And it is the power of the
Supreme Court, and the judiciary in general in the United
States, which has played a crucial role not only in the
search for doctrines to solve problems in a libertarian
manner but also as a great vehicle for "popularizing"
debate over civil liberties questions. The potential that
a written bill of rights had for the political education
and socialization of the people was one of the arguments
Jefferson used to support the inclusion of the first ten
amendments, and Jefferson's prophecy had great merit,
because the Bill of Rights became a convenient decalogue
that could be at least recited in American schoolrooms.
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Conceptions of Authority
in Two Polities
Deferential Polity
By way of contrasting and summarizing all of the
discrepancies between the two systems that we have men-
tioned, the most all-inclusive difference between the two
systems is what could be called the conception of authority
in each society. We must be aware, of course, that when
we posit two different conceptions of authority in each
nation, we are creating artificial analytic categories
which like the categories "homogeneous" and "pluralistic"
cultures, are based on interpretations of past behavior,
and as such form 'frozen descriptions." in societies
where the rate of change at tiroes seems to outpace the
recognition of such change, such static pictures of the
nation have obvious disadvantages, but since our purpose
is not primarily to describe, but to discern the relation-
ship to civil liberties problems in both nations, we shall
have to be content with descriptions which seem to fit the
general time period of 1945 to 1968. The conceptions of
authority in particular are interpretations of broad
historical patterns and the differences we shall set in
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bold relief re™.i„ differences i„ degree ,„d emphasis
rather than kind.
L. S. Amery, for example, who has written on the
dual nature of perceptions of authority, distinguishes
between a British and a Continental view of representative
government. The Continental view, and for our purposes
the American view, conceives of political power as a dele-
gation from the individual citizen through the legislature
and an executive dependent upon the legislature, m
Britain, according to Amery, "Parliament is not, and never
has been, a legislature in the sense of a body specially
and primarily empowered to make laws."^° Parliament
has as its principal function the articulation of dissent
and opposition, and acts as a check upon government, but
does not itself govern. Harry Eckstein characterizes the
same phenomenon as the Englishman's "ambivalent" approach
to the democratic principle of mandate.
In most democratic countries the idea of repre-
sentative government, if not its practice, involves
a simple set of principles; ultimate authority lies
in popular will, which is expressed in the election
of candidates whose chief function is to enact the
policies for which they campaigned and to represent
the interests of their constituents, in Britain
the matter is much more complicated. British ideas
of representative government stress not only the
derivative character of political authority (i.e.,
that authority lies in popular will) but also its
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independent character (I.e., that authority
is exercised over, or regardless of, popular
will)
. These two ideas are of course incon-
sistent, but the British believe in both
nevertheless; indeed this very want of logic
explains why their conception of authority,
democratic though it is, leaves such inordinately
great room for leadership. ^"^
This tendency of British public opinion to expect
their political leaders to " govern more than to
represent . . ." is phrased in a somewhat different ver-
nacular by Almond and Verba, who describe the syndrome of
British political attitudes as a "deferential civic
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culture." Both Britain and the United States are des-
cribed as having "civil cultures," meaning that partici-
pants are positively oriented to the political structure
and that there is a balance between participation and
obligation, but in Britain the balance is weighted
differently. According to these authors:
. . .
British political culture represents a(n)
effective combination of subject and participant
roles. . . the development of the participant
orientation in Britain did not challenge and
replace the more deferential subject orientations,
as was the tendency in the United States. Despite
the spread of political competence and participant
orientations, the British have maintained a strong
deference tg the independent authority of
government. ^
The causes of this deferential attitude are usually
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connected to the historical continuity of British poli-
tical institutions and the general cultural homogeneity
of British society, together with class stratification,
and an educational system which enhances aristocratic
deference.
Suspicious Polity
In contrast to the British attitude toward
authority, one could submit, Americans have historically
tended to be suspicious of government per se. American
preoccupation with the fragmentation of political power
in the form of federalism, separation of powers, checks
and balances and "state's rights,' reflect an essentially
negative or "suspicious* conception of authority on the
part of Americans. The historical conditions that engen-
dered this attitude are probably not similar enough to
European history to enable one to characterize this view
as Amery's "continental perception of authority," but an
attitude distinctly different from that of the British
emerges. This negative view of governmental authority is
partly a manifestation of the dominant ideology of the
United States and partly a reflection of the lack of
homogeneity in American culture. Laissez-faire liberalism.
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the Influence of Loclce, Jefferson, and so forth, plus the
fact that this industrial expansion could make use of an
ideology emphasizing individual rights against the state,
especially property rights, help to condition this nega-
tive view of authority. But a factor equally as important
as ideology was the fact that the divisive factors of
American society, such as regionalism, religion and
ethnic differentiation, necessitated diverse political
power because of the lack of consensus inherent in a
pluralistic society.
Almond and Verba note that American political
culture has a larger "participatory" component than almost
all other political cultures.
In the specific measures of subject competence
—
expectations of consideration by bureaucratic and
police authority—the Americans drop to third
place among our five countries, below Britain and
Germany. This cultural imbalance, we have
suggested, is a result of American historical
experience with governmental and bureaucratic
authority—an experience that began with distrust and
revolution against the British Crown, and that has
been consolidated by the American tendency to sub-
ject all governmental institutions, including the
judiciary and bureaucracy, to direct popular
control. ^
The eaaential ingredient for protection of individual
liberty is that power be exercised "responsibly." Responsi-
bility in a democratic state means two different, and
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sometimes, conflicting things. Responsible can mean
being accountable to the dominant sentiment of the
polity, or it can mean maintaining an open political
process in spite of the dominant sentiment of the polity.
Governmental control emerges as both a threat to liberty
and a protector of liberty. The political cultures of
Britain and the United States indicate two subtle, but
differing, "Gestalten" on the protection of individual
liberty, one emphasizing the "popular control" aspects of
the democratic formula, and at the same time attempting
to limit governmental jurisdiction; the other emphasizing
responsible leadership and an active role of government.
Both approaches can be constructive or destructive for
the libertarian tradition. The specific effect each has
on civil liberties conflicts will be our next concern as
we turn to the problem of seditious speech in both nations.
CHAPTER III
SEDITIOUS SPEECH IN GREAT BRITAIN
Seditious Libel
While words such as "treason" and "sedition" are
related and in many ways parallel concepts, sedition is
usually a more inclusive rubric designed to cover speech
which could have a treasonable effect if left unregulated.
"Ill opinions of the government" had always been a major
concern of the Crown, and the invention of printing,
while a technological advancement from some perspectives,
also magnified the problem of controlling hostile opinions
of the Crown, it was traditionally considered a royal
prerogative to approve or deny a license for the printing
of particular works. To publish works without an imprimatur
was a criminal offense under Henry Vlll, and under
Elizabeth an elaborate system of licensing acted as
effective prior restraint on publishing. Purely verbal
attacks on the Crown were dealt with under the category
"libel." The point of departure for the modern law of
criminal libel is Sir Edward Coke's report of a star
Chamber case of 1609 in which it was established that libel
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against a private person gains part of its justification
from the fact that such libel "provokes revenge and
therefore tends, however remotely, to a breach of the
peace. Since libel tends to a breach of the peace, a
libel against government is an even greater offense, "for
it concerns ... the scandal of government ^ Subsequent
common-law courts developed seditious libel, along with
blasphemous, obscene, and private libel, into a far-
reaching restraint on free expression. Seditious libel
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries became a
major instrument for controlling the press. ^ in 1704 in
the famous Tuchin'a case Chief Justice Holt underscored
the necessity of the concept of seditious libel by
asserting that if people cannot be called to account for
possessing ill opinions of the government "... no
4government can subsist."
Until the eighteenth century, however, the
difference between "treason" and "seditious libel" connoted
only the degree of punishment the Crown wished for a
hostile speaker. Since by Statute 25 Edward ill (1352)
part of the definition of treason was "compassing or
5imagining the King's death," a person who printed a book
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which endorsed the right of revolution, as did William
Twyn in 1663, could be sentenced for treason rather than
seditious libel because the scope of his attack on the
Crovm went beyond mere "scandal" of government.^ After
1720, however, the idea of treason as a crime unconnected
with some overt act beyond mere words died out.^ Fredrick
Seaton Siebert suggests that the government found the law
of treason too limited as well as too cumbersome to con-
trol the state of public opinion during the succession
Q
crisis preceding the Hanoverian line. Seditious libel,
while a less spectacular charge than treason, had the
benefit of being easier to justify because of less severe
punishment. It was also easier to get convictions because
the King's Bench limited juries to simple findings as to
authorship or printing, with the decision of whether a
given article or utterance constituted libel reserved for
the bench as a "matter of law." As the center of political
gravity shifted away from the monarch and to Parliament,
the latter developed techniques to protect itself from
criticism and to take appropriate action without recourse
to the courts. A "breach of the privilege of Parliament,"
in addition to preventing unauthorized reports of its own
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proceedings, was Parliament's device to prohibit personal
libel on a member, bad reflections on Parliament in
general, reflections on the government including asper-
sions on the King and his ministers, as well as certain
types of obscenity and blasphemy. While breaches of
privilege were frequently used by members of one House to
punish members of the other House, the largest number of
prosecutions by the House of Commons involved newspaper
publishers, printers, etc., who were charged with creating
"aspersions on the King," and there was little difference
between the House's concept of a "bad reflection on
government" and the common-law definition of seditious
libel.
A long series of libel prosecutions, with con-
victions made easy by the requirement that juries establish
only publication, resulted in Fox's Libel Act in 1792, which
allowed the jury to decide if the sentiment expressed con-
stituted libel. Juries sometimes broke the chain of dis-
tinctions which shackled them to facta of publication
even before this Act. In a 1744 prosecution of a printer
named Miller, for example, the government sought punishment
for an offensive letter which appeared in a newspaper.
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parliament had been unable, for technical reasons, to
proceed against the author of the letter or the publisher
of the newspaper, and so turned to the printer. After
being fined and imprisoned for two months by Parliament,
Miller was charged with "seditious libel," and the jury
was instructed to decide only if Miller had printed the
letter. This fact was openly admitted by Miller, but the
jury found him "not guilty" of printing the letter.
It is interesting to note that as authority
became more democratic, the concept of "sedition" became
less "personalized"
—that is, less an attempt to blunt
criticism of, first the Crown, then Parliament—and became
more an offense against the general public. The Libel
Act of 1792 defined sedition as any intent to incite
disaffection against the Crown, the Government, the Church,
or to "incite feelings of will will and hostility between
different classes.
. .
." This newer formulation of sedition
was narrower to the extent that the charge must pivot on
the concept "intent to incite," but broader because it
sought to prevent the causing of "ill will" among non-
governmental groups in society, in 1866 a group of
socialists were prosecuted for seditious libel because
73
their particular message was intended to excite hostility
between classes. The jury, however, refused to return a
guilty verdict.
Sedition and seditious libel gradually became
less a companion charge to treason and more directed
toward incitement to riot and what in the United States
would be called "group libel.- Since World war li the
specific phrases "sedition" or "seditious libel" do not
appear as frequent charges, in 1947 an editor named
Caunt was charged with seditious libel after he wrote
articles assailing British Jews for sympathy with
Palestinian Jews. Justice Birkett told the jury in this
case that it was their burden to decide whether the articles
had the effect, or if Caunt had the intention, of pro-
moting "... violence and hostility between Jew and
12
non-Jew." The jury acquitted Caunt.
In 1954 the phrase "sedition" was involved in an
appeal before the Judicial Committee of the privy Council.
Ebenezer Theodore Joshua was charged on two counts of
sedition and one count of public mischief following a
speech he gave in November of that year in the colony of
Saint Vincent. (This committee has appellate jurisdiction
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in cases coining from the colonies, and in this case they
were reviewing a judgment of the Court of Appeal of the
Windward island, and the Leeward Islands in the Saint
Vincent circuit.) Joshua, in his speech, allegedly stated
that the police were scheming politically and storing up
an arsenal at headquarters in order to " . . . shoot down
people when they decide to fight for their rights.
Evidence was also given at the trial that there was no
truth to the allegation that the police were storing up
arms.
On the specific charges of sedition the jury
failed to agree on the first count and Joshua was acquitted
on the second, on the charge of creating a public mis-
chief, however, the trial judge directed the jury that
they must as a matter of law find the appellant guilty of
the offense if they found that he spoke the words com-
plained of by the authorities. The authorities argued
that Joshua did, by means of certain false statements in
* public speech, "agitate and excite certain section (sic)
of the public against the police, to the prejudice and
expense of the community.
"
Joshua's counsel argued that comments about public
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officials, even if they are police, could not be said to
create a public mischief. The record indicated no action
taken by Joshua or anyone else against the police or any
other individuals. The judges in the Court of Appeal,
in reviewing the case, cited much common law precedent,
however, to the effect that offenses which tend to pre-
judice or which cause "expense to the public" justify
charges of the common law misdemeanor of causing a public
mischief. These judges also reasoned that it was
"
. . .
settled law that the question whether an act
might tend to the public mischief was for the judge, and
not an issue of fact on which evidence might be given. "^^
The Court of Appeals also held that no evidence of
"expense to the community" was necessary because the
offense could be constituted either by prejudice or by
expense. In this case the word expense in the charge was
simply superfluous, and the heart of the offense was the
"prejudice" Joshua created against the police.
In reviewing this appeal the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council, in an opinion by Lord oaksey, with the
concurrence of Lord Keith and Sir deSilva, side-stepped
the question of whether, apart from cases of conspiracy.
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there is any common law offense of effecting a public
mischief. This was an issue on which there was much con-
flicting judicial opinion, but Lord oaksey. felt the appeal
could be disposed of without reaching this general issue.
Their Lordships chose instead to reverse the Court of
Appeals on three less abstract grounds.
First, even assuming that the crime of public
mischief exists, Oaksey stated that it is the jury's
function to decide whether simple facts about words spoken
constituted the offense. While it is a general principle
of British law that in a trial by jury the judge's role
consists of directing the jury on matters of law, and the
jury's role is to judge the facts, the Court of Appeal
construed "fact" incorrectly. There are, the Committee
held, simple facts such as whether Joshua did say the words
in question, but there are also more complex "facts" as
to whether the simple facts constitute the crime alleged.
It was a misdirection to tell the jury they roust convict
if they found the defendant had spoken the words alleged
and the Committee held such directions to " . . . usurp
17the function of the jury."
Lord oaksey claimed that a second ground for
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reversal was the use of the charge of effecting a public
mischief along with charges of sedition with respect to
the same speech. Oalcsey suspected that the "mischief"
charge was not substantively different from the sedition
charges, except that conviction was guaranteed as long as
the trial judge held as a matter of law that Joshua's
speech was an offense. Acquittal on the sedition charges
should have also brought acquittal on the "mischief"
charge, according to Lord oalcsey, because the result is
that "the jury found the appellant not guilty of sedition
but guilty of effecting a public mischief by malcing a
speech the mischief of which was allegedly seditious in
nature .
"
A third ground for reversal was that when an
indictment charges that a person "agitated" certain
sections of the public, the jury must be presented with
evidence that agitation existed. Since the prosecution
offered no evidence that the public was agitated or
excited by Joshua's speech, the indictment could fall,
according to Lord oaksey, simply on grounds of insufficient
evidence
.
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is, of
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course, endowed with great latitude when construing the
common law. Even though, in this case, it retreated
from any statements about the offense, it did lay down a
rule which could only have more libertarian consequences
by insisting that the jury decide the question of public
mischief on the basis of evidence that there was in fact
some agitation of the public.
The words "sedition" and "seditious libel" have
not appeared in other cases since 1945, but this by no
means should suggest that the conduct which the govern-
ment sought to punish with such concepts has gone untouched.
Sedition, both in the sense of incitement to illegal
action and as "group libel," is spread throughout many
statutory provisions. The attempt of government to con-
trol speech which could possibly inflame certain subjects
of the realm and thereby breach the peace, which is at
the heart of the rationale for "seditious libel," has
been given renewed sanctity.
The Public Order Acts
The Public Order Act of 1936, with its prohibition
of the wearing of political uniforms and "the
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militarization of politics," was aimed expressly at Sir
Oswald Mosley and the Elackshirts, but contains two pro-
visions which were controversial from the standpoint of
affording a citizen raaxiraum scope of free expression. The
first, which was objected to at the time of passage by
the National Council for Civil Liberties, was the pro-
vision which gave to the chief police officer in an area
the discretion to disallow processions if he had a
"reasonable ground" for expecting serious public disorder.
The act also stipulated that a police officer could apply
to local authorities for an order prohibiting all public
processions of any class for a period not exceeding three
months if the "situation warrants." Libertarians objected
to the use of this provision in the East End of London in
the late 1930 's when all processions, not simply Fascist
processions, were banned.
The second controversial part of the Act was the
incorporation of what was commonly known as the "Breathing
Act," or the Metropolitan Police Act of 1839, which pro-
hibited "threatening, abusive or insulting words or
behavior whereby a breach of the peace is likely to be
20
occasioned." This was the charge frequently used to
check "heckling" at open air meetings.
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The National Council of Civil Liberties had a
tortuous love-hate relationship with these two parts of
the Act of 1936—being generally suspicious of the dis-
cretionary power vested in the police, but subscribing
totally to the "insulting words" proviso, especially with
reference to anti-Semitic statements, m the years
immediately following World war li the Council's criticism
of the use of the Act was usually that it was being applied
to all speeches and demonstrations, rather than specifically
against Fascists.
The prevalent fear that Fascist groups would break
up meetings of which they disapproved—a fear shared by
the NCCL—was the rationale used to prevent groups from
renting both public and private meeting halls. The logic
extended not simply to Fascist groups, but to opposing
groups which might attract Fascists, in 1948 the NCCL
was refused the use of Central Hall, Westminster (one of
London's largest halls), when it wished to co-sponsor
along with the London Trades Council a discussion of the
growth of Fascist and anti-Semitic propaganda in the
21
country. The Council could only obtain the use of a
smaller London hall by omitting the word "Fascist" from
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the title of the meeting. The NCCL objected to the
refusal to rent halls to the Communist Party, the Zionist
Federation and the Trades Council Movement, and was criti-
cal of the police in London for breaking up numerous open-
air meetings on the "pretext" of obstructing the highway.
Physical violence by Fascists had taken place, however,
at meetings of the Labour Party, Communist Party, Zionist
Federation, British-Soviet Society, and the Youth Movement
in 1948, and led the Council to criticize the police for
failure to take action against anti-Semitic speakers.
In the NCCL Annual Report of 1949 the following incident
was reported:
The Council has been much concerned at the wide-
spread increase of inflammatory ant i-Jewish
speeches from public platforms which have gone
on unchecked by police officers present at the
time. ...
... A particularly shocking, but by no means
untypical, example is that of a woman speaker at a
Union Movement meeting in Marylebone who stated,
•Gas chambers are too good for the Jews. • Although
eight police-constables and two sergeants were
present no action was taken. This example was
given to the Home Secretary by a member of the
NCCL's deputation to him in June.
At another Union open-air meeting it was
reported to us that the speaker made a statement
to the effect that he would be glad to see gas
chambers built for some of his audience, and would
in fact, help in the building of them. Again
although requested to do so by the individual who
sent us the report, the police refused to intervene.
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English libertarians and " provocative speech"
The Council attempted to justify police interven-
tion in the above instances by claiming that, "Such state-
ments are clearly an abuse of freedom of speech. ... it
has never been permissible to use remarks of so provoca-
tive a character against any religious section in this
24
country other than the Jews." The Council's position
involved more than simply a demand to give Jews as much
protection from invective as other religions have, however.
It involved the more general criteria of "provocative
speech.
"
It is clear that, however much self-control
is exercised by the religious section subjected
to abuse, sooner or later it must lead to dis-
turbances of public order . In the past ... it has
always been the practice when religious minorities
have been concerned for the authorities to stop
the abuse. Today no steps are taken to stop the
provocation, and when disturbances of public order
take place, the authorities tend to meet the problem
by restricting the liberties of all.
The NCCL has always held the view that it
should be illegal for such remarks to be made and
the deliberate propagat ion of race ^gtred and anti-
semitism should be prevented . . . .
The Council took the same attitude toward certain
proposed marches, as in its 1948 appeal to the Home
Secretary to stop a May Day march by Mosley in Hackney.
This was to be Mosley' s first outdoor meeting since 1940,
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and the Council claimed that he had chosen a borough with
a large Jewish minority and that the meeting and pro-
cession could
-only be regarded as deliberate incitement
26to trouble. ..." The Council's prediction of "trouble"
turned out to be accurate, and even though 834 police
were assigned to the procession, fighting broke out and
resulted in 31 arrests. The Home Secretary argued that
he did not have the authority to prevent any meeting from
being held, but that he could (and did) give consent to
the Commissioner of Police to use his discretion about
the political climate in general and the possibility of
civil disorder and to ban all processions for a period of
three months. The Council objected to this general ban
by invoking two different arguments. First, it claimed,
the "misuse" of traditional democratic rights of speech
and assembly by some led to the limitation of the rights
of all persons and groups. Innocent groups which did not
create disorder, they argued, v/ere being punished because
Fascist groups did create disorder. The Council's second
argument was that Mosley and his ilk desired a general
ban on all groups because their major objective was to
27
silence democratic expression.
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The standard the NCCL wished to have applied in
this kind of situation involved a prior assessment of the
probability of disorder.
Where a meeting is so provocative of the normal
sens ibi lit ies of its audience as to be calculated
to provoke disorder and in fact does provoke
disorder, the responsibility has been considered
to be on the police to prevent it by closing the
meet ing. ^®
This standard urged by the Council has several problems,
not the least of which is that it is anticipatory in
character and therefore must involve a prior assessment
of social disorder. While there is certainly nothing
unreasonable about wishing to foretell disturbances in
order to prevent them, such an attempt at prediction
necessarily involves an increase in police discretion.
Since the NCCL annually assails broad grants of discretion
to the police, this seems to be a formula designed to
guarantee criticism of the police for either acting or not
acting against a speaker. The Council, in the period
between 1945-60, was in the awkward position of urging
essentially a form of prior restraint against Fascist
marches and the application of "insulting words" to anti-
Semitic speakers, but in somewhat different contexts
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criticizing police for prior restraint and "anticipating
problems." m 1951, for example, the Council was extremely
critical of the London police for stopping numerous
public speeches in traditional meeting places on grounds
of traffic obstruction. Frequently the police stopped
meetings before any of the crowd actually blocked traffic
and were scolded by the Council for "anticipating" traffic
congestion and instructed to act only if there actually
were traffic congestion, if confronted with this incon-
sistency, the NCCL could perhaps respond by indicating
that the discretion involved in the traffic instances was
merely a "pretext" used by the police. The essential
point, however, remains that if nnly a concrete instance
of something undesirable (such as traffic congestion) can
insure that police are not acting by subterfuge, the same
criteria ought to apply to other undesirable circumstances,
such as riotous meetings.
More important than any apparent contradictions
about the proper scope of police discretion in the NCCL's
standard, however, is the factor deemed most appropriate
for controlling the range of permissible speech. If
police, or anyone else, are guided by the standard that
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speech
-so provocative of the normal sensibilities" is
not to be permitted, it would put the audience, and per-
haps not even the intended audience, in control of what is
said. "Normal sensibilities" would presumably vary
greatly from audience to audience, and while such a situa-
tional criterion could be an asset in terras of solving
real problems, it places the burden of prediction on the
speaker. Even if we assume that a speaker bears some
responsibility for the disorders caused by those who dis-
agree with him, the "normal sensibilities" standard is
an attempt to isolate and evaluate not overt behavior,
but rather the probable psychology of the listener.
In 1962, however, the Council was to criticize
the "insulting words and behavior" provision of the Act
of 1936 on the ground that it gave police the power to
prohibit processions not only on a particular occasion
but also "of a particular character. In the 1960 's
the groups using strident language had changed, and the
Council complained that the Public Order Act was being used
in circumstances far removed from those of the Fascist
marches in the immediate pre-war years. Even in the 1950 's
the NCCL objected to what it felt to be the improper
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application of the statute, such as the conviction and
L50 fine of a person displaying a poster near the U. S.
Embassy claiming that the Rosenbergs were being "framed
as part of the drive to silence fellow trade unionists
and peace workers." or the charge of "insulting behavior"
levelled in 1953 at a man who had witnessed what he
believed to be a wrongful arrest of another man and
demanded that police take his name as a witness for the
defense, in the course of explaining his position the
individual shook his fist and resorted to "improper
language" which the police found insulting, but the
Magistrate dismissed the case because he felt the charge
was inappropriate.^^ The Council never complained of the
validity of attempting to regulate "provocative" speech
divorced from any instance of disorder. Their objections
usually consisted of the request that the Act was designed
for, and by implication at least should be restricted to.
Fascist groups.
There can be several explanations offered for the
Council's concern to regulate Fascist demonstrations.
First, as is the case with libertarian groups in the
United States, the Council draws members from a constituency
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which overlaps the Jewish coniraunlty. Secondly, and this
is only a casual observation based on the tone rather
than the content of some of the Council's reports, the
NCCL perceives itself as somewhat more a member of the
"Anti-Fascist Front" than groups such as the American
Civil Liberties Union. But a more credible explanation
than either of the above, though they may be partial
influences, is the sensitivity in the NCCL, which is
also reflected in the press, public opinion, and the law,
to defamation and its consequences. Legally this is
reflected in the much more drastic restraint the English
law of libel places on the press than American law. The
guide editors must use is to question whether any item in
their columns will "tend to lower the individual to whom
it refers in the estimation of right-thinking persons
generally, or to bring him into hatred, ridicule, or
contempt, or to exclude him from the society of his fellow
31
men." Politically and socially it is reflected in the
enthusiasm of the press and the NCCL over the Race Relations
Act of 1965 which attempts to punish racial insults.
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English courts and " insulting/ ' speech
English courts, cannot, of course, strike legisla-
tion, but they can alter the utility of an act both by
interpretation of the act itself and by deciding whether
the use of the statute is appropriate to specific condi-
tions. In 1967, for example, the Oxford Magistrate's
Court dismissed charges against five picketers who were
demonstrating their opposition to the racial exclusion
policy of a local hairdresser. Police invoked the Public
Order Act by claiming that the picketers "displayed insul-
ting signs whereby a breach of the peace was likely to
be occasioned." The Magistrate, in addition to pointing
out the lack of evidence for actual "insults" scolded
police for inappropriate use of the Act on the ground that
what the police actually were attempting was the charge
of unlawful picketing through the use of the 1936 Act.
The question of the right to picket in Britain holds a
rather obscure position, with clarification actually
being a highly discretionary police function based on an
assessment of circumstances. In the Trades Dispute Act
of 1960, for example, a picket is only lawful: 1) "merely
for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating
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information," or 2) "merely for the purpose of peacefully
persuading any person to work or abstain from working."
The picketers could presumably be protected by the Act's
permission to "communicate information," but the NCCL
claims that the Act enables police to set severe limits
on the number of picketers and makes effective picketing
•*
. . .
virtually impossible if the police decide to
32
clamp down."
In two other cases, however, the application of
the Act and the meaning of "insulting words" was greatly
extended. In Jordan v. Burgoyne the Queens* Bench reversed
the London Quarter Sessions Court and upheld a conviction
for "insulting words" in a case reminiscent of America's
Terminiello v. Chicago
, except for the radically different
criteria employed by the Queen's Bench. The facts in this
case stem from an address given by John Jordan before a
group of about 5,000 people at a public meeting in
Trafalgar Square in 1962. in the front ranks of this
crowd there were reportedly between two and three hundred
young people. This group, the court record states, con-
tained Jews, supporters of the campaign for nuclear dis-
armament, and Communists. Jordan, in the course of his
speech used the following words:
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. .
.
more and more people every day
. . . are
opening their eyes and coming to say with us:
•Hitler was right.' They are coming to say
that our real enemies, the people we should
have fought, were not Hitler and the National
Socialists of Germany but world Jewery (sic)
and its associates in this country. 33
This statement by Jordan, while obviously impoli-
tic, also turned out to be illegal because of the activity
which followed, and the judicial assertion that such
activity was Jordan's fault.
George Burgoyne, Superintendent of the Metropolitan
Police, was in the vicinity of the speaker's platform and
was responsible for maintaining peace. There was reportedly
heckling throughout the entire meeting in all parts of the
crowd, but the people immediately in front of the speaker's
platform made repeated attempts to attack the platform.
After Jordan made his statement about the wisdom of
National Socialist policy in Germany, there was complete
disorder and a "general surge forward by the crowd toward
34the speaker's platform." The police had great diffi-
culty in restoring order, and twenty members of the crowd
were arrested for breach of the peace. Jordan was charged
under Section 5 of the Public Order Act of 1936 for using
"insulting words." In the Bow Street Magistrate's Court
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he was convicted and sentenced to two months'
imprisonment.
I
On appeal to the London Quarter Sessions the con-
viction was reversed on the ground that Jordan's words
would not have led an "ordinary and reasonable" citizen
to a breach of the peace. The Quarter Sessions explained
that they allowed appeal against conviction because, while
highly insulting, Jordan's words could only result in
conviction if they led to a breach of the peace. Quarter
Sessions claimed that Jordan's words preceded a breach
of the peace, but that the Public Order Act was aimed at
incitement of an ordinary reasonable citizen, and, in
their view, Jordan's listeners didn't fall into either
category. Quarter Sessions was essentially saying that
the words in Section 5 that read "... whereby a breach
of the peace was likely to be occasioned," should be con-
strued to mean "... likely to lead to a breach of the
peace by the ordinary and reasonable citizen. "^^
Burgoyne appealed to the Queen's Bench Division.
Lord Parker, with the concurrence of Judges Ashworth and
Winn, claimed he had great difficulty in "understanding
what Quarter Sessions was intending to convey." For Lord
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Parker the lower court's reference to "ordinary and
reasonable- citizens incorporates into the statute a
"hypothetical audience." The danger of interpreting the
statute to include this hypothetical audience, according
to Lord Parker, is that it overlooks the special nature
of this crowd and assumes that there was no one in the
audience intent upon breaking up the meeting. This
criticism of Lord Parker's incorrectly implies that
Quarter Sessions did not realize the volatile nature of
the crowd, when in effect the lower court was simply
stating that because the nature of the crowd was not
•ordinary and reasonable," the disorder was not Jordan's
fault. The function of the hypothetical audience for
Quarter Sessions was to shift culpability for the dis-
order, whereas for Lord Parker the predisposition of the
crowd toward violence places greater restraint on the
speaker. Even if one assumes. Lord Parker stated, that
the "persons present are a body of hooligans," if the
words used "threaten, abuse or insult," then the speaker
is guilty of the offense. According to r.ord Parker
"
. . .
the speaker must take his audience as he finds
,36them."
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Interpretation of the Act with reference to the
synthetic, rational audience is incorrect according to
the Queen'B Bench, but even using that criterion. Lord
Parker claims that he cannot "... imagine any reasonable
citizen, certainly one who was a Jew, not being provoked
beyond endurance Evidence that some menibers of the
crowd wanted to stop Jordan from speaking, which was the
factor which inclined the Quarter Sessions to excuse
Jordan, was a factor which, for Parker, added to the
wrongfulness of Ms action. The police had successfully
prevented the people in the crowd from obstructing the
speakers, but Jordan, in his opening statement, according
to Parker, deliberately insulted the people that the police
had successfully prevented from interfering with him.^^
This alone, he stated, constituted a clear contravention
of the Act.
Jordan, who acted as his own counsel in this case,
and did so according to Lord Parker "with great skill and
industry," had argued that police invocation of the Public
Order Act was an inroad into a citizen's freedom of
speech. For the Queen's Bench the action did not curtail
any rights of free expression, because Jordan's words
95
amounted to verbal assault. Lord Parker explained:
A man is entitled to express his own views as
strongly as he likes, to criticize his opponents,to say disagreeable things about his opponents
and about their policies, to do anything of that
sort, but what he must not do—and these are the
words of the Act—he roust not threaten, he must
not be abusive and he must not insult them,
•insult' in the sense of liit b^r words . ^
9
The Queen's Bench could have held with Quarter
Sessions on the same ground, or they could have upheld
even without the reasonable audience test, by claiming
that Jordan's speech did not constitute a verbal "hit."
The Quarter Sessions had essentially said that Jordan was
not guilty of "incitement." Lord Parker was to rule that
"incitement" does not, alone, constitute the crime des-
cribed in the Act. Speech which is a "hit by words" is
what the statute seeks to regulate, and Jordan was guilty
of several hits.
Once again, as in the case with seditious libel
when it covers group defamation, there is an obvious sense
in which people can be "hit by words"—sometimes with a
pain as real and damaging as a physical blow. But as a
guide in delineating the permissible area of speech it
places ultimate authority for what is said on the listener.
This is perhaps of some value when the listener is not in
96
a volitional situation, such as in sound truck speech or
public speeches in areas not typically used for such pur-
poses and where the listener cannot easily get rid of the
speaker by leaving the meeting or in some fashion "clicking
off" the message, in the present situation the audience
was in no sense captive, and Jordan received a two-month
sentence for insulting people who were already insulted.
Since Lord Parker ruled out any abstract criteria which
would define "insult" with reference to the average man,
the "hit by words' must be related to the pain threshold
of Jordan's audience, which, one could submit, vras close
to zero.
The NCCL, not noticeably irate about the ruling
in the Jordan case, did express concern over a 1966 case
in which the insulting words provision was greatly extended.
This case concerned the prosecution in the Divisional
Court of Gwyneth Williams after she handed out leaflets
addressed to "American Soldiers in Europe" to American
servicemen outside a residential club in Lancaster Gate.
This leaflet criticized U. S. involvement in Vietnam,
using what the NCCL classified as "restrained and temperate
language." The NCCL also claimed that the pamphlet was
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not designed to provoke passion. The judges, however,
held the pamphlet to be insulting because it invited its I
i
readers, if they accepted its arguments, to "consider
I
40
1deserting." The Council felt that the judges were in
I
effect saying that it was "insulting" to aak a soldier to
i
consider a certain point of view. The argument used by
the defense in this case was that soldiers, as morally
responsible and rational persons, would not be insulted
by being asked to consider whether they had a higher duty
than their military obi igIt ion. The judges were not '
impressed, however, and the Council bitterly noted, "The
Nuremburg decrees established that every individual has a I
duty to determine for himself the legality of his country's
actions. But English law now forbids us even to ask
41
servicemen to consider this duty!"
|
i
In the 1950 's the NCCL had been successful in
!
getting several charges under the Act dismissed, as in I
1951 when a Magistrate dismissed a prosecution for
insulting words and behavior against a person collecting
signatures for a peace petition. But in 1963 the Criminal
Court of Appeal extended the Act to include almost all
forms of actual and potential breaches of the peace. i
I
i
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Police in Ramsgate charged John ward with violating Section
5 of the Act when he was involved in a family brawl,
ward appealed his conviction to the Kent Quarter Sessions,
and at the end of the prosecution's case that court stopped
proceedings and allowed appeal to the Court of Criminal
Appeal because it understood the Public Order Act was
"limited to conduct at political meetings and the like
and in the course of political and similar processions
and could not be extended to disputes between
42
neighbors.
. .
Lord Parker ruled that the Act did apply to
domestic disputes by arguing that even though it was quite
easy to demonstrate that it was not Parliament's intent
to cover neighborly disagreements under the statute, the
intent of Parliament is only judicially relevant when the
controlling and operative words of an act are ambiguous.
Section 5 was not ambiguous for Lord Parker. Since it
was designed to preserve peace and order, both in the
sense of keeping the public orderly and keeping public
places orderly, he therefore saw no reason for "limiting
43the operation . . ."of the Act.
It is important to note here that the lower courts
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and Quarter Sessions made attempts to restrict the Act
to a narrower class of behavior, with the Queen's Bench
being reluctant to restrain the use of the Act. m the
ward case the Quarter Sessions asked, "Why invoke the
Public order Act?," and Lord Parker replied, without much
judicial elaboration, "Why not?"
CND Deroonstrat ions
The MCCL and the CND
The increasing frequency of conflict between the
police and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and the
"Student Left" became the focal point for English liber-
tarians in the 1960 's. Problems were compounded by the
fact that after 1961 the CND became enthused with "direct
action" rather than more routine methods of express ion.
The NCCL took the position that resort to civil dis-
obedience in order to gain support for a policy was not
justifiable because "... the people of a democratic
country should argue their policies rather than attempt
to impose them by force, even if the force is non-violent.'
It did, however, support many of the CND complaints about
police attendance at indoor meetings of the CND; police
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photographing deraonatrations (justified by some local
police as private curiosity rather than professional
interest) j the deportation of an American student who
was a leader in the CND; as well as general support of
the CND's claim that they were denied access over both the
BBC and independent television. It also supported com-
plaints about the refusal of public agencies, such as the
British Railways, to accept "political" advertising.
The CND has had problems obtaining meeting halls and has
claimed that bail is frequently excessive for its members.
It also claims that "binding over"—a process whereby a
person can be "enjoined" to keep the peace for a specified
period, even though no offense has been proven, and which,
if broken, can result in imprisonment without trial,
proof of offense, or appeal— is discriminatorily practiced
against them. Most of the NCCL's concern, however, has
been with the prevention of over-reactions on the part of
the police to demonstrations which have both legal and
illegal aspects. After publishing a special report
entitled "Public Order and the Police" which complained
of unnecessarily violent handling of sit-down demonstrators
belonging to the Committee of 100 in 1961, the NCCL began
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to issue credentials to "observers" at demonstrations in
the hope that their presence might discourage the out-
break of violence. These observers usually attempted to
prepare balanced reports after demonstrations which evalua-
ted both the demonstrators and police. Following a
Grosvenor Square demonstration in 1968, for example, the
Council criticized "minority troublemakers" and some
instances of the "provocative use of police forces," but
nonetheless complimented most police who, it felt, were
"admirably restrained considering the hostility of the
^ 46
crowd." According to the NCCL the relationship of the
police with the public deteriorated in the 1960 's,
especially with "particular groups such as young people,
colored people, demonstrators and motorists, ..." The
deterioration, they are fond of noting, is much less
severe than in the United States (the most prevalent
complaint was the use of mounted police to break up
crowds, rather than "brutality"). The Council has also
expressed sympathy for police who fall victims of a situa-
tion provoked originally perhaps by one or two irritable
exchanges between officers and demonstrators. Police,
the Council claims, by their mere physical presence at
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demonstrations, become a "target for the pent-up frustra-
tions and a substitute for the policies which are the
original object of the protest. "^^
Activities and the Police and Courts
The Public order Act, even though subject to broad
judicial interpretation, was not usually invoked against
the newer forms of propaganda and protest. Attempts to
stop CND activities when no disorder was involved included
the resurrection of the ancient Metropolitan Streets Act
of 1867 which requires permission of the Commissioner of
Police to advertise with handbills. The Act was used
extensively in 1963 against the Committee of 100 for
distributing leaflets without the necessary permission.
The NCCL, noting that the only other time the statute had
been used politically was against suffragette organiza-
tions, claimed the London police were engaging in deliberate
harrassment of the CND. The charge "willfully disregarding
the Commissioner's regulations" was also widely used and
is essentially failure to disperse when so ordered by the
police. This involves instructions at a demonstration
Which has been given approval, but which because of sub-
sequent developments the Commissioner has decided to
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disperse. Such a power is obviously necessary if the
police are to disband disorderly demonstrations. Having
the discretion extend to meetings which might be but are
not disorderly, along with the fact that prior approval
has already been given, can lead to great confusion and
even disorder. Such a situation existed in 1966 when the
British Council for Peace in Vietnam obtained police per-
mission for a demonstration in Grosvenor Square (American
Embassy) which was promptly dispersed by the police when
the Committee of 100 arrived with the march. Demonstrators
were informed of the Commissioner's decision verbally by
loudspeakers, and many claimed they did not hear the
instructions. Those who did, seeing no disorder and having
followed all proper channels in the planning of the demon-
stration, viewed the police action as arbitrary.
Appellate courts in two instances passed down
rules which narrowed police authority with reference to
demonstrations. The first involved the Divisional Court's
ruling in 1967 which eroded the famous "sessional order."
The sessional order is a House of Commons directive to
the police made at the start of each session to insure
that there is no disorder in the neighborhood. Since 1839
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the Comintssioner of Police, operating under the mandate
of the sessional order, has formulated regulations which
included the right to ban all processions and assemblies
and "causes of obstruction" in the area while Parliament
is sitting. The operating formula used by police, and
generally believed by the public to be a ruling by
parliament itself, was that Parliament was insulated by a
one-mile demonstration-free zone. After a Bow Street
magistrate had convicted participants in a stationary
(and peaceful) "vigil" at the juction of Whitehall and
Downing Streets, Divisional Court sent the case back to
the magistrate with the direction that the magistrate
must be satisfied, without hearing fresh evidence, that
the defendants were obstructing or could potentially
obstruct MP's or create a breach of the peace. On
re-hearing, the defendants were acquitted. The effect
of the Divisional Court ruling was to limit police power
severely in reference to peaceful demonstrations in central
London and to make justification for police intervention
swing on the behavior of the demonstrators, rather than
simply on some arbitrary zone around Parliament.
In 1963 the Court of Criminal Appeal reversed the
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conviction of George Clark in the London Criminal Sessions
Court for inciting people to commit a public nuisance by
unlawfully obstructing the highway during a demonstration
against Queen Frederika in July of that year. The Court
of Appeal, while undoubtedly influenced by the severity
of the sentence (eighteen months' imprisonment), stated
that for an obstruction to be unlawful it must constitute
an unreasonable use of the highway, and that a "peaceful
demonstration is not prima fac ie unreasonable."^^
On charges arising from the same demonstration,
Peter Moule and Terrance Chandler were indicted for the
common law offenses of conspiracy and incitement to public
disorder. These charges ^re dismissed, but the two were
imprisoned for four and nine months respectively on
charges of inciting people to commit a public nuisance.
It is with reference to Chandler that a vindictive motiva-
tion on the part of the government seems to emerge. This
is not based on the frequency of conflict between Chandler
and the police, which was extensive (he was also convicted
under the Official Secrets Act, which we shall discuss
later) but rather his conviction under the Forgery Act of
1913. This action would seem to reflect police impatience
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with his political activism because he was convicted for
"counterfeiting" under the Act when he was found in
possession of two litho plates used to make mock U. S.
"dollars." The "dollars" contained political slogans and
were of a color which clearly distinguished thera fro^i, the
real thing. Chandler and six others were convicted and
conditionally discharged for three years. The IJCCL
objected strenuously to the use of Old Bailey and
••thousands of pounds of public money ... in a futile
campaign to harass a few politically active young people. "^^
Political speech, of course, can take many more
forms than simply demonstrations and speaking before large
audiences, since the form as well as the content of
political speech can be as varied as self-expression and
social interaction itself, the charges employed to regu-
late political speech can be highly varied, if the form
of protest about the Vietnewj War is through paintings, it
can be subject to removal from an exhibit on aesthetic
grounds, as in Croyden in 1967. it is, then, virtually
impossible to distinguish between supression of a political
point of view and suppression of bad art, though the NCCL
34
assumed the former. Or if it is a play, such as
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"Macbird," a satire on President Lyndon B. Johnson, the
Lord Chamberlain was formerly able, as he did in 1967,
to refuse a license on the ground that "it presents a
head of state of a friendly power in an unfavorable light. "^^
The place as well as the medium can become important in
determining the legality of the political speech, as when
two persons were convicted of " indecency in church" after
they called the Foreign Secretary a hypocrite during his
reading of a sermon in a Methodist church service which
preceded the Labour party Conference in 1967. The two
received two-month sentences under the 1860 Ecclesiastical
Court Jurisdiction Act, and their appeal was rejected by
the Ijord Chief Justice on the assumption that controversial
matters should not be raised in sacred places, and this
disturbance could be regarded as indecent within the meaning
^ ^ 56of the Act. The libertarian issue becomes, in this
kind of case, whether the "other social interest" is
sufficiently real to avoid any indication of a simple
pretext to silence unpopular opinion. The NCCL views
denial of soundtruck permits as such a pretext, but the
simple fact that permits are easier to obtain for official
electioneering, which they use to butreas their case for
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discriminatory police discretion, could also be viewed as
a temporary relaxation of neighborhood tranquility in the
name of the fairly infrequent demands of electoral poli-
tics in a democracy. The churc i incident is compounded
by the fact that party politics and religious services
were not only mixed but involved the same personnel.
Given an element which views anything public and verbal
as a legitimate forum for public debate, it is perhaps
wise to remind people, in principle at least, that there
are some aspects of life which, if not "sacred," should be
at least non-political, a two-month sentence, on the other
hand, seems a harsh way to drive home a lesson about social
propriety, and there is some utility in distinguishing
(for purposes of punishment) between behavior which is in
bad taste and perhaps necessitates removal and that which
is truly criminal.
Freedom of Expression
and National Security
Pol it ical Activities and Employment
Just as a libertarian interest in free expression
must be weighed against probable public disorder and
community tranquility, freedom of expression and political
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association are also, most would hold, subject to some
restrictions when the people in question are involved
with national security. Their political beliefs and
association offer one kind of evidence as to their ability
to maintain the degree of trust or "loyalty" that such
positions require. Even though Britain has never used
"loyalty oaths" for governmental employment, Britain has
governmental security programs designed to protect against
infiltration and reinforce the necessary secrecy in matters
of national security. This concern extends also to labor
unions, personnel in private corporations with defense
contracts, and aliens wishing to enter the United Kingdom.
Political parties are sufficiently disciplined tc make
their rulings about associations quasi-official, but
Britain cannot be viewed as having a counter-part to the
American Attorney General's list. Major parties have lists
of "proscribed organizations," meaning that membership in
any of the listed organizations is "incompatible with
membership in the party." But this list is shorter, and
more cautiously drawn than the American list, and of
course relates only to party membership. Since 1946 the
Labour party's constitution has restricted membership to
those not owing allegiance to "political organizations
abroad." The Co-operative Party, an organization of
independent co-operative societies affiliated with the
Labour Party for political purposes, was faced with the
problem of many Communists holding posts of secondary
importance and instituted what amroounted to a disclaimer
affidavit for members of the national cormnittee and the
57central governing body.
Civil servants who are dismissed for security
reasons have recourse to an administrative tribunal which
makes the initial recommendation about an employee's relia-
bility. There is no counsel allowed in this procedure nor
any higher appeal since the tribunal only acts as an
advisory board for the minister, who takes ultimate
responsibility for dismissal. This was instituted in
1948 in an attempt to "tighten" security measures, and
was "tightened" again in 1952 when people engaged in
secret work or handling of secret material were required
to answer a questionnaire and disclaim association in
Communist or Fascist groups. The most important charac-
teristics of the governmental security programs are that
they are designed to effect only the possibly "disloyal"
Ill
in certain sensitive positions; efforts are made to
transfer "risks' to areas where their associations or
beliefs would not be inimical to security.^® The security
program is therefore directed at the specific objective of
insuring secrecy rather than a general denial of govern-
mental employment to alleged subversives. Designation of
a "sensitive" position is, of course, not easy, and the
practical effect of security regulations was most felt
at the Ministry of Supply since virtually all war produc-
tion contracts, atomic research, etc., pass through its
jurisdiction. The most controversial designations of
"sensitive areas" are probably the Ministry's concern over
telephone technicians. However, one of the most cele-
brated cases concerned the absence of a sensitive designa-
tion before the Ministry of War's inclusion of couriers.
This was done after a one-armed messenger who delivered
dispatch cases and sold the Daily Worker while on the job
received great newspaper publicity. The individual was
transferred to another ministry but was never told to
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stop selling the Daily Worker .
The problem of Communists in civil service unions
has also caused some controversy and led to a judicial
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inquiry under the leadership of Lord Justice Radcliffe
in 1963. The Radcliffe report, while not suggesting that
any union official ever had obtained secret information,
did suggest that the situation was a possible danger.
After 1963 the government was empowered to notify a union
that it considered an official unreliable for security
reasons. The union official has recourse to the three-
roan tribunal, and if not sustained, probably (although
this remains somewhat obscure), is removed from being an
official or the union is denied affiliation with a govern-
mental department, in 1963 two conflicts arose in this
connection; one concerning a technician's union (tele-
phone) official who reportedly met in social gatherings
with diplomats from Communist count ires, and the second
concerning an official of a manual worker's union who was
refused permission by the office of the Minister of Science
to enter the atomic research establishment at Aldermaston.
In the latter case the official was a member of the British
Communist Party but desired to enter only the canteen and
administrative block.
The rationale for the government's decisions about
security risks is usually not disclosed, and, as in the two
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instances above, the NCCL can only speculate as to the
real reasons. The rationale cannot even be gleaned through
Parliamentary question periods, in 1956, for example,
the Ministry of Supply had asked that a chemical company
dismiss one of its solicitors on the ground that he was a
security risk. Since the firm could not be awarded govern-
ment contracts unless it could comply with security
standards, the individual was dismissed, and because he
was not a governmental employee he had no legal recourse
or administrative appeal, when asked by the opposition
in parliament for the charges against the solicitor, the
Minister of Supply resorted to claims of ministerial
responsibility and "security" to avoid giving any answer.
Two years later the justification given by the government
(which the NCCL assumed to be the total justification)
was that the solicitor's wife, before marriage, had been
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a member of the Communist party. The notion of minis-
terial responsibility along with the cloak of security,
acts in the view of many, to reinforce governmental secrecy
in security dismissals. Some, such as Harry Street, argue
that ministerial responsibility causes innumerable cases
of Englishmen being denied access to the Courts in
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situations where "judicial scrutiny is standard practice
in the rest of the Western World."^^ The government's
refusal to disclose their rationale may, but need not
necessarily, imply that the action is arbitrary, m fact
the secrecy surrounding the security program can have, as
Wilson and Glickman have noted, quite beneficial liber-
tarian effects. Although the accused people have diffi-
culty getting reasons, there is also no "trial by accusa-
tion" in the press, and the secrecy of the government and
their standards can also make it difficult for outside
groups to attack employees on loyalty grounds. The
government was noticeably unresponsive to a plea from the
Evening Standard to dismiss a Communist who was also
general secretary of the Civil Service Clerical Association
and failed to heed the warnings of Common Cause , an anti-
Coraraunist organization's pamphlet which listed Communist
and "near-Communist" civil servants and called for their
62dismissal. Secrecy in this type of case can make the
issue appear to the public as a technical decision on the
part of the government, rather than stern warnings that
certain groups and certain associations will not be
tolerated in government. The "style" in which the security
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program was both implemented and justified created an
attitude much different than the one which existed in the
United States during the same period. The attitude is
characterized by u>rd Chief Justice Denning's assertion
that the government's concern with Communism should not
be to deprive them of liberty, but simply of access to
military secrets." This attitude is also indicated in
the Co-operative Party's explanation of its ban on
Communist officials in its organization as only a difference
in political faith, as not meant to question the right of
Communists to hold, advocate, and secure support for their
views, or to "dispute their sincerity. "^^ This attitude
reflects more than simply a penchant for polite expression
of disagreement; it reflects an assumption that Communism
is an incorrect political view but that it is not a
"totally evil
. . . satanic world-wide conspiracy ... or
65the anti-Christ." m an organization formed around
political principles, members may be dismissed if they
deviate from those principles. However, this implies
only a difference in opinion, not that the dissidents are
totally unfit for any employment or that they are rejected
as fellow citizens.
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This attitude is also reflected by the fact that,
while there have been controversies about Coramunism in
education and the Middlesex County Council did ban Communists
and Fascists from being appointed headmaster, generally
speaking little impetus was marshalled behind the proposi-
tion that communist teachers were subversive by definition.
Britain has not been lacking in attempts to ignite public
opinion on this subject, but such attempts have been
noticeably unsuccessful. The same has been true about the
general response of the public and the government to
charges that something should be done about disloyal
Englishmen in communications, entertainment, the pro-
fessions, and religion. Such incidents as the disclosure
of the Canadian spy ring and the cases of Alan Nunn May,
Klaus Fuchs and Bruno Pontecorvo, aroused concern for
British security and support for a tighter security pro-
gram. The fact that Fuchs was uncontroversial and
escaped detection for five years caused some to speculate
about the utility of attempting to ascertain a person's
reliability on the basis of expressed attitudes and
associations. Even with this increased sensitivity about
security, the distinction between speech and opinion on
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one hand and espionage and military secrecy on the other
66was preserved. This perception of Communism as a poli-
tical doctrine not necessarily related to espionage and
therefore not a "loathsome contagious disease" was also
widespread in the society, not just in government. A
post-war national poll by the British Institute of Public
Opinion which sampled attitudes about making Communist
party membership incompatible with membership in the
Labour party revealed that 54 percent felt that the Labour
party should not admit members of the CP, with 16 percent
feeling that membership should be open, and 30 percent
responding with "Don't Know."^*^ Another dramatic example
i» the rejection by the British Legion, the counterpart
of the American Legion, of a proposal to prohibit
Communists from joining because most members of the British
Legion did not want membership to depend on a political
criteria. This reflects the feeling that one can have
hopelessly erroneous political beliefs and still be a
worthwhile member of groups formed for social purposes
—
that one can be a Communist and still be English.
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The Official Secrets Act
The renowned Official Secrets Act which is cited
in almost every English spy thriller has also caused
occasional concern among libertarians. The Act, passed to
prevent the reoccurence of Foreign Office scribes giving
the contents of secret treaties to hostile powers and the
press, as one did in 1878 as a gesture of disenchantment
with the lower rungs of civil service employment, has
occasionally been used in obvious non-security matters.
In 1938, for example, it was invoked when a Daily Dispatch
reporter refused to reveal the sources of one of his news
stories when police were seeking to stop a "leak" in their
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own department. it has also been used to prevent
publication of articles about prison conditions, as well
as genuine instances of espionage. In February of 1962
the Act was to receive its most controversial application
when six members of the Committee of 100, including
Terrance Chandler, were charged and convicted on two
counts of conspiracy to commit breaches of the Act. The
five male defendants were sentenced to eighteen months in
prison and the lone female defendant to twelve for their
part in a large-scale demonstration at Wethersfield Airfield
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in 1961. Wethersfield was at the time occupied by squa-
drons of the United States Air Force assigned to the
Supreme Commander Allied Forces, Europe, and was chosen
by the demonstrators because of the alleged presence of
nuclear weapons. The intent of the demonstrators was
that a number of people should take positions outside the
two entrances to the field while another contingent would,
if possible, enter the airfield and sit in front of air-
craft to prevent them from taking off. The admitted
objective of such an action, at least on the part of the
six defendants, was to ground all aircraft and immobilize
the airfield or, as they expressed it, to "reclaim the
7
1
base for civilian purposes." The government had
designated Wethersfield as a prohibited place within the
meaning of the Act, and the defendants were convicted for
conspiring to enter such a place and entering such a
72place. At the trial the jury was instructed that in
order to find the defendants guilty it was necessary for
the prosecution to demonstrate that they conspired together
and that the conspiracy was clearly either to enter a
prohibited place, and that the intent of such a conspiracy
was for a purpose "prejudicial to the safety and interests
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of the state." The defendants freely admitted the con-
spiracy, but chose to argue vigorously over their intent,
on appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal, counsel for
Chandler put forth secondary arguments to the effect that
the Act could only be used to prevent mischiefs stemming
from espionage and the collection and disclosure of secret
information. Lord Parker quicKly dismissed these argu-
ments by ruling that the Act empowers the Secretary of
State to declare a place prohibited on the ground that
the "destruction or obstruction
. . . would be useful to
the enemy," and that the Act was not therefore limited to
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espionage.
More strenuously argued, however, was the plea that
the defendants had no intent to prejudice the safety or
interests of the state and that their action did not in
fact prejudice those interests. This argument focused
on the refusal of Judge Havers to allow questions during
cross examination that were related to, or tried to
establish, 1) the advisability of a nuclear deterrent
weapon in the United Kingdom; 2) the possibility of acci-
dental detonation; and 3) the "attraction" of such defense
installations for hostile attack by other nations. The
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defense argued that unless they could get at the "substance"
of the demonstration, i.e., the desirability of nuclear
disarmament, the prosecution could not prove an intent to
prejudice the interests of the state, nor could a jury
evaluate whether the defendants' actions actually did
prejudice the interests of the state. The prosecution
argued that intent could only be established by first
establishing that the defendants' actions were prejudicial,
after which their purpose could be inferred from such
actions. The defense argued that an individual's "state
of mind" was relevant to prejudicial intent, even if the
actions were prejudicial. Lord Parker sustained the
prosecution's point of view by contending that the
individual's state of mind was a different and irrelevant
issue with reference to establishing intent, if the action
taken is prejudicial, then an intent to prejudice simply
means, for Lord Parker, a deliberate intention to take
such action.
The defendants' desire to explore their "state of
mind" at the trial reflected their wish to debate nuclear
disarmament on its "merits,' This "intent" became pain-
fully obvious when Patrick Pottle, one the accused who
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conducted his own defense, asked an Air Commodore during
the process of cross examination whether he were "familiar
with all the facts on the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki; whether or not there was any official order
from government that he would not accept; and whether n
or not he would "press the button." m a style of argu-
ment that is now familiar to student activists, Pottle
asked the witness if he would "slit the throats of all
two year old children in this country;" quoted from a docu-
rnent (which the judge reminded him was not really cross
examination) from Sir Winston Churchill to the effect that
atomic bases in East Anglia made Britain the target of
Soviet attack; and asked whether the witness was familiar
with Adolph Eichraann's defense, judge Havers invariably
instructed the witness not to answer, and Lord Parker was
quick to note the larger "political motivation" of the
defendants, and rule:
Insofar, therefore, as it was sought to
challenge the policy of the Crown, it seems to us
that cross examination and evidence to that end
were rightly excluded. Granted that the policy and
granted the use of the airfield within that policy,
it was of course open to the defense to show, if
they could, that the acts proposed would not
prejudice its operational effectiveness . . . the
emphasis of the appeallants* arguments, both at the
trial and before us, was concentrated on a
1I
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challenge of policy rather than on the issue
whether, within the policy, the acts proposed
were prejudicial. Accordingly, we are satisfied
that the learned judge did not exclude any cross
examination or evidence which was adraissable and
relevant, and there being no possible criticism
of their summing up these appeals fall.
. .
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The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to
the House of Lords, however, because it felt that the
case raised a point of law of general public importance,
specifically the proper definition of the state's interest.
The Law Lords (in the House of Lords, before Viscount
Radcliffe, and Lords Reid, Hodson, Devlin and Pearce)
each wrote an opinion, but all were in favor of dis-
75missing the appeal. Lord Reid took essentially the
line of reasoning expounded by the Court of Appeal, arguing
that the disposition and use of armed forces was a govern-
mental matter and could not be questioned in the courts.
According to Reid it would be hardly "credible" that
parliament wished to entitle a person who had deliberately
interfered with the armed forces to submit to a jury that
the "... government policy was wrong and that what he
76did was really in the best interest of the country."
Lords Hodson and Pearce and iscount Radcliffe laid great
stress on the same point underlining the viewpoint that
I
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the wisdon. of nuclear weapons was not a justifiable issue.
Lord Devlin reached the same holding, but by
following a slightly different path. For him, the issue
of what was prejudicial to the state was not a question of
law but of fact, and should, therefore, have been deter-
mined by a jury, since he found it difficult to see how
a jury could have found actions designed to obstruct a
policy supported by a majority of the population as any-
thing other than prejudicial to the state, he concurred
in the holding, but resented the use of "government" and
"state" as synonyms. The government's argument through-
out all of the proceedings was that whatever was in the
interests of the government was necessarily in the
interests of the state, and by implication, all the people
in that state. Lord Devlin found no evidence to suggest
that the testimony given by the government in the Chandler
case was in any way exaggerated or offered in bad faith;
he argued simply that a purpose which "appears to the
Crown" as prejudicial is not the same as the fact of a
prejudicial action. Devlin deviated from the other Lords
only on the question of who is to decide what is prejudicial
Devlin appeared to agree with Lord Pearce when he insisted
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that "interests of the state" could not mean "... the
|
interest of the amorphous populace without regard to the
I
guiding principles of those in authority." The phrase
I
must mean, according to Pearce, "... the policies of
the state as they are, not as they ought in the opinion
77 'if a jury to be." Devlin"s distinction between "the '
state" as all legitimate authority and "government" as
simply the lessor implementor of sovereignty was designed
to avoid saying the interests of the Crown and the
interests of the state are the same. Some writers, such
as Geoffrey Marshall, have claimed that in this case the
distinction was obliterated by giving the Crown the privi-
i
lege of defining the "interests of the state." While the
I
distinction was obliterated (because it was not accepted
i
by the majority of the Law Lords) , for Devlin the funda-
mental point is that the servants of the Crown are capable
of formulating policies which prevent the citizen from
doing something that they (the Crown) do not want him to
do, and it is a legitimate judicial function to prevent
the abuse of this prerogative. There was nothing in the
Chandler case that suggested to Lord Devlin that such an
abuse existed, but the jury should have decided this.
For Devlin the Crown alone is able to give authoritative
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evidence as to the interests of the state, but the "Crown's
opinion as to what i. or is not prejudicial is just as
inadmissible as the appellants Marshall's basic
argument was that if the Crown can define its interests,
it can thereby determine what is to count as prejudicial
79to them, but this need not be the case. The jury for
Lord Devlin should decide if interests have been pre-
judiced, not what those interests are. in this case,
the defendants spent much time arguing that the normal
operation of Wethersfield Airfield was not an interest
of the state. For Lord Devlin neither the defendants nor
the jury can define "interest;" they must restrict them-
selves to the question of what is prejudicial. Such a
formulation of the problem avoids two dangerous alterna-
tives! having the Crown define both what is in the
interests of the state and what is prejudicial to those
interests, thereby restricting the jury to a determina-
tion of the actions alleged; or having the jury decide
whether Wethersfield is necessary to the "good life" in
England, and thereby solidifying sovereignty in twelve
impaneled subjects. The first method is reminiscent of
old seditious libel charges, in which the jury cannot find
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a defendant innocent unless it is willing to wink at
established fact. The problem here is that the offense ,
which is not the same as the action (of publishing or
entering an air base) is predetermined by the government
because conviction necessarily follows the action. The
action is ascertained, but the action is not evaluated
with reference to the offense charged. The second alterna-
tive invests the jury with a novel sort of ad hoc judicial
review power, which would encompass not only the power
to dismantle specific laws, but even to change foreign
policy. Marshall, who views the Chandler case as unjus-
tified governmental harrassment of the CND, seems
oblivious to the consequences of allowing the propriety
of unilateral disarmament to be a juridicial consideration.
Even if, as Marshall argues, the pivotal factor in this
case was the definition of interests, not the definition
of prejudicial, it is not sufficient to object to the
holding merely because it stipulates that the definition
of the national interest is a Crown prerogative. The
elemental fact remains that the definition of national
interest is someone's prerogative, and when the apparent
choice is between the Crown and a jury, it seems folly
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to assume that the jury would be any better a reflection
of the will of the nation than its government. The use of
the Official secrets Act to punish the behavior in the
Chandler case creates some awkward problems, but the
restriction of evidence about intent to a desire to stop
the normal functioning of the air base, rather than a per-
sons' intent vis-a-vis metaphysical standards, would
appear essential. Nor is it really accurate, given the
past uses of the Act, to claim that it was being used for
a purpose other than Parliament intended. The NCCL felt
the sentencing in this case was "savage," using as the
point of comparison the penalty for •criminal" offenses,
which implies that Chandler's conduct was less criminal
than grand theft because his rationale takes longer to
explain. What the use of the OSA did achieve was a very
dramatic charge against the defendants which pointed out
unsavory political purposes rather than simply trespassing,
and it is perhaps a mistake for the Crown to have tried
to compete with the CND in dramatizing an issue, it is
this drama which surrounds the Act that is an indication
80that the government was interested in a "political trial."
The Act connotes espionage to the general public, and the
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CND activities do not fit in that category as traditionally
defined. However, the antics of the CND were close enough
to espionage to shield the government from a charge of
engaging in ruthless suppression of freedom of speech.
There is presumably a difference between long-term
suppression and occasional outbreaks of vindictiveness.
Race Relations
Act of 1965
The Britton Case
The desire to protect subjects from speech which
is insulting received renewed emphasis in Section 6 of
the Race Relations Act of 1965 which states:
(1) a person shall be guilty of an offense
under this section if, with intent to stir
up hatred against any section of the public in
Great Britain distinguished by color, race,
or ethnic or national origin
—
(a) he publishes
or distributes written matter which is
threatening, abusive or insulting;
. . . (b) matter
or words likely to stir up hatred against that
section on grounds of color, race, or ethnic or
national origin.
(2) . . . 'publish* and 'distribute' mean
publish or distribute to the public at large or
to any section of the public not consisting
exclusively of members of an association of which
the person publishing or distributing is a
member . . . ^
During the second reading of the Race Relations
Bill before the House of Commons in May, 1965, the NCCL
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objected to section 6 because it omitted any mention of
religious groups and therefore was not, in their view,
sufficiently extensive. The reasoning here was that
much ostensible religious discrimination against Hindus
and Muslims was really based on color, which is certainly
true, but Section 6 is levelled at "hateful speech," not
employment or accommodations.
The first use of the Act was in July of 1966 when
17-year old Christopher Britton was caught by a member of
parliament (Bidwell) after he (Britton) had broken a
glass panel of the M.P. 's front door and inserted a
pamphlet entitled, "Blacks Not Wanted Here."®^ Britton
(who was, if not drunk, at least drinking beer during this
escapade) had littered several other pamphlets expressing
the same point of view on the front porch and was carrying
a copy of a pamphlet entitled, "Do You Want a Black
Grandchild?" The pamphlets originated from a London
group called the "Greater Britain Movement" which was
opposed to black immigration. Britton explained that he
believed that Bidwell was responsible for bringing blacks
to Britain, in Middlesex Quarter Sessions Britton was
charged and convicted for violating Section 6 of the Act
and was sentenced to a "period of reform school training."
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This conviction was reversed by the Court of Appeal,
because, in the opinion of Lord Parker, the antics of
Britton did not constitute "distribution" within the
meaning of the Act. According to Parker distribution to
an M.P. is not distribution to the public at large, and
while the police may have had a case against the pub-
lishers, they didn't have one against Britton. Lord
Parker was also perturbed that the issue of distribution
was withdrawn from the jury (the trial judge held there
was no contest about distribution) and based his reversal
on a narrow construction of "distribute." But in some
dicta at the end of his opinion he scolded law enforcement
officials for the use of the 1965 act in this kind of a
case. The police, he claimed, were invoking the Race
Relations Act because of the words used, and the crucial
consideration should not be the words or even the distri-
bution, but the circumstances of distribution. If the cir-
cumstances of distribution reveal an intent to stir up
hatred, the Act is appropriate, but in this case the
circumstances are far removed from intention to stir up
hatred. Lord Parker's approach is interesting because,
in addition to establishing a formula which places the
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emphasis on circumstances rather than on the words
used, it is a rare instance of the Court of Appeal narrowing
the application of an Act. The rather specific instruc-
tions as to when the Act is applicable and the open chiding
of the police is equally rare. The Court of Appeal's
ruling in this case received an immediate political
reaction when the House of Lords rejected a private member
bill introduced by Lord Brockway that would have closed
some "loopholes" of the Race Relations Act discovered by
Lord Parker. The government agreed that there was need
for "further action at the appropriate time," but felt
the Act was too new for amendment at that time.^^
Michael X
The first conviction to be sustained under the
Race Relations Act ironically involved the leader of the
British Black Muslims, Michael de Freitas, who adopted
the name Michael Addul Malik and Michael X when converted
to the Muslim faith after contact with American Black
Muslim leader Malcolm X in 1964. Malik received a
twelve-month sentence for inciting racial hatred during
a speech he gave in Reading in 1967. He was a substitute
speaker before an audience which had come to hear American
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Black Power Leader Stokeley Carmichael and, according to
prosecutor Kenneth Jones, elaborated on two themes.
The first consisted of an attack on white people generally,
contending that they were vicious, nasty, soulless,
savage, and guilty of degrading and oppressing black
people. The second, according to Jones, was an exhorta-
tion to black people to ignore the laws of tritain; to
inspire terror among whites; to use violence against
enemies and even shoot, kick and if necessary kill thera.^^
The initial hearing, in which Malik was refused bail, was
a noisy encounter between Malik and the judge, complete
with the removal of some of Malik's supporters from the
gallery. Malik was found guilty in Reading Quarter
Sessions, and ten days before the Court cf Appeal reviewed
the case, an article appeared in the Sunday Times which
Malik claimed made a fair appeal impossible. The Court
of Appeal held that there was no possible effect on the
appeal since the article had no effect on the original
trial. The Divisional Court, however, did find the
article sufficiently prejudicial to fine the newspaper
L5,000 for what it described as "a very serious contempt."
Malik, who conducted his own defense throughout
the proceedings, on appeal argued essentially that the
85
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meaning of the words he used meant something different
to him as a West Indian and meant something different to
his audience than they did to white Englishmen. Lord
Parlcer noted, however, that the issue of possibly
differing
-cultural contexts" had been presented to the
jury, and since they did not recognize a substantial
difference between West Indian English and Reading English
a new trial was not in order, i^ard Parker also refused
to reduce the sentence handed out by the Reading Court,
claiming that the propriety of any given punishment
should be related to the violence of the words used.
Since the maximum sentence for this type of offense was
two years' imprisonment and a fine of LlOOO, he saw no
reason to interfere in this sentence since Malik was
guilty of a "serious infraction" of the Act.®^
Neo-Fasciats
Colin Jordan, leader of the English Fascist move-
ment, was given an eighteen-month sentence in 1967 for
violating Section 6 of the Act for racist statements made
at a public meeting. Melvin L. Wtilf, legal director of
the American Civil Liberties Union, has noted that this
incident (which he describes as "intolerable by ACLU
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standards") received little attention, and that the Race
Relations act itself had provoked "... hardly any but
favorable comment" in Britain. The NCCL objected to the
use of the act against Malik but were silent about its
use against Jordan. The Council explained in 1968 that
while it welcomed the passing of the Act in 1965, it "had
not bargained for the way in which it would be enforced."
The Act was, in their view, designed to protect minorities
and blacks in particular, and they expressed concern
... that colored people should have been the first
to feel the whip, when Fascist and racialist publications
continue to circulate with relative impurity."®^
The Thorn Case
There was one other attempt to apply the Act of
1965 when Dr. Carl-Theo Thorn brought a private suit
against the BBC for inciting racial hatred because of its
"anti-German propaganda." The propaganda Thorn had in
mind was the television series "The Rat patrol" which he
sought to enjoin because of the use of "foul, abusive
and spiteful language, gestures, mimics and imitations,
when Germans or Germany were mentioned." The Act speci-
fically states that no prosecution can be instituted under
its provisions except by or with the consent of the
Attorney General. Thorn had no such permission, but
relied on an 1880 case which held that when a statute
creates a new offense there is a remedy in equity by
injunction to protect against such an offense. The
action was dropped, however, when the Chancery Division
ruled that the Act created no civil remedy for an
individual.®^
Conclusion
Free Expression and National Security
What is perhaps roost significant and most lauda-
tory in our account of controversies about seditious
speech are some things which did not happen, especially
with reference to the post-war response to domestic
Cciiiraunisro and the Cold war. There was no equivalent of
the Smith Act or a loyalty review board, no sensational
legislative investigations, and in general, no public
hysteria about an "enemy within." The reasons for this
response are complex, involving factors in the political
and social system as well as aspects of political culture
The Communist Party in Britain, while never strong, did
have a larger per capita membership than the party in the
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U. S. The simple existence of more Communists, together
with the existence of a political tradition which included
a theoretical alternative to capitalism, meant that the
CP had more respectability and was perceived as less of
an "alien" influence. Even this more relaxed public
opinion, however, cannot totally explain the responsibility
exercised by political leaders in dealing with the security
problem. Wilson and Glickman have pointed out that much
credit is due the professional civil service and the
administrative good judgment exercised in implementing
the security program. The general status which accrues
to the civil service, as well as the popular belief that
politics in general is a "respectable" endeavor (part of
the deferential political culture), creates an "institu-
tional self-respect which mitigates against irresponsible
conduct." The existence of an "establishment" in a
genuine sense, not simply an epithet to describe any
suburbanite regardless of influence, can act to limit
participation on many levels of decision making and can
have, when the threat stems from inflamed public opinion,
libertarian consequences. The same "insular" quality of
decision making can explain the lack of success in Britain
138
of the issue about Communism in education, since the
ordinary Englishman has never been encouraged to brood
about the content of courses at Oxford and Cambridge.
Since being a Communist was not viewed as an action which
condemned one to eternal damnation, being an ex-Communist
was also not viewed as instant salvation, and in Britain
few people made careers out of past political indiscre-
tions. English trade unions, where the threat of Communist
infiltration was much more real than it was in the U. S.,
usually managed to hold control; and the press, with a
few ostentatious exceptions, did not hammer away at the
evils of domestic subversion.
The insularity of decision making can also reveal
negative effects as when one attempts to ascertain the
motivation behind a prosecution, such as the application
of the Official Secrets Act and the Forgery Act against
the CND. Marshall, for example, had noted that long-
accepted political conventions such as cabinet responsi-
bility can immunize law enforcement officials from
undesirable political pressure, but can also inhibit on
occasion what may be justifiable political criticism.
This, together with typical judicial reluctance to embark
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on criticism of executive policy and solid control of the
legislature by one of two major parties makes it diffi-
cult to exercise effective control over ministers even
when the opposition wishes. When there is no such division
along party lines, the responsibility of law enforcement
officials to Parliamentary-based policy makers is amor-
phous at best. Advice given to police by the cabinet is
treated as confidential by the rules of the House, and
direct questions about such advice are out of order, as
are any questions which might prejudice a case pending.
This makes it difficult to ascertain whether the prosecu-
tions under the statutes we have mentioned were ministerial
decisions or promulgated at a lower level. The immunity
which surrounds the entire process of criminal prosecu-
tion in England means that in some cases "accountability"
can be traced to the Attorney General (or the D.P.P. who
acts on his authority) , but it is not clear even then what
is a governmental decision since the Attorney General acts
as a legal officer of the Crown, which is theoretically
separate from the role of minister. In most cases, as
Geoffrey Marshall is fond of pointing out, the charges
used against the politically unorthodox do not involve the
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spectacular uses of the Official Secrets, Race Relations,
or even the Public Order Acts. Much more probable are
charges for petty offenses—obstruction of the highway
or police, disobeying local by-laws, refusing to b«
bound over, and trespassing—which not only can be used
by the government to cloak an evil intent, but can even
be used by law enforcement officials to avoid governmental
scrutiny. Because most prosecutions in Britain are pri-
vate prosecutions brought by policemen as individuals,
the government theoretically at least, "does not start
_ 91ana cannot stop summary proceedings." Marshall even
suggests that the more spectacular charges against Chandler
were probably not the product of direct initiative of
ministers collectively or the Home Office, but simply
92police decisions. Even if this were the case, the use
of the OSA at Wethers fie Id is not an extravagant use of
the Act. In instances such as the Chandler case, the
Labour Party was quick to charge "political trial" and
criticize the government for its handling of the CUD in
other demonstrations, pressure at this juncture is per-
haps instrumental in preventing any regime fro n using
prosecutions against political groups to glorify its own
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importance. Although the same pressure would be applied
in the opposite direction, especially if the opposition
is looking for things with which to eitibarass the govern-
ment and harpoons the ruling party for inaction against
subversion. This tactic was not used by the "out" party
in Britain, which, in addition to indicating differences
in political culture, also indicates something about
English conservatism.
Free Expression and " insulting " Speech
On the negative side of the ledger is the favor-
able reception, in Britain, of the concept of "insulting"
speech, which was bolstered in the Race Relations Act of
1965. While the Britton and Malik cases, along with
Thorn's abortive attempt, certainly do not constitute
cavalier application of the Act by the government, it is
important to note that none of the cases involved the
actual outbreak of violence or disruption, and the
pivotal consideration is the content of remarks rather
than the situation in which they are made. True, the
Act itself makes a small "situational" rule by requiring
that the words be spoken in a context where they may be
heard by people who disagree. Thus racist statements at
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a closed meeting of racists would not be "insulting"
because there is no one present to be insulted. Lord
Parlcer's suggestion that police look at circumstances
rather than words themselves in the Britton case cannot
be interpreted as a plea that the Act be used in cases
of actual incitement, or a logic similar to the Homesian
emphasis on circumstances rather than words spoken as
the pivotal issue to be evaluated. Lord Parker's point
was that Britten's "speech" was not sufficiently public
for it to be insulting. The judicial circumstantial require-
ment is therefore an assessment of the scope of the audience
rather than the probability that the audience will react
undesirably. In fact, the entire logic of the Act of
1965 and of the "insulting words" provision of the Public
Order Act is that it can be presumed that a heterogeneous
audience will behave badly if a speaker is not sufficiently
diplomatic. Even Parker's attempt to restrict the con-
cept "insult" to circumstances where there is likely to
be an "insulted" drew quick reaction in Parliament,
indicating a feeling that the Act should be more inclusive.
There is no statutory or judicial rule that requires the
words to present any concrete danger to the community,
simply that the words, in the view of the government and
II
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a jury, be insulting. The best defense of this concept
'
was Lord Parker's decision in Jordan v. Burgovne that *
there was such a thing as verbal assault, and that "verbal
hits" threaten public order. Just as the logic of the
i
concept "libel" was sustained in 1609 because it "provokes
revenge" and is therefore a potential breach of the peace,
|
the verbal punches of Malik and Jordan were held to be
potential breaches of the peace in 1967. This is why we
j
have designated the charges stemming from the common law
of seditious libel, the Public Order Act and the Race
Relations Act as conceptually identical to group libel.
Specific objections to this concept on libertarian grounds
have been suggested; it is sufficient to note here that
English Law, and by and large English libertarians, place
great emphasis on the protection of individuals from
insults and abuse by other individuals. This desire to ^
protect an individual from certain speech can be viewed
I
as a different weighing of competing concerns for the '
rights of an individual. Just as English libertarians
have traditionally been less mechanical in their approach
to freedom of the press, making the "right to know" a
subordinate concern when in conflict with a "right to a
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fair trial," the concern for defamation outweighs the
concern for unfettered expression when the two values
collide.
It is also worth noting that the lack of oppressive
legal sanctions against those engaged in self-expression
is certainly not the result of a want of authorizing
legislation. Henry Hamilton has noted that an illiberal
regime in England has "an intricate web of unrepealed
legislative restriction" which could be used to limit
"the right of freely expressing beliefs severally desig-
nated sedition, blasphemy, and obscenity."®^ Nor did the
courts significantly truncate any of the legislation we
have analyzed. The attempt of Quarter Sessions to formu-
late a "reasonable audience" test in the Jordan case was
quickly undone by the Queen's Bench, and the Public Order
Act was extended even further by Parker in the ward case.
Parker's only attempt to restrict the application of a
statute was in the Britton case, which irritated parliament,
In cases involving street oratory and demonstrations
thought to endanger security, the courts implement no sub-
stantial alterations which would narrow statutes . In the
Jordan and ward cases, however, there was an extension at
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least in the sense that Lord Parker had defensible argu-
ments as to why the Public Order Act should not have been
used.
The lack of hysteria over "subversion" and the
desire to punish those who engage in verbal hitting are
not unrelated. Both can be traced to the "deferential"
culture and the expectation of responsible leadership.
The phlegmatic approach of the English to certain kinds
of diversity can make thera tolerant of radical political
creeds and reluctant to define "Englishman" as an ideo-
logical category, but can also make them concerned about
speech when it takes a form that could erode the under-
stood sense of social propriety. The assumption that
leaders should govern, not simply represent, leads to
certain expectations, one of which is that they act
responsibly, even if their leadership position entails
only "leadership" in the sense of speaking before a group.
In short, both a subversive "witch hunt" and an anti-semitic
tirade connote hysteria, and as such, conflict with the per-
ception of what constitutes a qualitative political style
that is supposed to reflect "rule by betters." Deference
implies a certain amount of respect for the leader—but
the leader roust, by his conduct, earn such respect.
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In one sense there is great emotive consistency in
wishing a person not to be hampered in expressing his
beliefs and desiring that be express such beliefs tact-
fully. To tolerate all but intolerance has long been a
libertarian motto and r fleets a desire to create an
environment in which minds can meet for purposes of
exchange rather than confrontation. An English liber-
tarian could easily argue, for example, that Malik or
Jordan did not really wish to change the hearts and minds
of those who disagreed, and thus failed to establish the
initial respect which would enable others to give them the
deference of listening. While it is difficult to establish
that a society "thinks" any particular way about any-
thing, it would appear that one could, for comparative pur-
poses, view the English as perceiving free speech as a
value of interaction rather than collision. A commitment
to speech is secondary to the commitment to communication
through speech and respect on both sides. As such, speech
can be legitimately restricted not only when it threatens
order, but also when it threatens decorum. The decorum
requirement is held to be essential if the speech is to
be meaningful. A deferential polity views democratic
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politics as less a matter of mandate and conflict and
more a matter of rule and control, in reference to free-
dom of expression it would appear that the English view
liberty not as a guarantee of a pure adversary-conflict
process, but more a matter of basic civility in social
interaction. Civil liberties do not become an extension
of the adversary legal process, but an extension of "good
form"
—
perceived as rules of cooperation, rather than
rules of conflict.
CHAPTER IV
OBSCENITY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
Obscene Publications Act of 1857
The Hicklin Rule
Until the passage of the obscene Publications Act
of 1959, English law on obscenity depended on an 1857 Act
which sought both to stop the sale of tawdry pamphlets on
Hollywell Street and to clear up the ambiguous nature of
common law doctrine on obscenity.^ The Act was designed
to "suppress works written for the single purpose of
corrupting the morals of youth and of a nature calculated
to shock the common feelings of decency in any well-
2
regulated mind." m 1868 Lord Chief Justice Cockburn,
R, V. Hicklin, interpreted the Act with phraseology
which became the keystone of Anglo-American notions on
obscenity. A work is obscene, and its author therefore
punishable under the Act, if it has a "tendency," according
to Lord Cockburn, "to deprave and corrupt those whose minds
are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a
3publication of this sort may fall."
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The diligence with which the 1857 Act was applied
varied of course according to the general climate of public
and official opinion. After sporadic use in the late
nineteenth century the number of prosecutions under the
Act rose in 1923 when the United Kingdom became a signatory
to a document from an International Convention dedicated to
the suppression of traffic in obscene publications. The
most notable case in this revival of prosecutions con-
sisted of the destruction order of Radcliff Hall's The well
4
of Loneliness. For the next quarter-century there was
what Harry Street called a "gradual cessation of prosecu-
tions in respect to literature," but the 1950 's marked
another increase in government concern about obscenfcy. It
was during this period that the King's Bench Division
cleared up legal details of the Act by holding that photo-
graphic negatives as well as positives come within the
meaning of the Act? and that the summons issued to a
publisher to "show cause" why the material should not be
destroyed must be made within a reasonable time of confis-
5
cation, but that eleven months is reasonable. It was
also held that if only the covers of a publication were
obscene, the destruction order could still include the
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entire publication:^ and that the prosecution should simply
present material thought to be obscene before justices
without comment or "innuendo," although when such "innuendo"
7
exists it will not overturn a conviction. In 1954 the
Court of Criminal Appeal held that a magistrate may leave
the matter of obscenity to the judgment of a jury, but
also went to great lengths to indicate that such a prac-
Q
tice was not only unnecessary, but probably bad procedure.
In the same year the Court of Criminal Appeal
refused to reverse a case on the ground that the Recorder
of London in his summation avoided any reference to con-
temporary standards.^ The court took note of the changing
standards for what may tend to deprave and corrupt but
held that the material in question possessed such a
tendency. The problem of a contemporary standard for
obscenity received more judicial attention, however, in
another 1954 case involving the publishers of Stanley
Kauffman's The Philanderers . The "opinion" in this case
consisted of Justice Stable's instructions to the jury
(five-and-a-half pages in the law reports) before each
member was given a copy of the novel to read and
evaluate.
While informing the jury that they were entitled to ignore
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any opinions he had about the matter, judge Stable expressed
his personal feeling that the prosecution's case contained
a "certain confusion of thought.' The prosecution had
suggested that the jury was going to determine whether
bool^s like The Philanderers were going to be published in
the future, and Stable warned the jury that their role
was not to establish what was good taste in the United
Kingdom, but simply to decide whether the prosecution had
established sufficient evidence to affix criminal punish-
ment for violation of a statute. After a lengthy discourse
on some of the more extreme Victorian attitudes about
parts of the body—such as referring to gentlemen's legs
as
-understandings"—Justice Stable cautioned the jury
that, while their function was to discover whether the
book tended to deprave and corrupt, they must be careful
not to confuse this criminal offense with any tendency
the work may have to shock or disgust.
The Hicklin rule. Stable further explained, answers
the question "corrupt and deprave whom?" by stipulating
anyone whose mind is open to such influences and into whose
hands the publication may fall. These words, however, are
not self-explanatory, according to Stable, and he therefore
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urged the jury to remember that much "great literature
. .
is wholly unsuitable for reading by the adolescent
. . .
and that the function of the contemporary novelist is not
merely to entertain, but to be "chroniclers of an age."
The Philanderers, the Justice admitted, may strike very
many people as very crude, but it purports to depict the
life of certain, perhaps not typical, people in New York
City. Since this is the objective of the novel. Judge
Stable asked
t
If we are going to read novels about how things
go in New York, it would not be of much
assistance, would it, if, contrary to the facts,
we were led to suppose that in New York no
unmarried woman or teenager has disabused her
mind of the idea that babies are brought by storks
or sometimes found in cabbage patches or under
gooseberry bushes?
In concluding. Justice Stable underlined his belief
in the necessity of obscenity statutes to protect a healthy
society, but warned of the ultimate ineffectiveness of
such laws if they are employed indiscriminately. The jury,
evidently choosing not to ignore Stable's personal opinion,
returned a verdict of "not guilty." This case is an
interesting example of how a trial judge, using instruc-
tions to the jury, can in effect truncate a statute at
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least on a case-by-case basis, since a literal rendering
of the Hicklin rule could have had The Philanderers
evaluated in terms of its effects on a sexually precocious
twe Ive-year-old
.
Reform
In response to the increasing number of prosecu-
tions for obscenity in the 1950 's the Society of Authors
set up a special committee, presided over by Sir Allen P.
Herbert, himself a prominent author and lawyer, which
sought to reform the Obscene Publications Act of 1857. Its
reform bill was introduced in the House of Commons by Roy
12Jenkins in March of 1955, but no action was then taken.
In the same year Parliament enacted the Children and Young
Persons (Harmful Publications) Act, 1955, in order to
deal with "horror comics." The Act punishes those who
produce stories told in pictures which portray violent,
cruel, repulsive, or horrible acts in a way which would
tend to corrupt a young person. In March of 1957 the
bill of the Society of Authors was referred to a Select
Committee, and a report to the House of Commons ensued two
years later. Impressed with what the committee viewed as
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the existence of a sizeable and lucrative trade in porno-
graphy, the report made proposals both for facilitating
the suppression of pornography and for clarifying the law
of obscene publications. The committee sought to vindicate
some of Judge Stable's concerns over the scope of the 1857
Act, and recommended that the effect of the work as a
whole be considered; that the defense of literary or
artistic merit be allowed; and that the author have a
right to produce evidence indicating that the material
does have literary merit.
The resulting Obscene Publications Act of 1959
was a compromise of the committee's report, which even in
its final form faced considerable opposition because of
the allowability of a defense based on artistic merit, and
on the admission of expert evidence as to artistic merit.
The 1959 Act tightens the definition of obscenity, but
expands the police power to suppress such obscenity.
Under the old Act, for example, the police could not obtain
a search warrant without evidence of previous sales; under
the new act a warrant can be had on evidence that the
material is being kept "for publication for gain." The
new Act also empowers the police to search bookstalls and
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vehicles and to seize business documents which might
help to uncover the wholesale outlets of obscene publica-
tions. However, the new act does not allow a defendant
to plead "no intent" to deprave or corrupt, but does allow
him to argue that he has not read the material, since
the accused is quite often not the author, but a book-
seller or the publisher, this defense was hailed as a
significant improvement by English libertarians.^^ Under
the new Act the author is also given the opportunity to
argue against destruction of the work and is entitled to
appeal against forfeiture even though he did not appear
before the court in the initial hearing.
Obscene Publications Act of 1959
Lady Chatter lev's Lover
The major clarification of the new obscene
Publications Act involved the prosecution of Penguin Books,
Inc., when they decided to mark the thirteenth anniversary
of D. H. Lawrence's death by publishing an unexpurgated
edition of Lady Chatterley 's Lover. The new Act, and the
success of the work in legal battles in the United States,
prompted the publishing house to attempt such a venture;
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but the Director of Public Prosecutions felt that the
work was prima facie obscene under the new statute.^"*
The well-publicized trial which ensued featured thirty-
five prominent authors, clergymen and scholars who testi-
fied on behalf of the book, pitted against the D.P.P. who
*t one point asked the jury if Lawrence' s work was a
book that "... you would wish your wife or your ser-
vants to read?" Three of the jurors were women, and the
defense counsel, noting that there were all sorts of
people, even jurors, who didn't have servants, exploited
the class prejudice implicit in the prosecution's argu-
ment. He recalled the observation of a judge in an earlier
case whose indictment against a work consisted of the
assertion that, "it would never do to let members of the
working class read this."^^
The prosecution was unsuccessful, and the major
importance of the encounter in R. v. Penguin Books , Ltd.
,
in addition to making the paperbook edition of Lady
Chatter ley '8 Lover an instant bestseller, was a ruling on
the status of the author's or publisher's "intent" vis-a-vis
depraving others and the proper application of the "public
good" defense. Justice Sir Laurence Byrne ruled against
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Penguin Booka
•
desire to introduce evidence as to their
(and D. H. Lawrence's) intent in publishing the work,
counsel for the publishing house argued that since the
new act was not a general censorship law but aimed only
at the obscene, the question of intent was of crucial
importance in determining the offense. Even though there
was much evidence to indicate that Parliament had intended
the accused to have the opportunity to rebut the presump-
tion of intent to corrupt under the new act, Byrne reasoned
that this was not allowed under the old act and the new
act did not specifically require it; so precedent ruled.
According to Harry Street, established tradition in
English legal procedure does not allow courts, in trying
to interpret law, to consult the reports of Parliament
and legislative committees. Courts roust rely on the
language of the act alone. The matter of intent was allowed
to sneak in on the defense of the public good, however,
when Byrne ruled that in deciding this issue the jury must
evaluate the general purpose of the author or publisher
in producing the work.
Apart from telling the jury that it was insufficient
that the book merely shock or disgust them to sustain it
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as obscene, the only help Byrne gave the jury as to the
meaning of the words "deprave and corrupt" was to offer
dictionary synonyms such as "make morally bad," "pervert/'
"debase," and "render morally unsound or rotten." The
defense of the public good, however, proved to be pivotal
in determining the outcome of the case. When the jury
deliberated for three hours, after having heard testimony
and read the book, and returned a verdict of not guilty,
C. H. Rolph claimed that the defense of the public good
probably prevented a hung jury.''-^ Reportedly nine of the
jurors were in favor of acquittal on the grounds that the
work did not tend to deprave and corrupt. Three other
jurors believed that the work was obscene, but on the
further question of publication for the public good, they
were convinced that the literary merits of the novel out-
weighed its obscenity; on the basis of this balancing
18process they supported acquittal.
Even though this case was only a specific trial
with no necessary force as interpretation in English law
it in a de facto sense began a construction of the Act
which emphasized expert evidence. The defense of public
good, Byrne insisted, did not mean that publishers who can
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give any kind of justification to literaty merit are
immune from punishment, m fact the onus is on the
defendant to establish "public good/' and the public good
must outweigh the harm caused by the work's obscenity.
The ruling that literary merit is part of the test for
the public good, even though this was clearly not the only
criterion, established a practice whereby both the defense
and the prosecution (which used no experts in this case)
can put forth diverse kinds of professional testimony to
help jurors determine the nature of the public good."^^
To a certain extent the D.P.p. was "cooperative"
in this case because of his decision to proceed against
the publisher rather than individual booksellers. The
latter course of action would certainly have resulted in
either less will or less finances to conduct an all-out
legal defense. No doubt Penguin Books emerged from the
whole incident with a profit, since the trial itself helped
to publicize the book, but the libertarian "victory" was
marred somewhat by Judge Byrne's refusal to award costs
to the publishing house. In this particular case the
costs were Ll3,000 and Milton Konvitz, totalling up the
court costs in both England and America (where the book had
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been cleared for the U. S. malls a weelc before), concluded
that the clearing of "Lady Chatter ley" of her ill repute,
along with vindicating the public's right to read, cost
at least $111,400.00.
R. V. Shaw
In 1961 the "Ladies Directory Case," in which
Frederick Shaw was indicted for publishing a prostitute's
directory, led to further judicial analysis of the new
20Obscene Publication Act. On appeal before the Criminal
Court of Appeals, Shaw sought a reversal of his conviction
at the Central Criminal Court in 1960, in which a jury
had found his activities to contravene 1) the Sexual
Offenses Act of 1956, because he was living wholly or in
part on the earnings of prostitution; 2) conspiring to
corrupt public morals by means of his magazine entitled,
"Ladies Directory;" and, 3) publishing an obscene article,
namely, an edition of the Directory, contrary to the
Obscene Publications Act of 1959. Shaw had been sen-
tenced to nine months' imprisonment. He had apparently
decided to publish the Directory, which consisted of names,
photographs, and other descriptions of prostitutes, to
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create a medium through which prostitutes could advertise
for clients. (Changes in the Street Offenses Act in 1959
had put penalties on soliciting in the streets.) Shaw,
who also claimed he had "cleared" the publication with
Scotland Yard before distribution, argued that his
endeavor had an "honesty of purpose" which should indicate
he had no illegal intent. Judge Ashworth, speaking for
the Criminal Court of Appeal, noted that the 1959 Act,
unlike a common law prosecution for obscene libel, did not
require an intention to corrupt— " . . . obscenity depends
on the article and not on the author. "^^
The main argument offered by counsel for Shaw
against the application of the OPA was that the trial
judge, during his instructions to the jury, incorrectly
directed them to regard what people did after reading the
Directory at; a test for obscenity. The trial judge had
defined the problem as one in which the jury was to decide
whether Shaw's magazine did encourage readers to contact
prostitutes. If the jury decided that such contact was
encouraged, the next step was to decide whether such
conduct corrupts or depraves people. Judge Ashworth did
22
not find this objectionable.
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Shaws final argument against the application of
the OPA was that inasmuch as the people likely to read
the "Ladies Directory" were people who had come to such
areas as Soho and Paddington in search of the practices
advertised in the booklet, they were corrupt and depraved
already. Therefore, argued Shaw, he cannot be found
guilty of corrupting those who are corrupt in the first
place. Judge Ashworth simply noted, "The fallacy in this
argument is that it assumes that a man cannot be corrupted
more than once. . . ."^^
The Court of Appeal held the first count of living
off the earning of a prostitute to be applicable, because
through the advertisements in his periodical Shaw was "in
essence
. . .
paid by the prostitutes." Shaw had argued
that he did not receive the prostitutes' earnings but
merely profited from the sale of the booklet after all
expenses had been met through advertising. To Judge
Ashworth this was a "much too narrow view of the facts. ""^^
The common law charge of conspiracy to corrupt
public morals was, however, a more complicated matter
for the Court of Appeal. Counsel for Shaw had insisted,
25
with considerable justification, that the use of the
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common law concept of "corrupting public morals" in this
case was the creation of a new offense by judicial fiat.
This argument was rejected by judge Ashworth because, in
his view, the court was not amaking new laws, simply
applying "existing law to new facts. "^^ The fact that
the precise definition of public decency and morality
will vary over a period of time because of different
juries does not affect the principle that conduct calcu-
lated or intended to corrupt public morals is an indict-
27
able misdemeanor.
The upholding of the common law charge was
especially awkward for the Criminal Court of Appeals since
Section II (4) of the Act of 1959 stipulates that the
Obscene Publications Act, not coiranon law, is to be used
if the essence of the offense is that the matter is
obscene. Counsel for Shaw argued that Parliament's intent
in his subsection was to prevent obscenity proceedings at
common law against a publication that was also being pro-
secuted under the Act itself. It was also argued that the
thrust of the indictment was obscenity, since that was
the concept necessary to establish any "conspiracy to
corrupt public morals." To this Judge Ashworth replied:
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In our view, the short answer to this
argument is that the offense at Common Law,
mainly, conspiracy to corrupt public morals,
did not 'consist of the publication' of the
booklets. The Common Law offense alleged by
the prosecution consisted of the agreement of
the appellant and others to corrupt public
morals by means of the booklets and although
it is unlikely that if the appellant had been
acquitted on a third count he would have been
convicted on the first, the two counts involve
different issues and the verdict on each need
not necessarily have been the same, in our
view the primary object of S. 2 (4) was to
exclude proceedings at Common Law for the
Common Law offense of publishing an obscene
libel. The offense has not been abolished by
the Act of 1959, although as a result of the
subsection, proceedings in respect of it can
no longer be brought. ®
The Court of Appeal found all three counts to be
valid. It dismissed Shaw's pleas against the nine-month
sentence, which it felt would have been appropriate on
any one of the counts, but did grant leave to appeal to
the House of Lords with reference to counts one and two.
The Law Lords sustained Judge Ashworth's reading of
29Section II (4) of the OPA.
Definition of "Publication"
An appeal in 1962 by one Will Barker against his
conviction and sentence of eighteen months' imprisonment
before a recorder and jury at Manchester Crown Court on
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five counts of publishing obscene articles in the form of
photographs and catalogs forced the Criminal Court of
Appeal to define what "publication" meant under the OPA.
Barker did not deny production of the photographs,
but he did claim that 1) the photographs in question were
not obscene within the meaning of the Act of 1959 and,
2) that since he sent the photographs to only four
individuals (one of whom claimed that he used them only
for sketching and never revealed them to anyone else)
,
he was not really "publishing" within the meaning of the
Act. judge Ashworth ultimately ordered the conviction
quashed, but not on any ground that was part of the
appeal argument. Ashworth held that the Trial Recorder's
direction that the jury disregard the testimony of one
of the recipients that he showed the photos to no one was
a misdirection. The Recorder had also emphasized the
fact that Barker had no knowledge of the age of those
who applied for his photographs, which Judge Ashworth
thought was an irrelevant factor which, together with the
misdirection, led him to conclude that the issues were
30
not properly placed before the jury.
In disposing of the arguments presented by Barker,
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however, the Court of Criminal Appeal ruled that the forms
of publication punishable under the OPA fall into three
distinct groups: first, publication to an individual;
second, publication on a wider scale involving more than
one person; and third, a mere offer for sale or letting on
hire which would constitute publication. So even though
Barker's conviction did not stand, the Court of Criminal
Appeal made it clear that "publication" means making any-
thing available to another, and even held that an exchange
of money is not essential to the notion "publish,"
The Copper Case
The issue of who can appeal a decision under the
OPA also arose in 1962 when a metropolitan police officer
(Burke) equipped with the proper warrant, confiscated 650
photographs, negatives, prints, etc., from the shop of
John B. Copper. Copper appeared to offer arguments as
to why the articles should not be forfeited and apparently
convinced the Middlesex Justices of the Peace that only
123 photographs and prints and 46 negatives were obscene,
because the rest of the articles were returned. Burke
appealed to the Queen's Bench Division urging that all the
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material was obscene and that there was no reason for
distinguishing between the articles forfeited and those
returned.
Copper's defense at the appellate level consisted
of two basic points. First, he claimed that the Act of
1959 "in effect contained its own code," and that in this
self-contained code there is a provision for appeal: it
stipulated that the party who has appeared to show cause
why material should not be forefeited has an appeal, but
the statute said nothing about the prosecution. To this
argument Lord Parker stated that while for certain purposes
the Act could be said to contain its own code, it cer-
tainly did not create a special code in regard to appeals. "^^
The second point pressed by counsel for Copper
was that Burke could have appealed only under the Magistrate'
Courts Act of 1952. That Act provides appellate procedures
for any person who is a party to a proceeding before a
magistrate's court. Counsel for Copper argued that Burke
was not a party to the proceedings and was not aggrieved
by the order. Lord Parker agreed that since no costs
were ordered against him. Burke was not a person aggrieved,
"But I am quite satisfied that he was a party lo the
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proceedings." Another factor to keep in mind, according
to Lord Parker, is that Burke was "not complaining in
respect of his success. He was complaining in respect
of the many, many articles in respect of which no order
33
was made."
This argument by Lord Parker is far from self-
explanatory, and he did not offer much elaboration. He
seemed to be saying that Copper's argument to the effect
that the magistrate's order was final and therefore could
not be appealed by the prosecution under the Act of 1959
or the Magistrate's Courts Act was fallacious because
Burke was not challenging the order itself but rather what
was not ordered. Lord Parker may have felt that his kind
of distinction was necessary, since counsel for Copper did
argue that there is no right of appeal in favor of a
prosecutor who has succeeded. Lord Parker was arguing
that the prosecution was not appealing what it succeeded
in doing, but rather what it was not successful in doing.
Lord Parker took great pains to explain that the
question of obscenity was largely "factual" and therefore
a judgment which is properly the jurisdiction of the
Justices, and that the Queen's Bench Division should limit
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itself to questions of law and not "superimpose their
judgment of obscenity over that of the justices."'^'*
But in this case the Justices "went wrong in law," Lord
Parker concluded, because, "There is no conceivable basis
on which it could be said that some photographs in the
bundle forfeited are more obscene than photographs in
the bundles which have not been ordered forfeited.
" To
dramatize the superficiality of the distinction made by
the Justices, Lord Parker, not exactly one who has a
great aversion to subtle distinctions, pointed out that,
"We had our attention drawn to one particular photograph
which appears in two bundles, the one to be forfeited
and the other a bundle not to be forfeited.
In those circumstances, it is perfectly
clear that something has gone very wrong.
Counsel for the respondent, I do not think
from any inspired knowledge but merely as a
suggestion, ventured to suggest that maybe
the justices divided up the photographs and
were each responsible for a certain number, and
on that basis it would be possible for one
justice to take a certain view of obscenity and
the other to take a different view. I am
loathe to think that that happened because it
would have been a most improper thing. The
decision is not a decision of individual
justices but a decision of the whole bench.
Something, as I have said, went clearly wrong.
Finding the same photograph in both the allowable
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and the "obscene' bundle is perhaps an index of a certain
amount of inattentiveness on the part of the Justices.
But Lord Parker's criticism (even though he called it a
"critic isra in law," when one could presumably argue with-
out great difficulty that he was substituting his "factual
observations" for those of the Justices) even goes to the
extent of arguing that the justices perhaps did not
realize how socially harmful these photographs were.
.
. .
these articles were liable to be sent to
anybody, young boys, school children, young
girls and anybody on payment of the price. One
has only to look at these photographs to
realize that in the vast majority of cases there
is no conceivable artistic merit. They provide
no inspiration, as has been said in other cases,
and are purely filth.
What was extremely interesting, and one could sub-
mit extremely devious in this case, was Lord Parker's
assertion, which he had to make in order to obtain juris-
diction, that the Justices made some sort of essential
mistake "in law." This is a point which he continually
asserted but in no sense proved. There emerges here a
curious kind of 'judicial activism," in the sense that
the appellate judges are construing their own role broadly
in order to reinforce police autonomy and free them from
the "errors in law" at Middlesex.
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Deprave and Corrupt Whom?
R. V. C layton
Later in 1962 two proprietors of a book shop were
convicted of conspiracy and the selling of obscene articles
under the act, and received sentences of fifteen months'
imprisonment on each count. The complication in this
case, and the basis for the appeal before the Court of
Criminal Appeal, was that the recipients of the obscene
articles were two plainclothes officers on the staff of
the Obscene Publications Department of New Scotland Yard.
Since the criterion set forth in the statute to determine
obscenity is the effect of the material (i.e., tendency
to deprave or corrupt) on those who are likely to receive
it, the bookshop proprietors argued that no obscenity had
been proved because the police officers, under cross-
examination, testified that the photography in the maga-
zines sold to them did not arouse any feelings in them
whatsoever
.
Lord Parker, for the Court of Criminal Appeal,
noted that precedents had established that the test of
obscenity was the effect of material on the recipient,
and while partially agreeing with the prosecution that
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there was such a thing as " inherent obscenity" which
could characterize the material itself, held that the
charge roust be related to the susceptibility of the
. 40
viewer. The prosecution had argued that the photographs
were inherently obscene and would tend to deprave and
corrupt a likely buyer. The fact, they urged, that the
material did not corrupt a "scientific viewer" (New
Scotland Yard) should not undermine the charge of "selling"
obscene material. Lord Parker, however, ordered the con-
victions for selling quashed because the offense depended
on what happened to the buyer. But the convictions for
conspiracy stood because, according to Parker, the only
possible defense against the charge would be to prove that
the proprietors sought only to sell their material to
New Scotland Yard and other such "scientific observers."
No such evidence was presented, and Parker reiterated the
fact that even if it were, conspiracy requires no actual
publication or measurement of the effect on others.
Relying on R. v. Shaw , Parker also rejected the
argument that the common law offense of conspiracy to
corrupt public morals is Inapplicable to a case being
tried under the OPA, by claiming that the two offenses
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are different and that the OPA conviction had been
quashed anyway.
This in effect means that there are two different
kinds of obscenity. One, under the OPA, is defined in
terras of the effect on an actual recipient; the other,
under common law, depends on intent to corrupt. The
publication is irrelevant to this offense, the courts
insist, but it raises the interesting question of how one
would prove intent without finding some material which
was obscene, obscene in this context, since the recipient-
effect standard is irrelevant, would have to be based on
the "inherent obscenity" of a piece of evidence which the
prosecution uses to demonstrate an intent to deprave and
corrupt others. Presumably "no intent" would be allowed
as a defense for this charge since we are not talking
about "obscene libel," which the OPA supersedes, but con-
spiracy to corrupt public morals which is still an indict-
able offense under common law. "Still" in this context
may only mean "since R. v. Shaw , " but it is an easier
charge to prosecute since it avoids recipients of material.
Parker even ended his opinion with a small apology to
police officials for handicapping them under the OPA but
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told them that test purchases were still valuable because
the police could then obtain a warrant to seize obscene
material in order to bring conspiracy charges. (They
are presumably relevant only to help establish intent.)
This seems to be a judicial tip to the police to concen-
trate on conspiracy rather than on the selling of obscene
material, what constitutes corruption of public morals
is a decision the jury makes with reference to their
understanding of both 'public" and "morals;" what con-
stitutes obscenity depends on the jury's evaluation of the
effect material has on actual, non-scientific, individuals.
This would imply that corruption of public morals is a
more general notion than obscenity, and one in which the
jury has more discretion.
R. V. Mayling
The contention, used successfully in R. v. Clayton ,
that, where the offense required a tendency to deprave and
corrupt, the police could not be used as a substitute for
the public, was unsuccessful as a defense against a common
law indictment for outraging public decency. A case in
1963 concerned a homosexual incident in a public lavatory
"to the great disgust and annoyance of divers of Her
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Majesty's subjects within whose purview such behavior was
committed." The "subjects" in this instance were the
apprehending police officers, and their "disgust and
annoyance," according to Justice Ashworth of the Court of
Criminal Appeal, could be used as evidence of the type
of annoyance required, it was more important, according
to the Court of Appeal, however, to realize that the pith
of the indictment was that the act was indecent and
committed in public, rather than that it was the reaction
42
of probable onlookers.
Queen's Bench Division
Morgan v. Eowker
In 1963 the Queen's Bench Division reviewed two
prosecutions under the OPA, the first of which concerned
the conviction of Robert Charles Morgan for publishing
obscene film, photographs and magazines which were adver-
tised in a booklet entitled, "Glamor Catalog 1962." This
catalog was advertised in a magazine called "Sparkle,"
which contained order forms inviting readers to order
copies of the catalog and/or some films and other material
described in Morgan's ad. No restriction appeared on the
i
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order form as to age or sex of the potential customer.
After presentation of the catalog and some examples of
its products. Justices of the County of Buckingham,
sitting at Slough, ordered Morgan to appear and "show
cause .
"
After the Justices had ordered forfeiture, Morgan
appealed to the Queen's Bench on two grounds. The first
was a procedural point involving the question of whether
the full court or only one Justice could issue the
summons, in Slough all the Justices had viewed Morgan's
material (for about five hours) and then all had ordered
the summons. Solicitors for Morgan argued that the use
of the full court to issue a summons to "show cause"
meant that the court had already decided the material to
be obscene, and therefore they could not have open minds
to Morgan's defense that the material was not obscene.
Lord Parker, speaking for the Queen's Bench, dismissed
this argument by explaining that the Act did not require
a prima facie case of obscenity and then a full hearing to
decide obscenity in fact. The function of the hearing
was not to determine the obscenity of the material but
rather to evaluate any reasons the appellant may give as
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to why matter already determined to be obscene should not
be forfeited.'*^
The second ground concerned the relvance of actual
recipients of the articles. The Justices at Slough
refused to hear any testimony about persons who received
copies of the material in question. Morgan claimed that
when he received orders for films and other material he
always wrote back to the respondent asking them to declare
they were over twenty-one years of age. This practice,
Morgan argued, should be allowed as evidence that his
material was not published for the young and therefore
could not be obscene within the meaning of the Act. The
Justices declined to hear such evidence by reasoning that
the Act required that they look only at the actual circum-
stance in which the articles were found in order to deter-
mine likely recipients rather than testimony about
recipients themselves. The Justices' interpretation of
their duty ste^rned from Section 3 of the OPA which states
j
For the purposes of this section the question
whether an article is obscene shall be deter-
mined on the assumption that copies of it would
be published in any manner likely having regard
to the circumstances in which it was found, but
in no other manner.
A confusion which, according to Parker, had been "constantly
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arising" was in the words, "but in no other manner."
In the present case the Justices took the view that it
meant they must be concerned with the actual circumstances
surrounding the finding which meant only the situation in
which the material was discovered. This interpretation,
for the Queen's Bench, was incorrect because the nature
of the offense required an assessment of the publication
with reference to the circumstances in which it was found,
and the "full circumstance" include the "nature of his
business and the method under which it has been
conducted
. . .
just as much as the nature of the premises.'
Morgan's intent is still quite irrelevant to the offense,
but testimony about who the actual recipients were is
not only not the same as establishing intent, it is
essential to determine whether the material will deprave
and corrupt. The case was returned to the justices, with
Lord Parker's instructions to consider whether the material
would corrupt adults; whether it was likely to be received
by minors; and if likely to be received by minors, would
46tend to deprave and corrupt them.
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Straker v. D.P.p.
On the same day as the Morgan decision the
Queen's Bench Clarified the status of negatives by holding
that unretouched prints made from seized negatives could
not be used as evidence, that the negatives should be
47forfeited. This appeal concerned the decision of the
Marlborough Street Magistrate's Court to seize about 1500
negatives and display cards from the studio of Jean
Straker. This was an unusual case in two respects: first,
Straker 's method of taking orders? and secondly. Lord
Parker's obvious sympathy for the defendant. Straker 's
studio, while at the end of a typical honky-tonk Soho
street, is also a corner building on Soho Square, an
affluent block of town houses in central Soho. Straker
considered himself a serious photographer and artist who
specialized in nude photography for both artistic and
medical uses. His method of advertising was to post
photographs of nudes (usually tastefully done) , in the
windows of the first floor of his studio, and then charge
a 5s. admission fee to his exhibition upstairs. Reportedly
once inside Straker 's studio each client could review
photographic prints on display cards. Each card had a
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number and for an additional fee prints could be ordered
from the corresponding negatives. The police seized
negatives, made their own copies, and presented these
positives along with the display cards as evidence that
Straker's work should be seized. Straker, conducting
his own defense in both the original hearing and on appeal
(where Lord Parker commended him for the "moderation"
with which he presented his case) argued that the unre-
touched prints were made by the police, not him, and could
not be used as evidence of material which he published.
Lord Parker agreed and ordered the negatives returned to
Straker, but was careful to avoid any general ruling that
negatives are not "articles" within the meaning of the
Act, simply that in this case the only negatives which
could be seized were those from which Straker had made
an obscene positive.
Straker also argued that the Magistrate was
incorrect in insisting that any member of the public could
receive a print, because he was vary cautious about
accepting the admission fee and taking orders for prints
so that no one was likely to be corrupted or depraved.
Lord Parker strongly implied that he would personally
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believe Striker's claim, but in his view the Queen's
Bench could only be concerned with whether the Magistrate
had erred in law. And since the Magistrate had found 204
of the display cards to be obscene and since Straker
could not tell whether something would tend to deprave or
corrupt an individual merely by looking at him, the for-
feiture of the material stood.
" Obscenity" Not
Restricted to Sex
Obscenity as Encouraging the Use of Narcotics
An important clarification and extension of the
concept "obscene" occurred in 1964 in the Queen's Bench
48Division's ruling in John Calder , Ltd. v. Powell . This
case concerned the confiscation of Cain's Book by Alexander
Trocchi, along with numerous other articles considered
obscene by Justices of the Peace in Sheffield. Calder
Ltd. (the publishers) appeared at the "show cause" hearing
although the shop owner and publishers of other material
confiscated did not present evidence. Calder Ltd. called
upon five expert witnesses, including the author, who
testified that, in their opinion, the book did not tend
to corrupt or deprave anybody. They also urged that even
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if the book did corrupt some individuals, it was still a
book of literary and sociological merit. One of the most
interesting aspects of the case was that the book concerned
the life of a narcotic addict in New York City, and the
prosecution invoked the obscene Publications Act of 1959
because they felt the book highlighted the favorable
effects of drug-taking. The danger of the book from the
standpoint of the prosecution was related to drugs, not
•ex. The Justices agreed and found that the work, taken
as a whole, was likely to deprave the people who were
likely to buy it.^^
Calder Ltd. on appeal argued that the book was
unlikely to corrupt individuals, and that the positive
testimony of the expert witnesses had not been rebutted
by the prosecution since the Crown called no witnesses.
The publishing company also argued that the Crown gave no
evidence that the book was not for the "public good" simply
50that it was obscene. Section 4 of the Act provides that
if any publication is justified as being "for the public
good, that is, in the interests of science, literature,
or other objects of general concern," it shall not be
destroyed, and also guarantees the right of the opinion
of experts to be used in deciding this question. The
Justices, in dealing with the matter of the expert
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testimony presented, simply stated that they did not
accept the evidence as sufficient, and therefore Calder
Ltd. had not proved that the publication was for the
public good.
Lord Parker, in giving the decision of the Queen's
Bench Division, stated that he also felt that there was
"abundant evidence" on which the Justices could come to a
decision that the book was obscene even with the existent
of expert opinion. Part of the argument used by Calder
Ltd. was the assertion that the justices should not have
read the book but simply evaluated evidence laid before
them by the prosecution and defense. To this Lord Parker
replied that the justices are certainly free to look at
the books themselves just as they are perfectly entitled,
however honest the witness, to say that they cannot accepts
his evidence. If the Justices are free to listen to
expert evidence, Parker asserts, they are equally entitled
52
. . . if they choose, to disregard that evidence."
Calder ltd. had misconstrued Section 4 of the Act.
In Parker's view the relevant section of the Act can be
rephrased this way:
. . . granted that a book has been properly
found to be obscene, nevertheless it nay be for
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the public good that it should be published, and,in deciding whether it is for the public goodthat It should be published, the justices must
consider whether this publication would bejustified on the grounds of science, literature
art or learning, or other objects of general concern.
In other words, the justices must weigh up the
obscenity against the merits of the article in
order to decide whether its publication is for
the public good.^^
In this kind of a case. Lord Parker seemed to be saying,
the Justices make up their minds as to whether the obscene
material has sufficient social merit not to destroy it.
Since the issue of obscenity is already decided, the
problem becomes one of weighing the social utility of
the article against its obscenity. The defense had argued
that the burden of proof had been reversed, and it was
essentially up to Calder Ltd. to establish "public good."
Lord Parker agreed, stating, "... the onus of proof on
the basis of probabilities is on the defense, "^^ but
didn't find this state of affairs objectionable.
Another obvious issue raised by the defense in
this case, but not the pivotal argument in their appeal,
was that the concept obscenity must have something to do
with sex. Lord Parker realized that this was a rather
crucial point, since none of the other points would matter
if obscenity had to be related to sex. Counsel for
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Calder Ltd. had argued that obscenity in the past had
always been treated as having regard to sexual desires
and sexual behavior, and that the word must be confined
to that sort of behavior. Lord Parker replied:
Of course it is true that the cases thathave so far come before the court are all
concerned with articles which do concern sex;but the fact that there has been no decision
on the point certainly does not conclude the
matter in his favor.
Counsel for Calder had even referred to the U. S.
Supreme Court decision in Roth v. United States to help
demonstrate that obscenity must be used in conjunction
with sex. Lord Parker, not going into the jurisdictional
aspects of this kind of argument, and also "confessing"
that he had not had time to read a report of the case in
detail, stated, "... but, in my judgment it is per-
fectly plain that depravity, and indeed, obscenity (because
obscenity is treated as a tendency to deprave) is quite
apt to cover what was suggested by the prosecution in
this case."
This book—the less said about it the better-
concerned the life, or imaginary life, of a junkie
in New York, and the suggestion of the prosecution
was that the book highlighted, as it were, the
favorable effects of drug-taking, and, so far from
condemning it, advocated it, and that there was a
real danger that those into whose hands the book
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carae might be tempted at any rate to experiment
with drugs and get the favorable sensations high-lighted by the book. ^
7
English law has held that there is more than one
road to depravity, with sex being the most frequently used
but by no means the only path.
Glorification of Violence as Obscenity
In 1967 the scope of the concept obscenity was
found to be even broader when the OPA was invoked against
"bubble gum" cards which depicted military battles. This
case was brought to the Queen's Bench by the prosecution
because Justices of the Northeast London Commission
refused to allow the prosecution to use testimony of
psychiatrists. The psychiatric testimony was to the effect
that the cards sold by A. and B. C. Chewing Gum, Ltd.,
would tend to corrupt and deprave the average child. Lord
Parker ruled that if the defense can use expert testimony
58the prosecution may also.
The London Justices had read the OPA as allowing
for expert testimony to establish the social value of
material but reserving the question of the tendency of
material to deprave and corrupt for the court and jury, not
a psychiatrist. According to Parker the ultimate question
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of which cards tended to deprave and corrupt was up to
the Justices, but evidence as to the general effect of
the material in question would have on the minds of
children should be allowed. By excluding such evidence,
the court hampered nob only the prosecution, but prevented
the defense from cross-examining experts put forth by the
state on a question which is pivotal to the entire indict-
ment. The question of whether material tends to deprave
and corrupt is properly the prerogative of the judge and
jury, but in answering this question they "need all the
help they can get," Lord Parker stated.
A point which the Queen's Bench felt needed some
additional clarification, however, was the interpretation
of the OPA put forth by the chewing gum company to the
effect that expert testimony could only be allowed to
establish the "public good" of material which had already
been decided to be obscene. Parker wished to make it
clear that expert testimony is allowable on both the
question of the social utility of obscene work and the
tendency of the material to deprave and corrupt (obscenity) .
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Defense of the " Public Good "
Private Prosecut ions
"Last Exit to Brooklyn," by Hubert Selby, jr., is
a series of stories about New York homosexuals and drug
addicts and the violence characterizing their environment.
In January, 1966, the publishing house of Calder and
Boyers, Ltd., realizing that the book was controversial
and might be regarded as offending the OPA, had its
solicitors write the Director of Public Prosecutions and
enclose a copy of the book along with their announcement
that they proposed to publish the work. The publishing
company, in this letter, argued that the work was serious
literature and not likely to appeal to those with merely
a "prurient interest," but also stated that if the Director
did decide to prosecute they would engage in a strenuous
legal defense against such a move.
If, contrary to their expectations, the Director
did decide to prosecute, the company requested that pro-
ceedings be instituted under Section 2 of the Act, wherein
a defendant is entitled to be tried by a judge and a jury,
as opposed to Section 3 under which the book itself would
be forfeited if it was considered obscene. A return letter
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Strongly implied that the D.P.P. didn't feel any action
against the book was necessary, using the sarae ground
originally put forth by the Attorney General, sir Elywn
Jones, who declined to prosecute because he saw no chance
to prevail against a serious, if somewhat repulsive, work.
However, Sir Cyril Black, described by Anthony
Lewis of the New York Tiroes as the Conservative Party's
member of Parliament who "regards himself as a moral watch-
dog of the community," brought private criminal prosecu-
tion under Section 3 of the Act.^^ This action was success-
ful, and the magistrate who heard the case ordered the
forfeiture of the three copies of the book which had been
seized. Calder and Boyers again wrote the Director of
Public Prosecutions informing him that in spite of the
magistrate's decision, they intended to continue pub-
lishing the book and expressed their willingness to fight
legally and proceeding he might feel impelled to take
under Section 2. The D.P.P. responded to the challenge
and was successful in getting a conviction against the
publishers in Central Criminal Court which resulted in a
60
L 100 fine plus L 500 towards the cost of prosecution.
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Court of Appeals
The basis for the publishing company's appeal
primarily concerned the trial judge's instruction to the
jury on 1) the meaning of "obscene;" 2) paraphrasing the
defense's allegation that the book was not obscene? and
3) guidance on the matter of "public good" as a defense
against punishment stemming from the OPA"
Judge Salmon, delivering the opinion of the Court
of Appeals, felt that the appellants' argument that the
trial judge should have explained that the essence of
moral corruption is to make a person behave badly or worse
than he otherwise would behave or blur his perception of
the difference between good and evil, would have resulted
in only greater ambiguity. The trial judge simply reiterated
dictionary definitions of "deprave" and "corrupt," and
instructed the jury that they must concentrate not on
isolated passages by the work taken as a whole. When a
statute lays down the definition of a word or phrase "in
plain English, it is rarely necessary and often unwise
for the judge to attempt to improve on the . . . definition,"
according to Judge Sllmon.
A flaw in the instructions to the jury which the
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appellants didn't point out, but which Judge Salmon
thought raised a 'difficult question/' was guidance on
the matter of "persons likely to read the book." To
Judge Salmon this cannot mean "all" persons, nor can it
mean "individuals who may be corrupted by almost anything."
Ultimately, according to Salmon, the question becomes one
of numbers: how many are corrupted. The statute cannot
be construed as meaning that a majority of the average
readers would be corrupted, because, according to Salmon,
such a work could never be justified as being for the
"public good." The interesting implication here is that
if a work should corrupt a simply majority, then it cannot
be defended as being for the public good—which would
make the defense of literary merit applicable only if
less than fifty-one per cent tended to be depraved. By
a process of elimination. Judge Salmon held that the
requisite number of corrupted to constitute the offense
cannot be all, it cannot be a majority, it cannot be one,
or even an aggregate of the easily corruptible.
This court is of the opinion that the jury
should have been directed to consider whether
the effect of the book was to tend to deprave
and corrupt a significant proportion of those
persons likely to read it. What is a significant
proportion is a matter entirely for the jury
to decide. ^2
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The lack of such an instruction is serious,
according to Salmon, but since it is impossible to deter-
mine whether the absence of such instruction made the jury
conclude that one must be corrupted or more than half of
the readers must be corrupted, the lack of direction on
this matter alone does not vitiate the conviction.
Two other flaws in the direction to the jury were
serious enough, however, for the Court of Appeals to over-
turn the conviction. The first was the trial judge's
failure to paraphrase the defense's argument against the
charge that the work was in fact obscene. The defense
argued that instead of tending to encourage any one to
homosexuality, drug-taking or senseless violence, the
book vrauld have precisely the reverse effect. The trial
judge construed that argument to be that the book could
have socially constructive effects, and paraphrased it
as part of the defense's argument on "public good," not
on obscenity itself. Judge Salmon viewed this as a fatal
defect since it was a contention that the book would not
have the effect the prosecution alleged, and that the
jury's assessment of the effect of the work is crucial
to the finding of obscenity. The jury might well have
rejected the defense' argur^ent, but the Court of Appeal
could not be absolutely certain, and the fact that the
jury deliberated for nearly five and one-half hours in
this case created the possibility of a "miscarriage of
justice. "^-^
The second flaw, according to the Court of Appeal,
was the lack of guidance on the "public good" provision
of the Act. The trial judge faced a difficult task
because he had no previous authority to help him with
the proper interpretation of the "public good," a section
of the OPA which Judge Salmon noted left even the Director
of Public Prosecution in a "state of perplexity." Any
guidance given by the trial judge might have been inade-
quate, but the problem in this case was no guidance at
all for the jury, "in effect he threw them in at the
deep end of S.4 and left them to sink or swim in its drrk
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waters." Judge Salmon, at least aptly named for such
aquatic metaphors, plunged into the dark waters of Section
4 and stated that in such a case:
. . . the jury must consider on the one hand
the number of readers they believe would tend to
be depraved and corrupted by the book, the strength
of the tendency to deprave and corrupt, and the
nature of the depravity or corruption; on the other
hand, they should assess the strength of the literary.
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sociological or ethical merit which they considerthe book to possess. They should then weigh up
all these factors and decide whether on balance
the publication is proved to be justified as beingfor the public good. A book may be worthless; abook may have slight but real merit; it may be a
work of genius. Between those extremes the grada-
tions are almost infinite. A book may tend to deprave
or corrupt a significant but comparatively small
number of readers or a large number or indeed the
majority of its readers. The tendency to deprave
and corrupt may be strong or slight. The depravity
and corruption may also take various forms, it
may be to induce erotic desires of a heterosexual
kind or to promote homosexuality or other sexual
perversions or drug taking or brutal violence. All
these are matters for the jury to consider and
weigh up; it is for them to decide in the light
of the importance they attach to those factors
whether or not the publication is for the public
good. A jury must set the standard of what is
acceptable, of what is for the public good in the
age in which we live.^^
The significance of the Calder case, in addition
to the "significant proportion" rule for establishing how
many must be corrupted, is that it makes clear that the
judgment of the "public good" served by any work is to be
based on the jury's weighing the positive effect the
book may have in literary or sociological terras against
the work's tendency to deprave and corrupt. Confusion
had arisen in previous cases because expert witnesses were
asked whether they regarded a particular book or section
of the book to be obscene. This ruling stipulates that
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What the experts should have been asked was whether they
regarded the book to have literary or other merit, with
the jury deciding whether these merits counterbalanced
the harm which they have already decided exists since
they have labeled the material obscene. A review of the
Calder case in the Quarterly Review found the holding
to "make sense of the law" because a jury may find with-
out questioning an expert's view, "that a book has great
literary merits and that on balance the book does more
66harm than good." However, as in the Chewing Gum case,
it appears clear that the defense can use expert wit-
nesses to present evidence to the jury that the work in
question does not tend to deprave and corrupt. Once the
jury decides that the work would tend to deprave and
corrupt a significant proportion of those likely to read
it, then experts are restricted to questions of literary
merit. But since the jury does not retire to decide
obscenity and then to sit again to hear evidence about
social merit, it is virtually impossible for experts to
know when they are doing what. The implementation of this
decision would seem to depend on the trial judge's ability
to sort out arguments about the effect of the book on
individuals and the importance of the book to society.
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Post Office Act of 1953
R. V. Stanley
In 1965 the Court of Criminal Appeals was called
upon to interpret the Post Office Act of 1953 and dis-
tinguish something which is "indecent- from something
which is "obscene." This case concerned the conviction
of Allen B. Stanley at the London Sessions Court on two
counts of sending a postal packet containing indecent and
obscene articles through the mail and conspiracy with his
co-accused and others to contravene the same section of the
Post Office Act. Stanley was also indicted on two counts
under the OPA of 1959 for publishing two obscene films;
the indictment failed, even though a fourteen-year-old
boy was found to possess a catalog describing Stanley's
films, because the jury found his films to be "indecent"
but not "obscene." Stanley was fined L 100 for viola-
tions of the Post Office Act and on appeal invoked
essentially four different arguments.
He claimed, first, that the instructions to the
jury were insufficient because the words "indecent" and
the words "obscene" were employed tautologically to convey
the same idea and mean the same thing. Second, he alleged.
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the jury had clearly indicated that they had found the
brochures referred to in the indictment as "indecent" but
not "obscene" because they acquitted him on the counts
stemming from the OPA. Therefore, their verdicts of
guilty on the counts stemming from the Post office Act
were "unreasonable." Third, he argued that, if the words
"indecent" and "obscene" were not synonymous, the counts
against him under the Post Office Act duplicated one
another because they alleged two separate or alternative
offenses in each count, and they were also vague. Fourth,
he claimed, the judge was wrong in law because he failed
to exclude evidence by the fourteen-year-old boy as to
the effect that certain exhibits had on him (the boy).^^
Lord Parker dismissed the argument about the testi-
mony of the boy by simply stating that it was "inconceivable"
that such testimony could have made the "slightest
63difference." on the semantic issue Lord Parker explained
that the London Sessions Chairman defined "indecent" to
mean simply something that offends the "ordinary modesty
of the average man," whereas "obscene" has a statutory
definition involving the tendency of material to deprave
and corrupt. The jury had concluded that neither the films
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nor the brochure were obscene but that they were indecent.
counsel for the appellant had relied heavily on some
dicta from a 1953 case in which Lord Cooper had stated
that "indecent or obscene" were employed tautologically
to convey the same idea.^^ All that Lord Cooper was trying
to convey, according to Parker, was that the two words
expressed the same idea but in varying degrees, m order
to make this assertion Parker had to stretch the meaning
of Cooper's opinion (where the point was exactly the
opposite of his) but the essential fact for Lord Parker
was that they jury recognized the works in question not
to offend against standards at the 'top end of the scale
so as to be obscene, but only at the lower end in that
70they were indecent." To the Court of Criminal Appeal
an indecent article is not necessarily obscene, but an
obscene article is necessarily indecent.
" Backup Statute " for
When the OPA Fails
Mr. David Cunliffe, publisher of an anthology
entitled The Golden Convolvulus , was charged with publishing
an obscene article but was found not guilty because he did
not have enough customers for the jury to decide the
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material's tendency. However, the jury thought that the
publication was "indecent/' and Cunliffe was fined L 50
for sending "indecent material through the post/' contrary
to the Post Office Act.*^^ The Post office Act, therefore,
is apparently used when the offending material is sent
through the mail, but is not objectionable enough for
prosecution under the OPA. in the above cases at least
the Post Office Act served as a convenient "back-up
statute" to be used when the OPA fails.
Official Censorship
Lord Chamberlain
Acts of parliament are not, however, the only
instruments of government concerned with obscenity, or
perhaps even the most important. Reading is essentially
a private matter, and obscenity in a public place, such
as a theater, involved not acts of parliament (or the
courts) , but the Lord Chamberlain, probably because not
all, or even most, of the Crown's subjects could read in
the early history of England, royal concern for what was
communicated was less with books and published material
than with plays and public performances where it was
possible for a citizen to ascertain a point of view or be
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corrupted without being literate. The institution of the
Lord Chamberlain, presently Cameron Fromanteel, first
Baron Cobbold, educated at Eton and Cambridge and former
head of the Bank of England, was designed for this pur-
pose, until 1968, when his censorhsip powers were
removed, he approved or disapproved (for a fee paid by
the author) of all manuscripts scheduled for public per-
formance in the United Kingdom. This curious British
institution was the object of endless complaints from
British playwrights, and the Lord Chamberlain's role as
official censor (he has other roles, such as keeper of
the Royal Swans, etc.) once led him to declare his own
official letters to theater managers as "not permitted"
when one imaginative producer enquired if the could read
the Lord Chamberlain's letter containing the required
deletions during the interlude such deletions would cause
in the production.
What was censored by the Lord Chamberlain was not
solely or even primarily sexual references, but any
references to the Government, Queen, or Church which he
73
considered to be in bad taste. The usual procedure was
for the Lord Chamberlain first to read the manuscript and
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make deletions. If any, and specify what must be sub-
stituted. This was frequently followed by a period of
lobbying between the author and the Lord Chamberlain over
substitute phrases, etc.
There were techniques of avoiding the scrutiny
of the Lord Chamberlain, such as declaring the theater a
"private club," but this was an effective technique only
because the Lord Chamberlain chose to make it so, since
his jurisdiction extended to "any public place," not
simply to theaters.^"* Periodic prosecutions were taken
against private clubs, usually on the grounds that non-
raembers had been granted admission, which served as
occasional reminders of official authority in this area.
In 1951, for example, action was taken against the Unity
Theater in which the management and everyone concerned
with the production of the play—including the ticket-
seller, was fined a total of L 218 plus costs. The issue
; 9 not the play itself, but simply the "easy membership"
in the club. This led seven other theater clubs, repre-
sented by the NCCL, to file a "watching brief" which urged
that licensing authorities desist from intervention with
75theather clubs. This may not have been a typical
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••reminder" of official power over play production, because
police, in interviewing the staff of the theater, allegedly
asked detailed questions about the private beliefs and
friendships of the staff, and the entire case took on
aspects of police harrassment of London's "minstrel class. ""^^
The End of Stage
Censorship
" Saved "
It was a judicial action which, ironically, set in
motion a chain of events which eventually, with the whole-
hearted approval of Lord Cobbold, led to the removal of
stage censorship powers from the Lord Chamberlain. Plans
to abolish the curious anachronism had probably existed
since its inception but had always ended in defeat. In
1865 and 1907 English playwrights petitioned Parliament
to do away with the Lord Chamberlain's power, but with no
results. In 1949 a bill got through one reading of the
77House of Commons but proceeded no further. in 1966,
however, several events coalesced into a road to reform.
Not to be overlooked, of course, was the impor-
tance of Home Secretary Roy Jenkins, who was openly
opposed to the Lord Chamberlain as censor and instrumental
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in liberalizing the Obscene Publications Act of 1959.
But an even greater source of pressure was generated when
the Lord Chamberlain himself extended his censorship powers
to cover plays put on by "private" theater clubs. The
action against "Saved," which some speculate was a deliber-
ate extension of power by the Lord Chamberlain to bring
about his own undoing, ''^ received judicial sanction in the
Marylebone Magistrates Court in April of 1967.
In this case Magistrate Leo Grodwell held that
the English Stage Society (the producers of "Saved") had
violated the "for hire" provisions of the Theaters Act
of 1843. The Lord Chamberlain wanted the deletion of a
•cene in the play in which a baby is stoned to death;
the author and producers refused, which meant the pley
was not approved by the L. C. The Lord Chamberlain argued
that he had jurisdiction over "Saved" because 1) English
Stage Society was not a genuine "private club" and 2) the
Theaters Act stipulated that a play must be approved by
the L. C. if it is "for hire." This was a break from the
long tradition of accepting a tongue-in-cheek definition
of private club. The English Stage Society charged 5 s.
by which a person became an "associate member" of the
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Society and was entitled to see a performance. The
Marylebone Magistrate was to help end this sixty-year-
old custom by holding that because the Royal Court Theater,
where "Saved" was performed, like most English theaters,
sold alcoholic drinks and did not have free admittance,
the entire production is "for hire."
During the trial such notables as Sir Laurence
Olivier testified as "character" witnesses for the
Society, and the magistrate showed signs of irritation at
the "advice" prominent citizens were offering. The
action against the English Stage Society did, however,
provoke a debate in Parliament which gave rise to a
promise by the Labor Party to form a committee to review
80the entire issue of censorship.
Act ion from Parliament
A joint conunittee of the House of Lords and the
House of Commons was then set up and, after studying the
problem for a year, announced in June of 1967 that it
unanimously felt that an end to the licensing system was
81desirable. Almost a year earlier the Lord Chamberlain
had publicly announced that he felt his censorship duties
were "no longer appropriate." The committee saidi
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No one man should possess unqualified dictatorship
over what may or may not be presented in our
theaters. Attendance at a theater is a voluntary
act. It is better that an individual should have
the right to decide, with full knowledge, what
sort of play he wishes to see than that some
central authority should attempt to lay down what
is suitable for the average person.®^
During the various hearings before the committee
the only significant group wanting to continue the cen~
sorial powers of the Lord Chamberlain was the Society of
West End Theater Managers. These managers, who run the
more lucrative of London's commercial theaters, feared
that if plays were not licensed they would be open to
83prosecution for libel and obscenity. The committee
proposed an end to all forms of licensing and recommended
that the theater be covered by the obscene Publications
Act of 1959. This, together with the laws of libel,
defamation, public order, blasphemy and sedition, it felt,
were sufficient to make the English theater subject to
the rule of law.
At the hearings criticisms of the Lord Chamberlain
as guardian of sexual propriety were frequent, but not
as frequent as the criticism of censorship based on the
political aspects of censored plays. The banning of
"MacBtrd;" Hochhuth's "The Soldiers," which Lord Cobbold
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held maligned the characters of Sir Winston Churchill and
Lord Cherwellr and the Hampstead Theater Club's production
of "In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer" were cases in
point. In the Hampstead case the simple technique of open
defiance resulted in the Lord Chamberlain subsequently
licensing the play for public performance.^^
On February 23, 1968, Labor backbencher George
Strauss (because he had good luck in the annual draw for
limited private-bill time) introduced the measure to end
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stage censorship. The Labor Government approved of the
idea, but left it as a private member's bill, which is
the usual course in matters of morals.®^ Strauss' bill
permitted legal action to be taken against a play if any
citizen complained the play libelled him. The Attorney
General was also authorized to bring criminal obscenity
proceedings under the OPA. Conservative MP Norman
St. John-Stevas, a noted libertarian legal scholar,
expressed concern about satirization of the Crown and
unsuccessfully called for an amendment to forbid the
depiction of existing heads of state in any country.
Strauss rejected the notion on the ground that political
figures can be and are satirized in newspaper cartoons
and books, and that there was no reason to attempt their
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protection on the stage. He also noted the popularity of
the stage hit "Mrs. Wilson's Diary" which portrayed Prime
Minister Wilson as a bumbler in a Batman costume.®''
Surprisingly, the long-argued proposal passed the
House of Commons by voice vote without recorded dissent,
and 400 years of stage censorship came to an end. The
last play to be submitted to the Lord Chamberlain was the
proposed production of "Hair," which came back marked
88
"unacceptable." The official date for abolition of the
Lord Chamberlain's censor power was July 25, 1968. On
July 26, 1968 "Hair" opened in Shaftesbury Theater, London.
Br itish Board of
Film Censors
Film censorship in the United Kingdom stems from
the original desire of the Crown to protect the public
from flammable films. Checking the chemical content of
the celluloid was extended to the content of the film,
but since sixteen-millimeter films were usually non-
flammable they are curiously exempt from censorship and
control. Repeated attempts, in 1934, 1939, and again in
1951, were made to introduce control over sixteen-milli-
mater films, but pressure group activity on the part of
208
the NCCL, the Missionary Societies, and the Association
of Cinematographic and Allied Technicians was able to
keep censorship from being extended.
The chief instrument for censorship of films is
the British Board of Film Censors, which, while not a
statutory authority, operates under the general model of
licensing conditions stipulated by the Home Office. In
films, as in plays, sexual impropriety is not the only
ground for censorship. Clause 10 of the general condi-
tions for licensing set down by the Home Office states
that a particular film may be banned if, "... it con-
tains matter which, if exhibited, would offend against
good taste or decency or would be likely to encourage or
incite to crime or lead to disorder or to be offensive to
89public feeling." This mandate is interpreted by the
general secretary of the BBFC. One of the central objec-
tions to censorship, of course, is that it makes art so
dependent on the censor, and nowhere is this dependency
more evident than with the BBFC, and the man who happens
to fill the role of secretary. Clause 10 was used by Lord
Morrison, secretary during the period immediately following
World war II, to prohibit producers from showing such
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things as "antagonistic relations between management and
labor," "clutching hands," "salacious wit," "sensuous
exposure of girls' legs," and "British officers and
civilians in an odious light as regards their conduct in
India."
Under the reign of John Trevelyan, the Board of
Film Censors became in the view of many, an important
positive influence on the British film industry. Lord
Morrison once stated that "South Pacific" was among his
favorite films, and critics charged that he used this film
as a critical yardstick for what was morally acceptable.
Trevelyan, on the other hand, is not only a connoisseur
of the arts (a jazz pianist, member of the Board of the
Wertern Theater Ballet, and for twelve years Chairman of
the London Philorousica) but also a genuine film aficianado.
The New York Times reported that while Trevelyan had his
detractors, many London critics and movie producers
credited him with having created the atmosphere "essential
for the revolution in British film making that began a
91decade ago." Trevelyan himself has stated that he liked
to think his job was not "wholly negative." One of his
most ardent supporters is Harold Pinter, whose pj.ay.
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"The caretaker," received severe deletions by the lord
Chan,berlain but emerged almost intact when it was made
into a movie, when the play was revised, the Lord
Chamberlain even reversed his decision as a result of what
Trevelyan had allowed in the film, and made no deletions.
"I detest and fear censorship and equally the office
of the censor," Pinter has stated. But about Trevelyan,
Pinter feels that, "Without him, most, if not all, of the
serious international products of the British industry in
recent years could not have been made."^^ Trevelyan
construed his function to be one in which the public
received films which were "in good taste." His only
criteria for establishing this was "on the feel of the
thing." His standards for obscenity centered very closely
on whether, for example, nudity was relevant to the film
or had any intrinsic value. Excessive violence and
violent sexuality, he would contend, can have disasterous
effects on children, and for this reason he believes that
some sort of censorship is necessary to the public
93interest.
Most of the cuts made by the BBFC in most films
seem to receive at least tacit approval from critics.
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Richard Round, £il™ critic of the Manchester Guardian,
felt that the scenes cut fron, Mai Zetterling-s
"Night
Games" still left "enough that is scandalous
. . .
regaining for those who are interested in that kind of
94thing." Much more controversial, however, was the film
version of James Joyce's "Ulysses/- shown widely in the
united States with all of its footage and dialogue intact
(although simultaneous two-day showings throughout the
nation helped to make action against the film difficult),
but subject to what the director felt was a "hatchet job"
95in Britain. Joseph Strick, director of the film, was
so upset by the twenty-nine cuts, twenty-seven involving
Joycian language and two involving Joycian images, that
he "retaliated" by marking each cut in the film with a
"beep" on the sound track and provided theater patrons
with a leaflet containing the beeped dialogue and a
description of the beeped scenes. Strick also facetiously
threatened to add a title card to the picture reading:
"Cuts by John Trevelyan.
"
But Trevelyan also met his critics head on. in a
meeting in Festival Hall on September 16, 1968, before a
crowd of about 2,000 film buffs and movie critics, most of
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them members of the New cinema club formed in 1967 at
least partly to campaign against governmental control over
films, Trevelyan showed more than two hours of film that
he had censored, and explained why. m the daring con-
frontation, in which the audience saw sequences never
Shown to the public before, many left still convinced that
censorship was inherently evil and unnecessary, but very
few left unmoved by what they saw.^^ Sean Day-Lewis of
The Daily Telegraph described himself as feeling "nauseated"
by film clips from japan depicting a maniac with a penchant
for slicing off the ears of young, naked virgins; the
Manchester Guardian's critic. Derrick Malcolm, was
"horrified" by the sequences depicting violence, although
he found the pornography sequences "quite harmless" (but
did add that he would not want his children to see thera).^®
Trevelyan described this rather unprecedented
exhibition as "an illustrated lecture" in which he tried
to justify his job in terms of what he felt to be
"regrettable necessity." What began as a hostile audience
ended up giving Trevelyan an ovation. "Frankly," Trevelyan
told the audience, "i find sex in truly artistic films
much less a problem than the mounting wave of violence,"
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and he expressed a particular concern about the possible
flood into England of American "blue movies" which he
said were "scarcely concealed pornography with a strong
streak of sadism thrown in."^°°
The audience did object to the deletion of a nude
scene in the Swedish film "Hugs and Kisses," but Trevelyan
argued that he had to "anticipate" probable action under
obscenity statutes and stated. "We have to protect not
only the public but the film industry itself."
Other Sources of Punishment
for Obscenity
Customs
H. M. Customs gained the authority to censor books
through the Customs Consolidation Act of 1876, which pro-
hibits the importation of indecent or obscene works.
Customs officials work from a black list compiled by the
Commissioners of Customs and Excise which may include
books which have not been the subject of prosecutions.
Customs officers are empowered to seize any books a citi-
zen or alien may wish to bring into England, but the list
102itself is not divulged to the public. This is
especially inconvenient since a person does not know what
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books he may buy abroad and import and has no way of
finding out. A person whose books are seized has a month
in which to notify the Commissioners that he objects.
As a matter of practice the customs officials do not
tell the individual of this procedure, and after this time
the books are automatically forfeited, if the person
does object within the specified period, the matter then
goes to court, m one of the more well-publicized
examples of customs censorship, jean Genet's works in
French were seized even though they had been bought for
the reference library in Birmingham.
British customs successfully resisted the Select
Committee's proposal that no destructions be made by
customs officials without a court order, arguing on
grounds of administrative inconvenience and expense, it
is important to realize that in the seizing of books by
the customs officers the OPA does not apply. Material
seized by customs operated essentially under the guide-
lines of the Obscene Publications Act of 1857; literary
merit cannot be raised as a defense, expert evidence about
such merit is inadmissible, and the criteria for deter-
mining obscenity can be based on isolated parts of the
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book, not the work taken as a whole. ^^'^ Nor, as we have
seen, do the standards of the OPA of 1959 apply to obscene
material sent through the mails. Post office officials
censor under the authority of the Post office Act of 1953,
which made it punishable to send obscene matter through
the post and authorized officials to detain and destroy
such material. Having essentially three different agencies
operating under three different statutes to search for
obscenity in books alone can create endless confusion. In
1960, for example, customs officials were allowing Lady
Chatter lev '8 Lover to be brought into the country, while
the Post Office was seizing copies which were mailed.
The NCCL, in 1968, effectively intervened on
behalf of a young American poet, Clive Matson, who traveled
to Britain in order to give a series of readings. Customs
officials seized sixty copies of his own book and seven
copies of a magazine in his possession because they were
"on the borderline" and could possibly be obscene. The
Council in this case provided Matson with legal counsel,
and after it approached some members of Parliament, the
material was returned to Matson with no further action
106
taken by the authorities.
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Local By-Laws
There are also, of course, numerous local acts
relating to obscene publications, as well as local by-
laws. The Home Secretary, however, has in recent years
refused to authorize those portions of local by-laws which
are submitted for his approval (as all by-laws must) if
they deal with obscenity.
Local authorities also obviously have numerous
informal mechanisms to control the type of reading matter
circulating in the community. There are unofficial
approved lists of comic books and picture post cards, and
numerous communities have unofficial censorship committees
composed simply of concerned citizens. There have been
certain types of industry pressure on the Home Office
to set up national censorship boards. The Post Card
Association, which represents most of the manufacturers
and wholesalers of post cards in the United Kingdom, on
one occasion asked the Home Office to set up an independent
national censorship board because the Association com-
plained that the criteria of various local authorities was
so erratic that the industry did not know what sorts of
things it could print and have legally distributed in all
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areas. Pressure groups urging more stringent appli-
cation of obscenity statutes presumably would be in
favor of decentralized control of the criteria for
obscenity, since this would force whatever "industry"
concerned to be extremely cautious in what it presented
the public if it wished their products to be widespread
and therefore make money.
The increase in literary and cinema prosecutions
for obscenity was usually not the result of high govern-
mental involvement but of local police officers and pri-
vate pressure. It was individual police officers who,
for example, made the decision to prosecute sellers of
Beards ley pictures under an early nineteenth-century
Vagrancy Act. This Act, aimed originally against veterans
Showing their wounds as they begged, prohibits "will-
fully exposing to public view an indecent exhibition"
and is prosecuted without a jury or the right to offer
evidence of serious artistic purpose. Concentrating on
the literal wording of the Act and avoiding its historical
context enabled Magistrates to convict the sellers.
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Obecenity Statutes and
Pressure Groups
The NCCL
The Council almost annually attacks British cen-
sorship laws, usually by pointing out that the measures
do very little to restrict the sale of what it calls "true
obscenity and pornography." it usually chooses to focus
on the archaic nature of the entire endeavor rather than
on the problem of obscenity itself. A typical statement
occurred in the 1967 annual report:
Meanwhile those in search of true obscenity
and pornography can still find it readily
obtainable commercially in unlimited
quantities (if not in the most attractive
surroundings) in Soho and elsewhere in our
large towns. So much for our laws of public
morality.
In its annual report for 1966 the NCCL stated its
general philosophy toward censorship, in principle it
accepts that there "may sometimes be a need for limited
censorship when real harm to individuals may otherwise
result: liberty is a principle only insofar as it does
not infringe the rights of other individuals. " It
went on to state that:
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In practice, however, it is at present difficultto 3U8tify censorship, in that no recorded case ofthe banning of a film, a book, play or a televisionprogram has in our view been in the public
interest.
This general acceptance of the power to censor is
thus not only typical of British society in general, but
also of libertarian organizations. For a whole host of
reasons the British are perhaps much more sensitive and
sympathetic to arguments about the public interest and
governmental action in the public interests, than Americans
are, and there does not seem to exist the rather congenital
hostility to power per se that exists among American
libertarians.
The great harm of pressure groups lobbying to
tighten up English censorship laws, at least to the NCCL,
is not their effectiveness but the fact that they detract
attention from the need to revise British censorship laws
"in the light of common sense and tolerance." The
OPA is viewed by the Council as a flagrant infringement on
civil liberty because it leaves far too much discretion on
the vague standards of obscenity to the judge or jury.
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Other Groups and
Public Opinion
There is also, of course, a demand for an increase
in censorship. Groups such as the League of Women and
the "Clean Up TV Campaign" pressured the House of Commons
to place greater restrictions on the portrayal of violence
and sexual relationships in TV plays, and certain MPs did
call for a control body for the BBC but were resisted by
the rest of the Commons on the ground that the BBC had
criteria for
-good taste and decency, and had not demon-
strated any violation of public trust. The BBC is not
especially timid about presenting things such as nudity
to its audience, in October of 1968, for example, it
ran a television documentary on a group of naturists
(nudists) exhibiting male and female anatomy in full color.
The program began with an opening shot of two nalced men
swimming in a pool, with the producer of the documentary
warning the audience that they might find what was to
come a bit embarrassing. A BBC official said later that
he had received some telephone calls from viewers com-
plaining about the program, but the overwhelming critical
reaction, on the part of the British press at least, was
116that the program was a poor advertisement for sex.
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While bold things were happening on the BBC, in
1966 the Hampstead Arts Council took what the NCCL viewed
as timid action when it withdrew from its exhibition
works by six Swedish painters, including a nude portrait
of the Roman emperor Heliogobalus because of "recent police
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actions." The police actions referred to by the Arts
Council were, the NCCL surmised, the prosecution of the
Robert Frazer gallery for its display of works by the
American pop artist Jim Dine which were visible from the
street and were held by the police to have "caused offense
to the public (violation of the Vagrancy Act) . The
Listener, describing the American's work as " .
. . phallic
exaggerations to be found on the walls of public lava-
tories," stated that Dine, "... used these graffiti deli-
cately and wittily, although not without sympathy.
"
The 1966 trial in which Ian Brady and Myra
Hindley were found guilty of murdering three children-
dubbed by the press as the "Moors Trial" because the bodies
were found in the nearby Moors—created an increase in
public sentiment for censorhip of salactious works with
overtones of sadism. This crime was motivated by a need
for sexual gratification, and Brady in particular had a
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library almost exclusively concerned with the works of
the Marquis de Sade and other works of this genre. While
there was much discussion about the relationship between
pornography and crime and the general social utility of
censorship, the dialogue quickly moved to a re-evaluation
of capital punishment and the complaint that the lack of
the death penalty made the trial "aesthetically" dis-
appointing because it did not produce any kind of public
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catharsis. Intense as the public reaction was to this
event, it brought no new practices about, simply "argu-
ments" to be used by those who had traditionally supported
stricter censorship.
Most English libertarians feel that pressure
groups designed to rid England of obscene material, such
as the Public Morality Council and the Catholic Teachers
Federation, are not very influential where the local
police are apathet ic about obscenity statutes. They are
more than willing to assist the police in uncovering
obscenity, but usually have not resorted to private pro-
secutions. The overwhelming majority of prosecutions
against obscene publications are taken by the police, even
though initiative may originally stem from a pressure
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group. When police prosecute they are required by the
Prosecution of Offenses Regulations of 1946 to report to
the Director of Public Prosecution. The Director is
empowered to advise police on whether to prosecute, and
occasionally, if he thinks the case is sufficiently impor-
tant, take up prosecution himself. The Director classifies
allegedly obscene works reported to him into four different
categories: 1) material for which previous destruction
orders have been made; 2) material for which destruction
orders have been refused; 3) new material which he thinks
should be put before the court; and 4) new material which
has been reported as obscene but which the Director thinks
120is not obscene. Local authorities may, however, reject
the Director 's "advice." The Select Committee in its
recommendations urged that the Director not only advise
on such prosecutions, but that obscenity should be added
to the list of crimes which cannot be prosecuted without
his consent. The Committee, and libertarians in general,
were anxious to promote uniform standards since most of
the more repressive obscenity prosecutions come from local
police officials. The Children and Young Persons Act of
1955, for example, required permission of the D.P.P. before
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any prosecution can be instituted, and the Select Committee
argued that since the Director had tabulated information
on which to advise local officials under this law, it
would not be a great addition to administrative labor
for him to decide whether to allow prosecutions for obscenity.
The government successfully resisted any such implementa-
tion on the ground that the definition of obscenity is
necessarily so imprecise that it would be improper for
the executive to usurp the court's task of deciding what
is obscene by screening all prosecutions.
But even if prosecutions were under centralized
control, determining precisely who initiates prosecutions
would still be difficult. Just as in sedition cases, the
Home Office is in some ways the government department
concerned, since the police forward all reports of con-
victions and detention orders to the Home office which
maintains records and statistics. The Home Office is also
notified of seizures by H. M. Customs and the Post Office,
and actions of the Director of Public Prosecutions, it
is also the designated authority to act in the name of the
United Kingdom under the International Convention for
the Suppression of Pornography and communicates with other
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states about obscene material being distributed, in
this international role, the Home office reportedly cir-
culates a list of books which it believes to be obscene,
although no prosecution has been launched against such
books. The American novel, Lolita, was never prosecuted
in England, for example. The Home office simply wrote to
France about this "highly obscene book," in order to
secure the suppression of an English- language version
being printed in France.
Cone lus ion
Nature of the
Crime
Legally the crime of "obscenity" is at once a very
broad concept, since it is not restricted to sex; on the
other hand it is now a quite technical notion denoting
only the effect a thing has on a probable recipient.
The telescoping nature of the offense is compounded by
numerous statutes used to attack the same problem. A
thing may be "indecent," i.e., not sufficiently corrupting
to be obscene in the technical sense, and still bring
punishment to an individual under the Post office Act, or
the Vagrancy Act, or the common law charge of corrupting
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public morals. Recipients of questionable material may
lose them when passing through customs, or be forbidden
to import English translations of them, based on a cri-
teria known only to the Home Office.
The profusion of statutes which can be applied,
together with the diffusion of the power to prosecute,
increases the variable nature of the offense, and is the
chief reason libertarians prefer centralized application
of obscenity laws—better one national censor than many
parochial censors. But even where prosecution is under
the OPA where the defense of "public good" is allowed,
the burden of proof is still on the defendant to demon-
strate socially redeeming value.
In between indecency and technical obscenity
there is the ambiguous notion of "inherent obscenity"
which turns up in common law prosecutions where a 'publi-
cation" is not necessary but an intent to corrupt is.
Intent here would presumably be based on evidence, i.e., a
magazine or picture, etc., which, since its effect is
irrelevant, would be evaluated on a reasonable guess as
to its consequences. This criterion remains as unannounced
as that of the Home Office.
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Role of the
Bench
Judicial interpretation has occasionally altered
application in a liberal direction, such as when Justice
Stable used his instructions to the jury in the Philanderers
Case to prohibit the old OPA from preventing the publica-
tion of serious literature simply because it might be
harmful to young children. The OPA of 1959, however, has
usually been bent in the other direction—almost to a
right angle in v. Shaw
. The "Ladies Directory" holding
seemed to establish that the tendency to deprave and
corrupt means any aid given to those who are corrupt
already and are seeking depravity. Since Justice Ashworth
held that a man can be corrupted more than once (and by
implication in more ways than one) , the offense of
obscenity can be constituted by simply facilitating the
desire of others to intensify their depravity. This is
not a totally absurd point of view, since most of the time
obscene material is not paraded before unadorned innocenca,
but before those whose expectations of depravity make them
seek out situations in which they can become probable
recipients. But it is an awkward doctrine in the Shaw
case. As Lord Reed (the only dissenter among the Law
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Lords in this case) pointed out, the directory itself is
not inherently obscene, nor is resorting to prostitutes
an offense? but the conviction punished the act (of
inviting others to prostitution) as a conspiracy to corrupt
publicnorals, and the actual printed invitation ( (the
directory) is held to deprave and corrupt (i.e., is
obscene). This in itself. Lord Reed stated, is a "novel
doctrine," but his basic objection centered around the
wide power given both to the bench and the jury. Reed
was upset with what he viewed as judicial usurpation of
the delicate question of how far the law ought to punish
immoral but basically private acts. This, he argued, was
properly a legislative problem which the Law Lords has
made a problem of common law. But more important, he
insisted, the case negated judicial power at precisely
the juncture where it was most needed— in defining such
terms as "corrupt" and "deprave." The meaning of words
is normally, and should have been in this case, a question
of law. Juries are not allowed to use their own defini-
tions of such things as negligence, and to Lord Reed, giving
them such power in obscenity cases erodes the certitude
of criminal law. The law loses its ability to inform a
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man what conduct is and what conduct is not criminal.
The holding. Reed correctly points out, makes the jury
a censor morum; 'the law will be whatever any jury may
happen to think it ought to be. .
.
."^23
In Calder v. Powell
, which held that "Cain's Book"
was obscene because it could tempt readers to experiment
with drugs, and later in the "Chewing Gum" case, the scope
of obscenity was greatly extended, m Calder the grounds
for forfeiture came close to saying that the work "advo-
cated* something which Lord Parker, and in the case of drug
abuse most others, believed to be socially harmful,
using the logic employed to justify these cases any speech
in Hyde Park which advocated the positive aspects of
narcotic addiction would be illegal, not only on grounds
of corrupting public morals, but because the statements
themselves would be obscene. Obscenity with this kind of
construction emerges as a concept which seeks to delineate
legal punishments for attempts to deprave Her Majesty's
subjects in all senses. There is more than one path to
depravity, and enticing subjects down a particular path
can be illegal, phrased in this metaphorical fashion, the
concept is certainly not a new one to Anglo-American
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jurisprudence; enticing an individual to murder another
individual has long been held to be punishable behavior,
but it is important to realize the someone who "entices"
another to murder is guilty of murder. What raises enor-
mous problems with the concept of obscenity is that where
it is defined as enticing someone down a particular road,
it is not always clear that the situation at the end of
that road is illegal, with narcotic addiction it would
be perhaps clear, but it is difficult to say that what-
ever exists at the end of the sexual road to depravity
is illegal, unless the judges and the prosecution are
making assumptions about criminal sexual activity, if
these assumptions do exist they are not sufficiently
examined to be stated as part of the rationale for the
concept obscenity.
Several judicial rulings had the consequence of
undermining the liberal aspects of the OPA. The creative
use of common law in R. v. Shaw , the tip to police by Lord
Parker in R. v. C la^rton to use common law rather than the
OPA, and Parker's "error in law" holding against the
Middlesex Justices in the Copper case reflect a judicial
determination not to be cavalier about depravity in England
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The latter case especially reflects Lord Parker's atti-
tude about "pure filth"—under the guise of a fine point
of law.
The Bench's own felt need to restrain itself has
interesting consequences in obscenity cases. The restraint
is always most pronounced when it acts to sustain convic-
tions. In instances such as the Copper case the appellate
justices are not so willing to defer to the judgment of
lower courts, in other instances, such as the Straker
case where Parker apparently felt that the material was
not obscene, judicial humility triumphs and the conviction
stands
•
This judicial deference to the prosecution is
especially dangerous considering that the rationale used
against any attempts to centralize prosecution of obscenity
cases is that it would be an interference with the courts.
The national government's deference to the courts and the
bench's deference to both the prosecution (on the appellate
level) or to the jury create a round-about abdication of
responsibility in this area.
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Obacenity and English
Culture
The notion that law should punish activity which
tends to deprave and corrupt is obviously an idea which
is still very much alive in the United Kingdom. The
specific content of what is "obscene" is dependent not only
on the general tenor of the times but also on the particu-
lar jury. Also, the seriousness of the problem of obscenity
tends to fluctuate between serious assaults on human
depravity and sporadic reminders that the sword of state
is sharp enough to cut paper (or celluloid, as the case
may be). But the basic idea that it is a legitimate
function of government to protect the public from corrup-
tion and depravity is usually not challenged even by
British libertarians. A legal concept is simply a demarca-
tion of authority in this area remains fairly constant,
while the specific content encircled in the crime of
obscenity is highly variable. Tt is much more variable
than the same notion in the United States, because as
social mores about sex change, the content of obscenity in
the United Kingdom has moved progressively away from
simple candor about sex to a concern about violence, sadism
and drug abuse. Whether something depraves is a much more
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inclusive question than whether something is simply
prurient, it is this variable nature of the content of
obscenity in the United Kingdom which led English play-
Wright and former MP Benn Levy to describe the implementa-
tion of obscenity law in Britain as a search for "a crime
to fit the punishment."
While obscenity law could probably be described
as •punishment" in search of a crime" in almost all cul-
tures. Levy's witticism seems especially accurate for
Britain. The deferential political culture and the liber-
tarians in that culture once again seem to concentrate on
how reasonable the particular exercise of authority is,
not whether that power belongs to government at all. m
Britain, while there have certainly been objections to
censorship, the longevity of the censorship power of the
Lord Chamberlain and the present existence of the Board of
Film Censors would seem to indicate that questions of
obscenity are not formulated with the initial assuitption
that prior restraint is necessarily an infringement of
civil liberty. While prior restraint may be more acceptable
to English libertarians because it is more accepted in
English law, the cultural propensity to construe liberty
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not as a matter of reluctantly mandated authority but as
-reasonableness" of those who govern has meant that the
libertarian attack on obscenity law has focused on the
more antiquated institutions of censorship rather than on
the constitutional propriety of protecting the public
from themselves.
English obscenity law is punishment in search of
a crime because concern about obscenity symbolizes a
sense of rectitude, if not self
-righteousness. But this
motivation would be as true of other cultures, even
though "Victorian" is a phrase thoroughly English in
origin. in another sense, different from Levy's meaning,
English obscenity law is legal punishment poised before
changing targets not only because the concept is sta-
tutorily broader, but because the English take the sword
of state more for granted.
CHAPTER V
SEDITIOUS SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES
Doctrinal Influences Prior to 1945
Seditious Libel
The exact status of the English common law crime of
seditious libel was not definitively settled in the United
States until 1964 when the Supreme Court ruled, in New
York Times v. Sullivan, that there was no such concept in
American law.^ This had long been a view urged by judges
such as Holmes in his dissenting opinion in Abrams v.
U. S. (1919) and Jackson in Beauharnais v. ill . (1952),
and it received support from such prestigious American
constitutional scholars as Zechariah Chafee.^ Some his-
torians, such as Leonard Levy, disagreed, arguing that the
framers of the Constitution were "nurtured on the crabbed
historic ism of Coke and the narrow conservatism of Black-
3
stone." others argued that since the fines levied under
the Sedition Act of 1798 were repaid by an Act of Congress
(on the ground that the Sedition Act had been unconstitu-
tional)
,
and since Jefferson pardoned all those convicted
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under the Act (even though he was willing to see his
Federalist opponents prosecuted for seditious libel in
the various states)
, the concept had atrophied long before
4
1964. In any case punishment for seditious speech in the
U. S. has not historically been tied to the notion of
"libel"—the more commonly used rubric was "espionage."
The Search for a
Judicial Rule
"Clear and Present Danger "
The Espionage Act of 1917 gave birth to a cluster
of famous Supreme Court decisions in which the judges began
their quest for guidelines on freedom of expression. This
Act, applied during the aftermath of World War I and the
Russian Revolution, was part of the general "Red Scare"
hysteria that swept the nation and penalized many forms
of utterance. Under its provisions over 1,900 people
were prosecuted for alleged subversion, and many radical
publications were excluded from the mails. It was in sus-
taining the application of this Act against a socialist
who had mailed circulars to eligible draftees urging them
to resist conscription that Justice Holmes enunciated his
homely analogy about shouting "fire" in a crowded theater
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to demonstrate that speech cannot have absolute protection
in all circumstances, since the First Amendment is not to
be understood as an unqualified right to verbalize regard-
less of consequences. Holmes defined the issue, in Schenck
V. U. S. (1919), as whether:
... the words are used in circumstances and
are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right
to prevent.
This is an important approach to the problem because
what is being evaluated is not merely the content of what
a speaker says but the circumstances in which he is speaking.
These circumstances, not the words themselves, can justify
removal of the speaker if (and presumably only if) they
present a clear (not ambiguous), and present (immediate)
danger that they will bring about some substantive evils
the Congress or a state has a right to prevent (with the
assumption that they do not have the right to prevent all
substantive evils). with reference to Schenck, however,
Holmes hastily concluded that when a nation is at war,
"... many things that might be said in time of peace
are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance
will not be endured. . . ."^
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Holn,e. also wrote two other unanimous opinion, for
the court urging that the sa™e standard be applied to up-
hold conviction, under the Act.'
.ater, i„ i^is, „,i„„,
along with Brandeis, began to pen dissents claiming that
the majority of the court was not correctly applying the
"clear and present danger' test.« The doctrine was to
become Characteristic of Hol,nes-Era„deis dissents in free
speech cases and was to be ™o.t explicitly stated in
mtnsL V. California (1927), where Brandeis insisted that
the "danger apprehended' must be not only 'serious" but
so "imminent" that the proper remedy for fallacious speech,
namely "more speech," could not avert the danger.^ it is
open to conjecture as to whether Holmes really believed
that people such as Schenck did present a clear and pre-
sent danger to the country. Holmes may have realized that
the Court wished to uphold convictions under the Espionage
Act. regardless of rationale, so he yielded on the conclu-
sion (making a unanimous court and a much stronger posi-
tion for the doctrine than if it had simply been a dissent)
,
but formulated a judicial standard which could have
libertarian consequences in less hysterical times. Whatever
the motives, it is important to realize that while the
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Holmesian formula was logically quite libertarian, its
successive statements during this time were, in the words
of C. Herman Pritchett, "eloquent but .
. . kept no one
out of jail."^^
" Bad Tendency"
While Holmes and Brandeis were busy clarifying
their doctrine, the Court majority began to evolve a new
standard, frequently called the "remote possibility" or the
"bad tendency" test which as a theoretical formulation was
considerably more restrictive of freedom of speech than
the Holmesian test. Enunciated by Justice Stanford in
Gitlow V. New York (1925), which upheld the conviction of a
radical pamphleteer under the New York Criminal Anarchy
Act, this formula emphasizes the possible consequences of
a particular speech rather than the probability of a
specific evil. Silencing utterances which call for violent
overthrow of the government are not arbitrary or unreason-
able exercises of authority, according to Stanford, because
such measures seek "to extinguish the spark without waiting
until it has
. . . blazed into conflagration. " """^ Thus if
the speech has the "tendency," even though remote, to lead
to disorder, it is in the public interest to prevent such
i
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speech, under this formula it was not necessary to demon-
strate an actual relationship between speech and disorder,
simply to demonstrate a relationship between the content of
the speech and the possibility of disorder at some future
date.
The Search for a
Judic ial Role
Judicial Activism v. Judicial Restraint
Initially the clear and present danger doctrine was
not a test for the validity of legislation, but only a test
for determining "how closely words had to be related to
illegal acts in order to be infected with their illegality."
In Schenck, Abrams and Git low
. Holmes did not challenge the
statutes in question? he merely in the latter two cases
doubted whether they were correctly applied. Brandeis in
the Whitney case, however, extended the clear and present
danger doctrine from a rule guiding the application of
statutes to a rule evaluating the constitutionality of the
statutes themselves. In Whitney , Brandeis claimed that
declarations by state legislatures that certain kinds of
speech and assembly do in fact create a danger is merely a
13
"rebuttable presumption." The clear and present danger
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test by Brandeis was to be used to determine whether the
conditions alleged by the legislature in fact existed.
The Whitney concurrence was to set forth a doctrine by
which courts and citizens could challenge any law abridging
free speech and assembly by "showing that there was no
emergency justifying it."^"*
This formulation of the clear and present danger
doctrine moved it away from simply being a standard to
evaluate speech and into the most sensitive area in which
a court can move? namely, a theory about its own power.
While judicial review gives the Supreme Court the power to
nullify legislation, it also gives it the burden of
justifying the use of that power in terms which spare the
Court the image of being arbitrary or political. The
traditional way the Court approached this problem had
been to claim that there exists a presumption of con-
stitutionality of all statutes, and that this constitution-
ality must be upheld if the actions of the legislature
were "reasonable." To strike down a statute on any other
ground other than that it is hopelessly arbitrary or
grossly unreasonable was to engage, some believed, in
judicial legislation, superceding the legislative branch.
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Both the clear and present danger doctrine and the
criteria of legislative reasonableness ironically trace
their origins to Justice Holmes. His operating assumption
about the proper role of the Court was that it leave
statutes alone unless, as he said in his dissent in Lochner
V. New York (1905), "... a rational and fair man would
necessarily admit that the statute proposed would infringe
fundamental principles as they had been understood by the
traditions of our people and our law."^^
While there is no contradiction in the ultimate logic
of claiming that when possible courts should leave legisla-
ture alone, and when possible legislatures should leave
individuals alone, to stop the second is obviously to
transgress on the first, and so cases involving First
Amendment freedoms were to perennially raise two sorts of
questions. The first question involved judgments about
the permissible limits of speech, while the second involved
judgments about the proper function of the Supreme Court,
vniile these two arguments did not address themselves to
the same question, they frequently had opposing consequences
in the disposition of free speech cases, and an attempt to
resolve this conflict was not attempted until the time of
the Roosevelt court.
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" Preferred Position "
After 1937 such new appointees of President
Roosevelt as Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge,
aided by Chief Justice Stone, began to reassert the clear
and present danger test. But since the doctrine, at least
as it was formulated after Whitney
, implied an active role
for the court in nullifying legislation; and since the new
appointees were hostile to the older court's assumption
that it had an active role to play in declaring social
and economic legislation unconstitutional, the Roosevelt
court was left with the problem of justifying judicial
activism in one area and not in another. The "preferred
position doctrine" emerged as the judicial theory to explain
this apparent paradox and served as the larger theoretical
fab. ic on which the clear and present danger doctrine could
be pinned.
The ultimate logic, if not content, of the pre-
ferred position doctrine occurred in a footnote penned by
Justice Stone in United States v. Carolene Products Co .
(1938) in which he noted that the Covrt is always to presume
legislative judgment as constitutional when it affects
ordinary commercial transactions unless obviously
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unreasonable, but that there may be a "narrower scope of
operation of the presumption of constitutionality when
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first
ten Amendments.
. .
."^^ waiter F. Berns is quick to note
that there were other periods in constitutional history
when the Bill of Rights was elevated over the assumption of
legislative reasonableness, such as the time when the Taft
Court gave so much emphasis to the Fifth Amendment and its
concern for property, and suspects that the transfer of
Stone's logic from a footnote to a central doctrine is
more motivated by libertarian wishes than constitutional
^ . 17tact. Stone's footnote, however, provides only the
structural scaling of the doctrine. The actual design of
the interior came later through the efforts of Stone,
Douglas and Rut ledge, the latter of whom gave the most
concise statement of the doctrine in Thomas v. Collins in
1945.^®
In this case, which concerned the validity of a
state law requiring all labor organizers to secure permits
before soliciting members, the Court held the statute to
violate the First Amendment, and Rut ledge justified this
245
action with reference to the special status of First
Amendment liberties.
This case confronts us again with the duty our
system places on this Court to say where the
individual's freedom ends and the state power
begins. Choice on that border, now as always
delicate, is perhaps more so where the usual
presumption supporting legislation is balanced
by the preferred place given in our scheme to
the great, the indispensable democratic freedom
secured by the First Amendment. That priority
gives these liberties a sanctity and a sanction
not permitting dubious intrusions.
For these reasons any attempt to restrict
those liberties must be justified by clear public
interest, threatened not doubtfully or remotely,
but by clear and present danger. The rational
connection between the remedy provided and the
evil to be curbed, which in other context might
support legislation against attack on due process
grounds, will not suffice. These rights rest on
firmer foundation.
This doctrine, and the clear and present danger
test, laid the foundation for an active libertarian role
for the Court in its interpretation of the First Amendment.
Speech and Disturbances of the
Public Order
Access to the Public
Permits
The iQode of speech rather than its content is frequently
subject to regulation in the interest of public tranquility
or order. But because "content" and "mode" are frequently
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difficult to separate, the issuing of permits poses First
Amendment problems. The simple "volume" of speech, for
example, can develop community pressure to stop the speech.
The Supreme Court approached this aspect of the problem
in 1948 when, in Saia v. N. y
.
, it overturned the convic-
tion of a Jehovah's Witness minister who used loudspeaker
equipment without a proper permit. Justice Douglas,
speaking for a narrow majority, held the authorizing
ordinance to be an unconstitutional "previous restraint"
because no standards were prescribed for the exercise of
discretion by the police chief in defining "abuse."
A year later, however, in Kovacs v. Cooper (1949),
a Trenton, New Jersey, ordinance outlawing sound amplifica-
tion devices, if they emitted 'loud and raucous noises,"
21
was held to be constitutional.
Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion, took the
opportunity to attack the preferred position doctrine
which had, "... uncritically crept into some recent
opinions. ..." This "mischievous phrase," Frankfurter
asserted, subtly implied that any law touching communication
was infected with presumptive invalidity. This point of
view, he stated, had never been accepted by a majority of
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the Court, since Justice Rutledge only represented the
opinion of four judges in Thomas v. Collins , and the
phraseology of the doctrine was a gross misunderstanding
of both the clear and present danger doctrine and the
judicial philosophy of Justice Holmes.
Black, Douglas and Rutledge dissented, with Black
claiming the Court had denied "constitutionally-sheltered
speech the power of amplification."
When the issue appeared to focus more on the con-
tent than the loudness of speech the Court was more willing
to strike local ordinances, in Kunz v. New York (1953),
for example, a majority of the Justices reversed the convic-
tion of a Baptist minister who held outdoor worship ser-
vices in New York City without the proper permit. Kunz,
after a hearing before the police commissioner, was denied
a new permit on the ground that he had "ridiculed and
denounced other religious beliefs" in his meetings. The
city ordinance regulating permits did not specify this as
a criterion for permit revocation, but it did, in clear
language, allow the police commissioner to exercise dis-
cretion in denying permit applications. This ordinance was,
to the Supreme Court, an invalid prior restraint because it
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vested an administrative official with too broad a dis-
cretion.
Justice Jackson, labeling the majority's opinion
as a "quixotic tilt at windmills which belittles great
principles of liberty," relied heavily on the fact that
Kunz was frequently indiscreet in his attacks on Roman
Catholics and Jews. To Jackson such "sermons" were
"intrinsically incendiary and divisive," and speech which
was simply a "name-calling contest without social value"
was not protected by the Constitution.
The ACLU, while lauding this decision, was quick
to point out that Kunz was arrested shortly after the court
opinion on grounds of disorderly conduct. The New York
Civil Liberties Union carried the case to the Supreme
Court, but appeal was denied. The ACLU claimed that the
police had "simply found another way to suppress a speaker
they do not like," and that Kunz was "suffering from a
hostile discrimination not applied to other collectors of
23
crowds."
Injunct ions Against Demonstrations
Many of the Court's decisions about injunctions
involved attempts at economic persuasion, rather than moral
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or political persuasion, and thus were inevitably tied to
considerations about legitimate restraints of trade rather
than the probable disorder caused by such "speech."
Injunctions against clearly political kinds of events were
dealt with by the Court in 1968, however, when it reversed
a 10-raonth restraining order which prohibited the National
States Rights Party from holding rallies in Princess Anne
County, Maryland. The party, a "white supremacist"
organization, was subject to a l©-day ex parte restraining
order after it made militantly racist speeches at a racially-
mixed outdoor rally. At the end of the 10 days a Maryland
Circuit Court extended the injunction for 10 months, also
in ex parte proceedings, and the Supreme Court held such
action to constitute an unwarranted prior restraint on
speech. Justice Fortas, speaking for the majority,
emphasized that while there are limited circumstances in
which speech is so "interlaced with burgeoning violence"
that it is not protected by the First Amendment, in ordinary
circumstances criminal penalties imposed after the freedom
to speak has been grossly abused are sufficient. If the
conditions are not ordinary, then such mechanisms as an
injunction bear a heavy presumption agains t their consti-
tutional validity, and in this case, the Court felt that
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even the 10-day restraining order could not be sustained.
Even though the Court had ruled a year earlier that demon-
strators who had proceeded with a protest march in the face
of an injunction should have sought judicial review of the
order rather than disobey it,^^ ^he ex parte proceedings
in this case were felt to be unnecessary. Some of the
justices, such as Douglas in his concurrence, suggested
that the net effect of such a temporary injunction is to
give the state the "paralyzing power of a censor."
Breach of the Peace
" Fighting Words "
Justice Murphy had made it clear, in Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire (1942),^^ that not all random utterances
deserved protection when he ruled that the "lewd and obscene,
the profane, and libelous, and insulting or 'fighting'
words," are not "speech" within the meaning of the First
Amendment. But "fighting words" are always linked to the
mood of the audience, and several controversies have forced
the Supreme Court to deal with the nature of legal rights
when a provocative speaker meets a belligerent audience.
In 1947, for example, the Court overturned, by denying
certiorari, the action of peace officers in Lacona, Iowa,
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who prevented a group of Witnesses from entering the town
to hold a Sunday religious meeting because their meetings
on four previous Sundays in a public park had evoked
heckling and physical attacks by the townspeople. ^'^ A
Federal District Court found that the local sheriff had
acted within the scope of his authority because the "threat
of mob violence in Lacona was apparent and real," but the
Federal Court of Appeals felt that the disorder in the park
was due to the failure of the local and state authorities
to police the park when unpopular people gave Bible lectures.^®
The strongest, and some critics would say most
"mechanical," application of the clear and present danger
doctrine to this type of problem was probably the Court's
1949 decision in Terroiniello v. Chicago, which reversed the
conviction for inciting a breach of the peace against a
suspended Roman Catholic priest after he delivered a speech
in a city auditorium under riotous conditions, in the face
of a volatile crowd-situation Terroiniello started to give
a speech, which was strongly anti-semitic, and explanations
of what ensued ranged from "an increase in the riotous
situation" to "total pandemonium." The police reportedly
asked Terroiniello to stop, but he refused, and the police.
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reasoning that he was the immediate cause of the riot,
arrested him.
Justice Douglas, in delivering the majority opinion,
focused on the failure of the trial judge to define breach
of the peace in terms of the clear and present danger test.
The judge instructed the jury that the offense included
speech which "stirs the public to anger, invites dispute,
brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a distur-
bance." This formulation of the question, according to
Douglas, was unconstitutional, because the "function of
free speech under our system is to invite dispute. "^^
Counsel for Terminiello had not argued this point, but for
Douglas that was immaterial, it wasn't so immaterial for
Justice Frankfurter, who thought the Court should stick
to deciding questions asked of it, and was joined in
dissent by Justices Burton and Jackson. The latter, after
giving a lengthy description of the situation in which
Terminiello attempted to deliver his address, warned that
if the Court did not "temper its doctrinaire logic with a
little practical wisdom, it will convert the Constitutional
Bill of Rights into a suicide pact."^^
The deaths of Justices Murphy and Rutledge in 1949
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and their replacement by Justices Clark and Minton meant
that only Justices Black and Douglas remained active
supporters of the preferred position doctrine. The
remainder of the Court examined restrictive statutes on
the basis of "reasonableness" with the presumption that
all such laws were valid until proven otherwise.
" This
shift in presumptions about constitutionality became
especially apparent in two 1951 decisions on free speech
written by Chief Justice Vinson.
The first, Peiner v. New York
, concerned the con-
viction of a college student on the charge of disorderly
conduct in Syracuse, New York, in Vinson's interpretation
of the trial record Feiner, "gave the impression that he
was endeavoring to arouse the Negro people against the
whites, urging that they raise up in arras and fight for
32
equal rights.' These statements in such a racially-mixed
audience stirred up sone "excitement," and some of the
onlookers chided police on their inability to handle the
crowd, and at least one threatened violence against the
speaker if the police did not act. After three requests by
police to stop speaking, Feiner was arrested "in order to
prevent a fight." To a majority of the Court, the arrest
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was not motivated by any content in Feiner's speech but
by the situation which it engendered.
Frankfurter, sensing shades of Terminiello in some
Of the dissents, wrote a concurring opinion in this case
which argued strenuously that it was not a constitutional
principle that protection of free speech meant that police
must proceed against a crowd, whatever its size and temper,
and not against the speaker.
Justices Douglas, Minton and Black dissented, with
Black objecting to the Court's "blind acceptance' of the
trial court and the judge's testimony on all the important
points. It is the Court's prerogative, he felt, in spite
of its desire to review only questions of law, to examine
evidence itself when the case involves fundamental con-
stitutional guarantees. The pertinent facts, for Black,
were that Syracuse had granted a permit to a former
Assistant Attorney General to speak in a public school
building on the subject of racial discrimination and civil
liberties. On the day of the proposed address, however,
the authorities cancelled the permit, and the Young
Progressives, under whose auspices the meeting was scheduled,
then arranged for the person to deliver his speech at a
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local hotel. According to Black the gathering on the
street and Feiner's speech was a protest against the can-
cellation of the original permit and to publicize the
meeting at the hotel. Black remained highly suspicious
of police testimony to the effect that the crowd was
"restless," "pushing," "shoving and milling around,"
and claimed that there was nothing in the record to indi-
cate that Feiner used the phrase "in arms" except for
innuendo by the prosecution. The majority of the Court
reasoned, according to Black, that police may, if they
reasonably conclude that a serious fight or riot is
imminent, stop a speech in order to prevent a breach of
the peace. As a general principle Black found this
unarguable, but maintained that it was "far-fetched" to
suggest that the facts showed any imminent threat of
uncontrollable disorder. An isolated threat of assault
on a speaker did not, he insisted, "forbode disorder."^"*
In Edwards v. South Carolina
, when a city manager
ordered a civil rights demonstration to disperse because
some onlookers were in his view "possible troublemakers,"
the 1963 Supreme Court overturned convictions of the 187
demonstrators for breach of the peace after they failed to
J
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disperse. This situation was, the Court insisted, "...
a far cry from
. . . Peiner."^^ The demonstrators were
parading on the South Carolina State House grounds, and
since the crowd of three hundred onlookers made no
threatening remarks or hostile gestures and there was
adequate police protection, the protestors were, in the
words of Justice Stewart, convicted of an offense "so
generalized" that it was "not susceptible of exact
definition" and upon evidence which proved nothing more
than that some members of the community were probably
opposed to the views of the demonstrators.
Justice Clark dissented and viewed the case as a
simple application of the clear and present danger test
by the city manager to prevent a public brawl. The fact
that the demonstrators responded with defiance rather than
with cooperation created, in his view, a new situation
which was more dangerous than the one which already existed,
The city manager might have been honestly mistaken as to
the imminence of the danger, Clark stated, but the impli-
cation in the majority opinion that police may not inter-
vene until the riot has occurred overlooks the "almost
spontaneous combustion in some southern communities," and
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is "
. . .
like keeping out the doctor until the patient
dies."
The Court was much more divided, however, in two
1965 cases stemming from a protest rally in Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, in which 2,000 Southern University students,
led by E. Elton Cox, an ordained Congregational minister,
were protesting the arrest of 23 students who had been
picketing segregated lunch counters the previous day.
Cox was arrested and convicted on three separate charges
j
1) disturbing the peace; 2) obstructing public passages;
and 3) picketing before a courthouse. The Supreme Court
reversed all three charges, but with greatly varying
degrees of consensus. The Court unanimously reversed the
breach of the peace conviction using the same criteria put
forth in Edwards
, but on the second charge the Court
divided 7-2. At least five of the Justices felt that the
obstructing public passages statute was basically a permit
statute which gave too much discretion to local officials
36and was not applied to all groups equally. The issue
of picketing before a courthouse, dealt with separately in
Cox No. 49, was narrowly overturned. Justice Goldberg,
speaking for the 5-4 majority, claimed that while the state
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has a legitimate interest in protecting its judicial
system from "pressures which picketing near a courthouse
might create," in this case police gave demonstrators
permission to gather where they did, and to sustain con-
viction would be to approve entrapment.
Justice Black, along with Justices Clark, White,
and Harlan, angrily dissented, claiming that he could not
understand how the majority could reverse the conviction
because of, "
. .
.a permission which testimony in the
record denies was given, which could not have been authori-
tatively given anyway, and even if given was soon after-
37
ward revoked."
The majority of the Court was to reaffirm the Cox
rationale in 1966 when it overturned by a 504 majority
the conviction of five Negro demonstrators for breach of
38the peace after they refused to leave a public library.
Justice Black, who argued in dissent that tranquility in
a library should take precedence over the expression of
dissident ideas, was to be vindicated later in the same
year when a majority of the Court held picketing before a
39jail to constitute trespass. In Adder ly v. Florida ,
Justice Black, speaking for the majority this time, drew
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a distinction between Edwards and the present case by
noting that the speech took place in front of a publicly-
financed building, but that it was "public" in the sense
of being designed for security purposes, not "public" in
the sense of being open to the public, in this context.
Black warned, the fundamental fact of the First Amendment
is that it dees not create a constitutional right for
propagandists to protest "whenever and however and where-
ever they please."
Justice Douglas, joined by Warren, Brennan and
Fortas, felt that a jail was a "seat of government" and as
obvious a center of protest as executive mansions and
legislative chambers.
The Court seemed to continue im the tradition of
Edwards, however, in a 1969 case which overturned the con-
viction of Dick Gregory and others for refusing to stop a
demonstration when police feared that the conduct of the
spectators might lead to a severe breach of the peace.
The controversial Chief Justice Warren, speaking for six
of the judges, thought the essential fact in this case
was that the defendants were charged with disorderly con-
duct when not even the police claimed that their conduct
was in fact disorderly. However, reasonable the police
request may have been, the Court felt that the charge
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disorderly conduct, rather than a more accurate charge,
such as refusal to obey a police officer, negated convic-
tion. There were no dissenting opinions, but Justice
Black in his concurrence underscored the fact that the
holding was tied to the lack of narrowly-drawn statutes to
handle the problem of "obnoxious conduct" which do not
collide with the broad rights guaranteed in the First
Amendment. The holding was not a construction of the First
Amendment, he insisted, which would "subject all the
people of the nation to the uncontrollable whim and
arrogance of speaOcers, and writers, and protestors, and
41grievance bearers." The authority of government is not
"so trifling," he warned, that it elevates the interest
of those with complaints above the community's interest
in tranquility; especially the tranquility of those spots
which Black thought people have selected to "escape the
hurly-burly of the outside business and political world,"
or other buildings that require "peace and quiet to carry
out their functions." For Black a list of such places
would have to include at least hospitals, schools, courts
and libraries, and an individual's home, even a Mayor's,
should be free of uninvited dialogue about social change.
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While discourse is to be left free, so that public matters
can be discussed with impunity, picketing and demonstrating
can be, according to Black, "regulated like other conduct
of men."
Incitement
The charge of inciting disorder usually assumes a
sympathetic audience which a speaker wishes to lead in some
illegal action, but there have been cases where the charge
was used when police suspected that a speaker deliberately
planned on the reaction of a hostile audience to create
disorder. In 1966, for example, a state District Court of
Appeals reversed a "conspiracy to riot" charge leveled by
California authorities against members of the American
Nazi party. The charge, along with charges of assault
(which were sustained) , stemmed from an incident which
took place when defendants, wearing Nazi uniforms, steel
helmets, and carrying provocative and derogatory signs,
pushed their way through a crowd of persons who had con-
gregated outside a meeting hall to await the beginning of
a celebration of the fifteenth anniversary of Israeli
42independence. In the wild melee which ensued a number
of the members of the crowd and police officers were injured.
262
but the Court of Appeal, relying heavily on the Supreme
Court criteria set down in Terminiello, insisted that
picketing and the carrying of signs, even though derogatory,
were legitimate forms of free expression, and ruled that the
simple fact of membership in the American Nazi Party or the
wearing of uniforms (even steel helmets) did not jger se
constitute a conspiracy.
On the issue of "provocative" speech the American
Civil Liberties Union insists that unless the most obnoxious
have freedom of speech, it cannot be guaranteed for others.
In the context of innumerable defenses of George Lincoln
Rockwell and his American Nazi Party's right to hold out-
door speeches and demonstrations, the Union has stated that
in its view,
• . . speech can be limited only when a speaker
urges immediate violent action and there is a
real danger that his followers will act then and
there on his incitement. This 'cletu: and present
danger* applies only to violence urged by the
speaker. It does not apply to threats of violence
by his opponents (or even actual attempts to
carry out such threats)
,
although, of course,
opponents of the speaker have every right . . .
to peacefully express their views.
The Union opposed the cancellation of permits, etc., to
controversial speakers on the grounds that they may create
violence because of the strong feelings they may evoke in
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their audience. To deny a speech or demonstration on
these grounds, such as Mayor Wagner's refusal to grant
Rockwell a public park permit in New York City because he
was "an invitation to riot," the Union maintained was to
sacrifice freedom of speech to the "threat of mob action."'*^
In 1968, the Supreme Court, by denying certiorari,
upheld New York State's prosecution for incitement of William
45
Epton. Epton, in the wake of a racial disturbance in
New York City, was alleged to have actively participated in
the formation of a group dedicated to armed revolt against
the police. Police claimed the riot was under the direc-
tion of "block captains" and "terrorist bands," equipped
with Molotov cocktails which Epton himself had explained
how to use. He was convicted and sentenced to serve three
concurrent one-year terms; one for conspiring to riot,
one for advocating criminal anarchy, and one for con-
spiring to engage in advocacy of criminal anarchy. In
the Court's per curiam decision, two justices wrote
opinions—Stewart concurring with the denial and Douglas
dissenting from the Court's decision. Stewart felt that
the riot conviction presented no substantial federal ques-
tion and, in a footnote, asserted it was probably arguable
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that a state could convict someone for criminal conspiracy
without first "demonstrating some constitutionally unpro-
tected overt act in furtherance of the alleged unlawful
agreement." Instruction in the use of incendiary devices,
however, could make no "serious claim to constitutional
protection." Douglas, however, reasoned that, since many
of the alleged overt acts consisted in part of speeches
made by Epton and his participation in preparation and
distribution of certain leaflets, the indictment was
improperly inflated. Douglas argued that the Court should
have approached the question of whether an overt act
required to convict on a conspiracy charge can be an
activity which is customarily protected by the First
Amendment (with a strong implication that he thought not)
.
In later cases, however, the Supreme Court was
quick to overturn cases in which inflammatory speech was
simple political hyperbole not followed by disorder. A
"threat" on President Johnson's life made in the context
of a rally to protest alleged police brutality in Washington,
D. C, was held by the Court not to violate the federal
statute making it a felony to willfully threaten the
46
President, and racist remarks of a leader of the Ku Klux
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Klan were held to be inadmissible as evidence of violation
of an Ohio criminal syndicalism statute. In the latter
case, Brandenburg v. Ohio , the defendant's rhetoric even
took place at a cross-burning rally at which some of the
participants carried firearms. The Court chose this case
to overrule the longstanding precedent of Whitney v.
California and declare that the First Amendment forbids
states to proscribe advocacy of the use of force or law
violation except where such advocacy was clearly related
to "imminent lawless action." While Brandenburg was
unanimous in result. Black and Douglas each concurred
separately on what they believed to be the confusion in
the venerable phrase "clear and present danger." Douglas,
using this concurrence to scold the Court for its holding
in U. S. V. O 'Brien (to be discussed later)
,
even stated
that the formula had become "so twisted and perverted" that
it should have "... no place in the regime of the First
Amendment
.
In 1970 the Supreme Cou overturned the disorderly
conduct conviction of some anti-Vietnam War demonstrators
because the trial judge's instructions to the jury failed
to distinguish speech from other forms of conduct in the
266
demonstration. Thus it would appear that the Court,
while not claiming that disorderly conduct can be "speech"
(because of the "fighting words" criterion), insists that
rhetoric, short of incitement, be clearly separated from
other actions (such as lying across a public sidewalk in
this case)
,
so that conviction is free from any taint of a
jury's disapproval of a demonstration's "point of view."**®
Libel and Freedom
of Expression
Group Libel
Politically-related speech and the rubric "libel"
were to cross paths in 1952, when the Supreme Court upheld
a state statute prohibiting the
. . .
manufacturing, publishing or exhibition in
any place of any publication portraying depravity,
criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a
class of citizens, of any race, color, creed or
religion which
. . . exposes citizens ... to
contempt, derision or obloquy or which is pro-
ductive of breach of the peace or riots. . . .^^
At issue in Beauharaais v. Illinois was the conviction of a
president of the "White Circle League" because of leaflets
he distributed in downtown Chicago asking the Mayor and the
City Council of Chicago to "halt the further encroachment,
harrassroent and invas of white people, their property,
neighborhoods and persons, by the Negro. ..."
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The trial court, proceeding on the assumption that
the material in question was libelous in character, instruc-
ted the jury to decide only the question of publication.
On appeal, the Supreme Court, by a narrow majority, found
the Illinois statute valid since it prohibited speech
"liable to cause violence and disorder" and this "para-
phrased" the traditional justification of criminal libel.
Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the majority, noted that
the classes of speech reiterated in Chaplinskv are all
utterances which are "no essential part of any exposition
of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality." in such a balance. Frankfurter concluded, an
individual's interest in hurling epithets is outweighed
by society's interest in order and morality.
Justice Black, dissenting along with Reed, Douglas
and Jackson, feared that minority groups would hail the
decision as their victory and quipped, "Another such victory
and I am undone." The majority, he said, condoned an
expansion of state censorship by "painstakingly analogizing
it to the law of criminal libel," but this "sugar-coating"
did not make "censorship less deadly."
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Jackson, in his dissent, subscribed to the validity
of the notion that a "group" could be libelled, but felt
that the clear and present danger test should have been
invoked to assess the consequences of such libel, it
j
!
would appear impossible, however, to sustain any group
libel conviction using the clear and present danger doctrine
j
as an interpretation of the First Araendraent since, if
correctly applied, if would prevent any state action i
against group defamation, except as another label for
incitement to a breach of the peace. This was the rationale
applied by the ACLU when it listed the case an an "unfavor-
50
able decision" in its annual report.
The notion of group libel usually receives the
most support from those, like Richard B. Wilson, who also
|
object to the clear and present danger formula as the most
|
51
appropriate criterion for approaching free speech problems.
^
I
Wilson, for example, would prefer to relate basic First
I
Amendment values to the maintenance or improvement of the
\
nation's "capacity for self-government" and since group
defamation is, in his view, anti-democratic in character,
it reduces a community's capacity for self-government and (
should not be tolerated on First Amendment (democratic) i
i
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grounds. Even Wilson felt, however, that much of
Frankfurter's analysis of libel was incorrect.
But Loren P. Beth, who shares Wilson's hostility
to the clear and present danger doctrine as the dominant
interpretation of the First Amendment, nonetheless conclu-
ded that since group libel laws are unlikely to achieve
any substantial results and do involve suppression of
speech they are unjustified. Beth was willing to grant
that consideration of free speech in a value hierarchy
does not automatically rule out the possibility of dealing
with the problem of group vilification, but he posed the
problem as a choice between the value of free speech and
the value of racial equality. Wilson, and the defenders
of the notion of "group libel," seek to make the two
values not only compatible, but complementary, and for
Beth a democratic process (since "practically if not
philosophically" free speech is more basic to self-govern-
ment than equality) can (though it should not) function
without equality.
It is noteworthy that Frankfurter, while insisting
that Beauharnais was convicted under valid libel law,
refused to allow him the protections normally provided in
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a libel procedure. Even if the criterion is restricted
to the truth or falsity of statements made rather than
the intent of the speaker, the very nature of such state-
ments, as Beth pointed out, makes it almost impossible to
prove them either true or false.
Even though the validity of "group libel" was
sustained, it is a rare charge, and what was viewed in
1952 as libeling a group would probably, if applied con-
sistently, be viewed as hyperbole— if only because
invective against groups (especially if the Establishment
or "effete snobs" are groups) is so widespread.
Political Speech and Individual Libel
In addition to the flat declaration that the notion
of seditious libel is inconsistent with the First Amendment
in New York Times Co . v. Sullivan (1964), already mentioned,
the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that since erroneous
statements are probably inevitable in any public debate,
the First Amendment protects even false statements
"honestly made." In this case the Court overturned a libel
conviction against the New York Times which published a
paid advertisement criticizing the treatment of Negroes
in Montgomery, Alabama, by the police in particular. The
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ad contained some factual errors and the local Commissioner,
though not mentioned in the ad either by name or specific
reference to his office, contended that the criticism
constituted a libel of hira.^^ The issue as Justice Brennan
formulated it for a majority of the Court was whether the
constitutional protection given to debate on public issues
was withdrawn if some of the statements were erroneous.
To follow a rule which would compel any critic of official
conduct to guarantee the truth of all of his factual
assertions on pain of libel judgements, would impose,
said Brennan, a "pall of fear and timidity . . . upon
those who would give voice to public criticism.
"
In concurring opinions Justices Black, Douglas
and Goldberg were willing to go further, with Black
claiming that the press must have an absolute immunity for
criticism of public officials and viewing state libel laws
as a threat to the very existence of freedom of the press.
The "actual malice" test, he insisted, was an attempt to
create an "elusive, abstract" exception to the First
Amendment. Goldberg expressed concern that freedom of
speech could not be effectively safeguarded by a jury's
evaluation of the speaker's "state of mind." The American
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Civil Liberties Union, which submitted a friend-of-the-
court brief in this case (as did numerous newspapers),
hailed the decision as one of their most important victories
as well as a landmark decision in civil liberties law,^^
The Union's general position on libel suits is
that they do not raise civil liberties questions, but that
suits which involve "political" figures, criminal libel
and "group libel" all threaten freedom of speech because
government becomes the arbiter of truth in what is usually
"politically-related speech." While " . . . defamatory
attacks on individuals have little relation (if any at
all) to the purposes for which freedom of speech is safe-
guarded, " according to the Union, in civil suits involving
people in political life, and in criminal libel "there
exists an overriding public interest" in maintaining the
55
"widest scope of criticism and free discussion." By
implication, at least, the Union would not wish to pro-
hibit suits by political figures totally as long as
greater proof, in the form of "convincing clarity," were
required by courts to establish "actual malice."
In 1964 the Court extended the "actual malice"
rule to criminal as well as civil libel, and in 1966 it
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reversed a conviction which defined criminal libel as "any
writing calculated to create a disturbance of the peace. "^^
In 1968 the Court overturned a defamation action brought
against a candidate for public office who charged in a
televised speech that a local deputy sheriff had a criminal
relationship with a local labor union officer. The
allegation was false and the sheriff sued, but Justice
White, speaking for six members of the Court, ruled that
the defendant had relied solely on an affidavit given by
a union member without verifying the information; and
even though he gave no consideration to the consequences
of his statements, he fell short of demonstrating a reck-
less disregard for accuracy.
Black and Douglas concurred, but argued on grounds
of freedom to criticize official conduct rather than "actual
malice." Justice Fortas dissented, claiming there should
exist on speakers a burden to check the reliability of
their statements.
While "group libel" is a precedent, it has tended
to remain only a precedent. The Court's handling of
individual libel when such speech even hints at being
"political" or "official" would indicate no propensity to
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use, or to let local governments "use/' libel as a device
to narrow the dialogue on public policy.
Figurative Speech
Speech Plus
Even justices thoroughly devoted to the spirit of
the First Amendement find difficulty in deciding what
constitutes "speech." The idea of "speech plus" was first
developed by the Supreme Court in labor picketing decisions,
and in the accompanying difficulties with such phenomena
as picketing, potential breaches of the peace, permits for
demonstrations, etr-, which were not simple verbal or
written communication but part of a more encompassing
58activity. Some, such as Harry Kalveon, have found the
dichotomy between "pure speech" and "speech plus" worth-
lees, because all speech, since it can be interpreted as
noise by someone else, is necessarily "speech plus." But
even though speech which tends to be politically and
legally significant is usually inherently social and thus
involves other dimensions, the distinction is useful, as
Pritchett suggests, precisely because it draws attention
59
to a wide range of speech situations. The distinction,
for example, helps to emphasize that a demonstration, while
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certainly an expression of a point of view, is also a
gathering of people which can create problems simply
because it is a gathering of people regardless of any
ideas which may have motivated such an assembly. Injunc-
tions, for example, were issued and sustained to control
both the time, route, frequency and numbers involved in
Martin Luther King's open housing marches in Chicago in
1966. In the same year Chicago enjoined George Lincoln
Rockwell from demonstrating in Jewish neighborhoods during
Jewish high holidays.
Some scholars who are not notably illiberal, such
as Pritchett, have criticized the Court for its decision
in Greoqry v. Chicago by arguing that the sheer numbers
involved in that incident could have constituted an invasion
of privacy. Even though it may be claimed that a public
official has no private life, the reasoning would hardly
extend to citizens unfortunate enough to live next to that
public official. To Pritchett, Gregory's method of making
contact with the Mayor had "less the character of a petition
and more that of harrassment, intimidation, and coercion. "^^
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Sit-ins
If picketing is "speech plus," the variations of
picketing (protesting), such as the "sit-in" (a technique
used widely by the Negro civil rights movement after 1960
which consisted of refusal to leave segregated lunch
counters or other places when service was denied) , would
have to be labeled speech "plus-plus." Such action usually
led to the demonstrators being charged with either breach
of the peace or criminal trespass. The Supreme Court, in
a series of decisions between 196C and 1964, was reluctant
to find such modes of "speech" illegal, even when such
reluctance was somewhat embarrassing legally. In cases
where the charge was breach of the peace, as in Garner v.
Louisiana (1961), the Court easily held the charges invalid
if the demonstrators were not disorderly. Until 1964
the Court was able to directly avoid dealing with the
trespass issue by holding that since segregation was legally
required by the state or municipality and was thus a state
action in violation of the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, no trespass occurred because the
demonstrators were entitled to service.
Bell V. Maryland , however, the Court received
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a clear case of criminal trespass in the restaurant where
the decision not to serve Negroes was entirely a private
choice of the owner. m earlier cases the judges had
noted that demonstrations conducted on private property
over the objection of the owner would not constitute
protected speech, and the groundwork was clearly laid for
the Court to uphold this sit-in conviction. The Court was
able to avoid this, however, by claiming that the owner
had engaged in illegal activity because a Baltimore ordi-
nance prohibited racial segregation, and there was thus no
basis for the trespass charge. This was a particularly
clumsy way out of the problem because the Baltimore law
was passed five months after the trespass convictions were
affirmed by the Maryland Supreme Court. This was apparently
the rationale of three of the Justices, with Warren,
Goldberg and Douglas concurring to make a majority but
arguing that restaurants, since they are devoted to public
use, are not private and are controlled by the equal pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Black, Harlan,
and White dissented, insisting that the Fourteenth Amendment
"standing alone," did not "prohibit privately-owned res-
63taurants from choosing their own customers."
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Symbolic Speech
The Court was less malleable when novel methods
of protest focused on something other than racial segrega-
tion. The principle that even peaceful picketing and pro-
test can be enjoined if it interferes with the effectuation
of valid state policies was the basis for the Court's
upholding of a draft card-burning conviction of 1968.
64In United States v. O'Brien four persons who burned their
draft cards as an expression of opposition to the Vietnam
War were tried and convicted under a 1965 Congressional
statute passed in order to stop such activity. Even
though both the draft card burners and Congress viewed
mutilation of draft cards as an expression of contempt,
the Court did not view it as speech. By a 7-1 vote, with
only Douglas dissenting and arguing that the Court should
have dealt with the constitutionality of conscription in
the absence of a formal declaration of war, Chief Justice
Warren held that the draft cards were sufficiently impor-
tant to the administration of the Selective Service System
to deserve protection. There is not, according to warren,
a "limitless variety" of conduct which can be labelled
"speech" simply because the conduct expresses an idea. As
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in the picketing cases, when speech and non-speech ele-
ments were combined, the interest was in regulating the
non-speech element, and draft cards. Warren submitted,
serve as proof of registration and identity, and give the
address of the local board. Destruction of the cards
would also, the Court argued, make tracing the illegitimate
use of draft cards for identification more difficult. A
Circuit Court of Appeal had declared the Congressional
statute unconstitutional because the conduct it sought to
punish was already punishable, but with less severity,
under existing law. The Supreme Court felt, however, that
it was within Congress* power to enact such a statute in
the interest of the smooth functioning of the Selective
Service System. The Court never really touched on the issue
of Congressional intent (which was not a concern for smooth
administration) nor did Warren explain why the functions
of a draft card, which were largely inflated since there
are other ways of determining registration and identity,
were so essential to smooth administration of the system.
Even though the Court had made it clear in O'Brien
that one man's symbol may be another ' s essential tool of
administration, the use of arm bands to protest U. S.
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involvement in Vietnam by high school students was held to
be constitutionally protected speech, m Tinker v. pes
Moines Independent Community School District public school
officials suspended students who wore armbands on the
grounds of maintaining order and decorum in the school,
but Justice Fortas, speaking for the majority, found no
evidence of actual disruption, and claimed that the.-appre-
hension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right
to freedom of expression. "^^ Black, however, thought the
majority was undercutting the power of school officials
over pupils, and in his dissent expressed concern that
schools in the country would be subject to the "whims and
caprices of their loudest-mouthed but maybe not their
brightest students."
Presumably, the rationale in Tinker was that
neither society, government, nor the public schools had
a genuinely valid purpose which was interefered with
because of students wearing armbands, but in another case
involving destruction of the American flag, the Court
showed signs of indicating that the symbolic destruction
of a symbol was not deserving of constitutional protection.
Street v. New York , the Court by a 5-4 majority
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overturned the conviction of Street, who after learning
that James Meredith had been shot in 1966, burned an
American flag on a Brooklyn street while shouting the words,
"We don't need no damn flag."^^ The statute in question
punished mutilation of the flag, but also prohibited any-
one from casting "contempt upon the flag by either word or
act." Justice Harlan, expressing the view of the narrow
majority, felt the statute was over-broad because it
included "by word," and there was no way of telling whether
it was Street's words, which are protected by the First
Amendment, or his actions which were the basis of his con-
viction. The Court was thus able to skirt the issue of
whether flag desecration could be punished, but even for
the majority there was the strong implication that it could.
This case is also interesting because of its unusual
voting alignment. Harlan's fine distinction, which enabled
the Court to skirt the basic question, was not unusual
since the Court frequently relied on him for fine distinc-
tions, but it did put him among an unusual majority, with
Warren, Black, Foruas and White composing a rare combina-
tion in dissent. Warren, Black and Fortas wrote separate
opinions and all took notice of the trial record's emphasis
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on "burning" as opposed to "words." To these justices
Street was in fact convicted of "burning," and such a con-
viction was in their view constitutional, justice White
felt that the action punished was not speech alone, and
that the conviction for Street's "plus" activity was legiti-
mate, warren simply stated that he believed government
had the power to protect the national emblem, but he
didn't state reasons because the majority had refused to
meet the central issue. To Justice Black it was simply
beyond "... belief that the Federal Constitution bars
a State from making the deliberate burning of the American
flag an offense." Portas attacked the notion that flags
were simply private property to be disposed of as one
pleases by insisting that a flag may be property, but that
it is property "burdened with peculiar obligations and
restrictions." Fortas did not say why a flag is so
"burdened," only that property has always been subject to
reasonable regulation when competing interests are involved
—
without mentioning what the competing interests are. Fortas
mentioned that if a state made it a misdemeanor to burn
one's shirt on a public street, it could hardly be asserted
that the citizen's constitutional right would be violated.
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but the tone of his dissent suggests that his concern about
flag burning was not really based on a desire for cleaner
streets or less air pollution.
The Court could presumably have found easy logic
to construe O'Brien as a de facto attempt to inhibit
symbolic expression, and thus have held that flag burning
was constitutionally protected. Public opinion would
probably have been outraged, but certainly no more than
in the Court's prayer decisions or rulings on criminal due
process. Even though Street's conviction was overturned,
the fine distinctions drawn in the majority opinion,
together with the holding in O'Brien and the dissents in
Tinker, indicate a warning to dissident groups that they
must choose their symbols very carefully.
Direct Act ion
There is frequently a great deal of confusion
surrounding differences between simple challenges to laws,
either as applied or on grounds of unconstitutionality,
and other challenges justified in the name of "direct action"
or "civil disobedience." Direct action, stemming from
Martin Luther King, and ultimately Ghandi, refers to a
technique used to establish sufficient tension in a community
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so that the community is forced to confront the issue which
a given political group wishes to dramatize. Such activity
can be legal or illegal, violent or non-violent, in the
case of the early civil rights movement it was usually non-
violent protest involving the use of the sit-in or street
demonstration. Further confusion arises when some view
activities such as sit-ins as acts of civil disobedience,
since there is a deliberate violation of either criminal
trespass, or (as in the early sit-in demonstrations in the
South)
,
a violation of a local law (requiring segregation)
.
Others would argue, however, that such challenges to laws
were simply techniques to force application of federal and/
or constitutional law, and thus were not acts of civil
disobedience but merely activities which were legal in all
respects, but not respected as legal in certain areas of
the nation.
The advent of confrontation politics and the
decision of protesting groups to move from simple forms of
assembly and picketing to tactics of "direct action" in
which laws are violated in order to dramatize a political
issue compounded the problem of legitimate free expression
not only for the courts but also for the American Civil
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Liberties Union. The Union opposed an automobile "stall-in
which sought to block traffic approaching the World's Fair
in 1963. The Union's position was that such action was a
violation of the "legal protections of the public's right
to movement/' and that stall- ins "exceed the limits of con-
stitutional guarantees." The Union's general position on
"direct action" was set forth in a 1963 pamphlet entitled
"How Americans Protest" which, while condemning the
physical obstruction to the public's "free access,"
emphasized with almost equal ink that "disorders' are
usually the result of "pervasive discrimination that public
officials and the public itself have done little to combat.
After the World's Fair "stall-in" for example, the ACLU
statement of disapproval of the tactic was hidden in a
rhetorical flourish which insisted on "bold action to
remove the bias that prompted such forms of protest." The
New York Civil Liberties Union spent most of its energy
attacking Mayor Wagner for attacking the demonstrators.
"Criticism," said the affiliate is no "substitute for
affirmative action." "The dominant forces in our community
and especially its elected officials," the Union said,
cannot.
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.
.escape responsibility for harsh events bypointing an accusing finger at the lawless acts
of Negroes and their supporters. They must
understand that if lawlessness occurs, it is adirect consequence of the failure of the
community, and especially its white majority,
to implement the laws of the land, the laws ofhuman decency and the laws of social experience.
Public officials must recognize the simple truththat men who have been brutalized by their
society will not always act in a peaceful fashion-
men who feel they have little at stake in their
society will not always act conservatively for
they have little to lose.^*^
The ACLU uses the "concentrate-on-the-causes-of-the-
incident-rather-than-the-incident-itself" argument a great
deal, but there is some evidence that they apply this argu-
ment with a kind of evenhandedness, especially if the ulti-
mate blame is placed on government for failing to investi-
gate the "true causes." The Union was critical, for
example, fo President Johnson's suggestion that Congress
investigate the Ku Klux Klan after the murder of a civil
rights worker in 1963. The Union suggested that "trial
by publicity" and the methods of HUAC would be hostile to
civil liberties and suggested that the real need was to
"probe the underlying reasons for the encouragement which
overt criminal acts now enjoy in some Southern states. "^^
In 1968 the Union issued a statement on civil dis-
obedience, specifying two categories in which it would not
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undertake a defense of an individual, one category was
when an individual engaged in a deliberate violation of
law based on his belief that the law was unjust even
though it was constitutional. The second category involved
violation of laws which the individual did not find intrin-
sically objectionable but violated in order to call atten-
tion to some other evil. Examples of conduct which the
ACLU felt to be beyond its concern were such things as
refusal to take part in civil defense drills, to pay
federal taxes as protest against military expenditures or
refusing to register for military service. The very
decentralization of the Union, however, and fierce internal
conflicts which began to be apparent with the fragmenta-
tion in local affiliates when confronted with such things
as the New York City school strike make it difficult to
predict the behavior of any local branch. The Union agreed,
for example, to defend Benjamin Spock in the 1968 anti-
draft conspiracy prosecution as well as some defendants in
the "Chicago Eight" trial.
Speech and National Security
Ant
i
-Subvers ion Legislation
The "Smith Act"—the Vinson Court's approach to the
problem of civil liberty, and that of the older Roosevelt
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Court, were to be inost apparent in cases involving members
of the American Communist Party and federal loyalty and
security programs. The Court, between 1946 and 1953,
operated almost "entirely within the tradition of the
6^Strong legislature-weak judiciary formula. . . ." The
Vinson Court also deferred to the "democratic" authority
of legislatures at a time when American public opinion was
more sensitive to the notion of a foreign threat using
internal mechanism than it had been since the period
immediately preceding World War I. Participation in World
War II with the Soviet Union as an ally acted to blunt
pre-war fears about Communism, but the beginning of the
"Cold War," U. S. involvement in Korea and along with the
improbable career of Senator Joseph McCarthy, all coalesced
to create an atmosphere in which, in the words of Justice
70
Douglas, "suspicion (had) taken the place of good will."
The federal government brought indictments against 145
leaders of the American Communist Party and was successful
initially in securing 89 convictions. The "Smith Act,"
technically the Alien Registration Act of 1940, was the
first law to be used against the Communist Party (though
it was initially designed with Fascists in mind) and makes
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it a criminal offense to advocate or teach the overthrow
of the United States government by force or violence, to
print or distribute written matter advocating the same, to
organize or knowingly become a member of any group which
advocates the same, or to conspire to accomplish any of
the aforementioned, it is this statute which, in the view
of Zechariah Chafee, Jr., contains "the most drastic
restrictions on freedom of speech ever enacted in the
United States during peace."
The prosecution of 11 leaders of the American
Communist Party under the Smith Act, which some speculate
was the Truman Administration's technique to under-cut
72Republican charges of being "soft on Communism," resulted
in a tumultuous trial marked by exchange of insults,
bickering, and criminal contempt citations that ranged
from thirty days to six months' imprisonment, as well as
73the disbarring of attorneys. The central figure in this
case, Lawrence Dennis (who had already been convicted in
1947 for failure to comply with a House Un-American
74Activities Committee Subpoena)
, ,
was General Secretary
of the party, and he and his co-defendants were convicted;
their conviction was upheld by the Court of Appeals of the
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second Circuit, with Judge Learned Hand (probably America's
most respected jurist) writing the opinion. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari but limited review to the ques-
tion of whether the Act violated the First Amendment free
speech guarantee of the Fifth Amendement because of
indef initeness
.
On both counts the Court was to answer, "Nol"
,
and in the process created a new formula for interpreting
free speech under the Constitution. Chief Justice Vinson,
after a lengthy discussion of the clear and present danger
doctrine (with the implication that he was applying it)
invoked instead the rationale of Judge Hand. Under this
formulation the question is not whether a danger is
imminent, or even whether the speech tends to create public
disorder, but 'whethe*. the gravity of the evil, discounted
by its iraprobabxiity, justifies such invasion of free
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." In other
words, what is advocated is as important as when , and since
for Vinson the government's existence was at stake, there
was no need to wait until a "putsch" was about to occur.
Justices Frankfurter and Jackson, in separate concurrences,
attacked the application of the Holroesian danger test to
this type of casei the former argued that the doctrine
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was "a sonorous formula" which disguised an inability to
solve concrete cases; and the latter; while holding the
doctrine useful in dealing with "street corner
.
zealots," claimed that its use in this case would have
placed government in a "judge-made verbal trap." Black
and Douglas, in dissents, indicated they would have applied
the clear and present danger test, and using this would
have struck down the Smith Act, since it is aimed at
advocacy, not overt acts.
The ACLU actively opposed the Smith Act at the
time of its enactment, scolded the Communist party for
approving the use of the Smith Act against Trotskyites in
1943, and continued to press for repeal after the Dennis
decision. The Union attacked the majority's decision in
Dennis on the grounds that it "permitted punishment of
advocacy in the absence of a clear and present danger."
It also argued that the jury should pass on the question
of a clear and present danger, and that the new formulation
of a "clear and present danger" was unwise and ultimately
hostile to a constitutional tradition which elevates First
76
Amendment guarantees to fundamental values of the society.
After the favorable ruling in Dennis , the government
went after the Communist Party's second string. Over 100
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convictions were obtained before the Court intervened with
a clarification of Dennis in Yates v. United States in
77
1957. In this case the Court granted certiorari without
limitations and found the conviction of 14 California
Corarnunists defective because the trial court judge had
failed to distinguish simple advocacy from "advocacy of
action." Justice Harlan, writing for the raajority,
claimed that the Act, to be constitutional, must be directed
at advocacy of action, not ideas. Mere doctrinal justi-
fication of forcible overthrow of government was, for
Harlan, "too remote from concrete action to be regarded
as the kind of indoctrination preparatory to action which
was condemned in Dennis .
"
Clark dissented on the ground that the Smith Act
was basically directed at conspiracy, and that the same
conspiracy existed in Yates as in Dennis . Clark found
Harlan's opinion to be a confusing "artillery of words,"
and since there was little substantive difference between
the cases, he correctly suspected that the majority was
subtly pushing some kind of new doctrine.
The more stringent evidentiary requirements laid
down in Yates led to the reversal of many convictions in
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federal circuit courts and even impeded denaturalization
proceedings against naturalized citizens accused of Communist
7fiParty membership.
The addition of Warren and Brennan to the Court
created a large minority hostile to the Smith Act, and in
1961 the majority, while holding the membership clause of
the Act constitutional, did so in a fashion which made
simple membership in the party an unacceptable basis for
prosecution. Justice Harlan, in Scales v. United States,
reasoned that the Smith Act membership clause was not
repealed by the section of the Internal Security Act of
1950 which said that mere membership in any Communist
organization would not be a violation of that law, because
the Smith Act was directed only at "knowing, active"
membership, not simple membership. The Smith Act can't
mean mere membership, according to Harlan, because if it
did it would be unconstitutional; and since it isn't uncon-
stitutional, it can't mean that. Harlan's technique of
changing the Act by interpretation in order to keep it
constitutional irritated Douglas, who didn't want to save
it; but in a companion case, Noto v. United States , Harlan
and the majority were to hold the act unconstitutional as
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applied because evidence indicated that the defendant only
engaged in the "abstract teaching of Communist theory.
The distinction between various types of 'member-
ships" made in the Scales decision was welcomed by the ACLU
as a hopeful sign that the Supreme Court would not tolerate
"wholesale prosecution of members of the Communist Party/'
but the union still maintained that regardless of how the
government chose to implement the Smith Act, the Scales
verdict, "strikes at the very heart of the First Amendment
guarantee that freedom of association, unrelated to the
performance of an illegal act, is inviolate." The decision,
the Union argued, "vitiates the First Amendment by placing
every individual on notice that he joins organizations
under peril of future criminal prosecution."
It puts a premium on an ignorant, not an
enlightened citizenry, it requires that a
person who considers joining any organiza-
tion roust do so either without regard for
its stated purposes or, to protect himself,
attempt from the outside, to look behind
such purposes to find the 'real' motives of
the organization. Either procedure places
extra burdens on the right of free
association.®^
Internal Security Act of 1950
The "Cold War" atmosphere induced Congress to enact
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the most comprehensive legislation on Communism in the
Internal Security Act of 1950 (the McCarran Act)
. This
Act (title one) and the Emergency Detention Act (title
two), was, due to the deft skill of Representative Richard
Nixon, passed over President Truman's veto, and makes it
unlawful to "knowingly combine, conspire or agree with any
other person to perform any act which would substantially
contribute to the establishment within the United States
of a totalitarian dictatorship." This phraseology was
designed to avoid the "force or violence" test of the
Smith Act, since in Nixon's view Communists had developed
techniques for taking over governments illegally, but
without using force or violence. No prosecutions were
ever brought under this section, which was fortunate since
the proviso contains what Pritchett has called a "loose
definition of sedition" which is "rather clearly
82
unconstitutional.
. .
This Act also established the Subversive Activities
Control Board (SACB) to designate Communist action organiza-
tions and "front" organizations both of which would then
be required to register with the Attorney General. The
proviso that Communist Party membership per se would not
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constitute a violation was the Congressional technique of
satisfying the Fifth Amendment guarantee against coerced
self-incrimination.®^ The order to register also meant
that the organization must disclose the names and addresses
of its officers and give an accounting of the sources of
its finances, other sanctions under the Act included the
labeling of mail, radio and television broadcasts of
registered groups as subversive propaganda; prohibition
of members from working in defense plants; and withholding
84
of passports.
This Act always received opposition from the ACLU
and while the Union usually did not oppose the findings of
the Board (other than to point out the "semantic spectacle"
of the hearing on whether the Communist Party was a
Communist organization), they consistently attacked the
registration requirements and the other provisions of the
law as violative of free speech and association.®^
The Communist Control Act of 1954
In 1954, Congress (led by Senator Hubert H. Humphrey)
finding the Communist Party to be "an instrumentality of a
conspiracy," statutorily held it to be a "clear and present,
and continuing danger." The Communist Control Act of 1954
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added to the McCarran Act's category of Comraunist organiza-
tions the label "Communist- infiltrated" organizations,
and also contained the interesting phrase that the party
"should be outlawed." since it is specifically not outlawed
in the McCarran Act (or it couldn't be asked to register),
this emerges as Congress' moral judgment rather than its
legal command. This attempt to "keep the party legal
enough so that it can be successfully prosecuted for its
illegalities.
. .
."®^ was hardly the product of pristine
libertarianism. if it were an unequivocal offense, the
law would at least be clear in its command to citizens,
and Communists would be entitled to the due process pro-
tections of courts rather than the "non-punitive" techniques
of Congressional committees? and a statute of limitations
could prevent people from being harassed who had flirted
with radical politics twenty years earlier, in the sub-
sequent hearings which attempted to register the Communist
Party as a Communist action organization, numerous problems
as to admissible evidence and the use of governmental
informers, ex-Communists and professional informers (whose
names would not be divulged) created significant questions
about a fair hearing and evidentiary requirements. The
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Supreme Court, for example, remanded a case, requesting the
introduction of additional evidence in 1956 when it was
persuaded that three government witnesses had been dis-
credited and the findings of the Board had been based on
87their evidence.
In round two the Board found again that the Party
should be required to register, and on appeal the Supreme
Court upheld the order by a 5 to 4 vote in 1961. Justice
Frankfurter, writing for the majority, rejected arguments
that the Act was a technique for "outlawing" the Party.
Frankfurter also refused to consider the constitutionality
of any of the sanctions which the Act applied to registered
organizations, on the ground that they were hypothetical,
since the Communist Party had not yet registered. The
sanctions incurred by a registered organization were all
problematical because. Frankfurter argued, no one could
foresee what denial of tax exemption would mean, whether
the Party would wish to utilize the mails, whether its
members would ever seek eraployement in a defense facility
or a labor union, or whether they would ever apply for a
passport. Frankfurter was more interested in attacking
the notion that the First Amendment enjoyed a preferred
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position in the Constitution, since this was the "activist"
premise of those who wanted to anticipate unconstitutional
consequences of the Act before they occurred. He urged
hi« brethren to balance the competing interests at stake,
and in his view the government's interest in protecting
itself outweighed the social and individual interest in
83freedom of expression (at least, of Communist expression).
So, eleven years after the Act had been passed by
Congress, the Communist Party was registered, opening the
door for litigation about the constitutionality of the
consequences which followed from registration. After the
1961 decision individual Party officials refused to
register, and the SACB gained conviction but was reversed
by a Court of Appeals in 1963 on the ground s that the act
of registration was necessarily incriminating and no
89individual could be forced to register the Party. The
Supreme Court denied certiorari, so the ruling held.
In 1965 the government, not to be outdone by
judicial ingenuity, again brought action, claiming that two
FBI informants within the Party would volunteer to register
the Party if asked, and presumably, because of their
affiliation with the FBI they would not be incriminating
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themselves. A federal District Court convicted the Party
on this evidence and levied the maximum fine of $230,000,
but this conviction was reversed by a Court of Appeals in
1967 on the grounds that the McCarran Act contravened the
Fifth Amendment's guarantee against self-incrimination,
even if it was registered by FBI informants. The govern-
ment, showing signs of fatigue, decided not to appeal this
decision to the Supreme Court.
The McCarran Act also stipulates that if a
Communist action organization does not register as ordered,
then individual members of the organization must register
and, since no one voluntarily took this step, the SACB
brought action against two individual Party members in
91Albertson v. SACB in 1965. The Supreme Court, in a
unanimous decision, held that this procedure constituted
compulsory self-incrimination, and that it was not pre-
mature to raise the question even though they had not
registered, because the individuals would be incriminated
if they registered and punished if they didn't.
The ACLU supported the appeal of Albertson, arguing
that compliance with the SACB's order would force disclosure
of political associations without any showing a "grave
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public necessity" to justify such disclosure. Prior to
accepting the Albertson appeal the Supreme Court had side-
stepped a case which could have raised questions about the
legitimacy of requiring "communist-front" organizations
to register, and the ACLU urged Attorney General Nicholas
de B. Katzenbach to discontinue legal action against such
groups on the grounds that such a "futile pursuit" failed
to meet the clear and present danger test; failed to dis-
tinguish between a communist-front and a communist action
organization; and because it sought to penalize a vague
and uncertain range of actions. In the same year the
SACB attempted to register the American Committee for the
Protection of foreign Born and the Veterans of the
Abraham Lincoln Brigade without success. In 1966, how-
ever, in a per curiam decision, the Court oustained ^ move
by the Attorney General to petition the SACB for an order
requiring the DuBois Clubs of America to register. The
plaintiffs attempted to bypass the Board by suing in
District Court, alleging that the Communist-front registra-
tion provisions of the Subversive Activities Control Act
were unconstitutional. A three- judge District Court dis-
missed the appeal. The Supreme Coutt also refused to enjoin
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the Attorney General and the Board from proceeding, with
seven of the judges holding that since the Act provided
full evidentiary public hearings and a review process, the
DuBois Clubs had not exhausted administrative remedies and
thus could not challenge the constitutionality of these
proceedings. The DuBois Clubs had relied on a 1965 ruling
in Dombroski v. Pfister, in which the Court held that it
is not necessary to exhaust all administrative remedies
if the action had a "chilling effect upon the exercise of
First Amendment rights." In the present case, the Court
maintained the complaint constituted no more than a "con-
clusory allegation" that the purpose of the threatened
enforcement of the Act was to "harass" the appellants.
While the total Act remained constitutional on its
face, application became impossible because of judicial
truncation. In 1964, the Court declared the passport
96provision of the statute unconstitutional. in the same
year the Court struck down the defense facility employment
proviso on the ground that it indiscriminately lumped all
types of association with Communist action groups together,
"without regard to their quality or degree of membership .
which, the Court held, was literally establishing guilt
97by association.
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In 1968 the Court applied the same criterion and
ruled that the Coast Guard had exceeded its authority by
inquiring into the beliefs and associations of an
individual before granting a conunon seaman's license.^®
At the end of eighteen years of costly litigation,
the only operative part of the Internal Security Act seems
to be the registration provision, which is only applicable
if the individual voluntarily chooses to register, it
emerges as one of the few pieces of legislation in history
which is dependent for its effect upon the consent of
those to whom it would be applied. After 21 years the
SACB has no function which is constitutional, but still
receives an appropriation of $450,000. This, plus the
renomination of Otto Otepke, small hero of the subversive
hunting right wing in American politics, led Marquis
Childs to equate the SACB with a kind of lavish unemploy-
99
raent compensation for career anti-communists.
"Gravity of the Evil" Test
Comment on the Dennis decision was, of course,
extensive, and there appears at least a general consensus
that Vinson's decision was a substantial alteration of the
Holmcs--Brandeis doctrine, and that the pivotal test was
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really Learned Hand's "gravity of the evil" formula. Some,
in considering the majority's opinion, claimed that any
"danger" judges perceived was entirely divorced from any
notion of "present," and for others the case marked the
second "red menace" in American legislative-judicial
history.
The "gravity" test was defended by Elliot L.
Richardson, who argued that proof of probability that
some illegal activity will occur is one sort of judgment,
but that it is also useful to arrange these illegal acti-
vities in some sort of hierarchy. Richardson, for analytic
purposes, posed walking on the grass at one end of a
continuum and violent overthrow of the government at the
other. Both, though they are different requests that a
speaker may make, contain a common idea; namely, a
direction to violate the law. When a person speaks and
encourages his listeners either to walk on the grass or
overthrow the government, he can be clearly punished,
"provided the probability that the utterance will bring
it about approaches certainty." Supposing that the degree
of probability is the same, but not certain, Richardson
argued that it should make a difference whether we are
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talking about revolution or unrestricted grass-walking.
Since revolution is a greater evil, it needs less pro-
bability than some lesser and more probable offense.
Nathaniel L. Nathanson, in a much less ornate
argument than Richardson's but one closer to the basic
issue, supported Douglas's view that the trial was
essentially a conviction for the crime of seditious con-
spiracy, but used another statute which did not require
as much proof for conviction.
"Doctrine " v. "Action "
The majority's distinction between advocating
"doctrine" and advocating "action" in Yates was well
received by Walter Gellhorn who in somewaat livelier
language than the Court dramatized the distinction as
follows S
One can recognize a qualitative distinction
between a speaker who expresses the opinion before
a student audience that all law professors are
scoundrels whose students should band together
to beat them within an inch of their lives, and a
second speaker who, taking up the theme, urges the
audience to obtain baseball bats, meet behind the
law faculty building at three o'clock the next
Thursday afternoon, and join in attacking any
professor who can then be found. The first speaker
(in the Yates Court's vievj, should not be pro-
secuted; the second has stepped over the line
between advocating a belief and advocating an
illegal action.
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But Learned Hand, perhaps realizing that Yates comes close
to a clear and present danger test by another name,
claimed there may be times when a speaker loses his privi-
lege even though he confines himself to " principles
divorced from action." The hypothetical situation which
Hand posited is that of a man who denounces an inept and
corrupt government before a crowd which he knows to be
"ripe for a riot," and that he has been told that what he
proposes to say would probably set it off.'*"^^
Loyalty and Security
Loyalty Oaths and Security Programs
By Executive Order 9835 President Truman set up
in 1947 a loyalty program for federal employees in which
employees and applicants were required to undergo a loyalty-
security check, and the Department of Justice prepared a
list of subversive organizations to aid the Loyalty Review
Board of the United States Civil Service Commission in
making determinations about security risks. This list,
known as the Attorney General's list, was made public in
1948 and contained 82 organizations; by 1953 the number
had grown to over 250. This list is important, since
tax-exmmpt organizations that find themselves on the list
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lose tax-exemption privileges, and it is also used to
decide admissi'.n policy for aliens wishing to visit the
United States, as well as by some private employers.
Thus the loyalty program not only involved issues of due
process to civil servants but also due process vis-a-vis
the groups on the Attorney General's list, in 1951 the
Court dealt with this program in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Committee v. McGrath, and by a 5-3 decision held that
three organizations had been improperly placed on the list.
The itJajority reasoned that the Attorney General could only
designate groups after "appropriate investigation and
determination," and since this had not been performed,
the Attorney General had acted arbitrarily, and the
defendants were denied due process. Justice Black, in his
concurrence, held that the publicized findings of the
Attorney General, regardless of their truth or falsity,
"are the practical equivalents of confiscation and death
sentences for any black-listed organization;" he viewed
the existence of such a list as a bill of attainder.
The dissenters argued that the list was only a
criterion for federal employment and did not constitute
guilt by association or a bill of attannder, since no
"punishment" was forthcomingi there was no constitutional
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"right" to a federal job. On the same day the Court split
(Clark did not participate), and thereby sustained a
Court of Appeals ruling which upheld a removal for dis-
loyalty^^^ but affirmed the doctrine of United states v.
Lovett ^^^ by holding that a loyalty board order barring
individuals from federal service for a three-year period
was a bill of attainder.
During the Eisenhower administration the standard
for discharge was changed from "disloyalty" to "security
risk." This new rubric made discharge possible if a
person's employment was not "consistent with the interests
of national security;" it included sexual immorality and
perversion, drug addiction, excessive intoxication,
"criminal, infamous, dishonest, or notoriously disgraceful
conduct," conspiring to commit acts of treason, sabotage,
sedition or espionage and membership or affiliation with
107
any subversive group as indicators of security risk
status.
The ACLU opposed all attempts to make "loyalty" a
criteria for governmental employment, and commended the
Eisenhower administration for, "... recognizing a
principle" it had long advanced, namely, "... that the
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necessary test is not one of loyalty-which results in
inevitable incursion upon freedom of speech and association
without any compensating gain to national security.-but
one of security." The Union also applauded promises by
the Administration that it would attempt to transfer possible
security risks to non-security positions, but did criticize
the new security program for its lack of centralized review
procedures which would have helped to insure uniformity in
the application of security criteria.
The warren Court, in a number of rulings on loyalty
dismissals, usually avoided constitutional questions but
managed to overturn dismissals on procedural and evidentiary
grounds. Lack of statutory authority was used to overturn
dismissals in " non-sensitive positions," or, in other
cases, failure to follow proper administrative procedures.
In 1959, by a 5-4 vote, the Court even reinstated
a Department of the Interior employee because the depart-
mental hearing included questions about the employee's
feelings about Negroes, Jews, college admission quota
systems. Franklin Roosevelt, Norman Thomas, Henry Wallace,
and other matters which Justice Harlan could not believe
were related to the question of national security. The
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Court also insisted on tighter measures in loyalty hearings
connected with private manufacturers doing government work,
but when a commanding officer of the Naval Gun Factory in
Washington revoked the security clearance of a civilian
cafeteria worker without any hearing or any other type of
procedure, the Court upheld this action on the ground that
in a military establishment the government has "unfettered
control" over personnel and operations. "'"^^
The number of loyalty oaths in the United States,
as well as punishment for disloyalty, is an indication of
the seriousness with which Federal, state and local law-
makers, and some private member organizations, took the
notion of "subversive activity." Indiana's demand for a
loyalty oath from professional wrestlers; the loyalty
oath requirement for membership in the Screen Actors Guild
of America (invalidated by a federal court in 1966);
as well as New York State's suspension of drivers' licenses
for anyone who advocates violent overthrow of the govern-
ment, serve as cases in point.
The loyalty oath provision of the Taft-Hartley Act
reached the Supreme Court in 1950, in American Commun icat ions
112
Assoc iat ion v. Douds. The Court sustained the
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constitutionality of the requirement that all officers of
labor organizations annually sign an affidavit disclaiming
any affiliation with the Communist party or any other
organization which believes in or teaches violent over-
throw of the government.
The Taft-Hartley oath, which was the center of
the controversy in Douds
. was repealed in 1959; it had
proved ineffective because Communists were willing to take
the oath, and perjury sanctions proved difficult to
establish. Pursuing the same objective. Congress then made
it a crime for a member of the Communist Party to serve as
an officer or employee of a labor union, but this action
was struck down as a bill of attainder by a narrow Supreme
113Court majority in 1965.
Oaths disclaiming membership in the Communist
Party in order to obtain state and local employment were
114
upheld by the Court in 1951 as "sufficiently relevant
to effective and dependable government . . ."to justify
their existence, but blanket endorsement of such oaths
was quickly qualified in 1952 when a unanimous coux't held
that oaths must encompass "knowing" association as opposed
to mere membership in order not to offend the due process
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clause. In 1958 the Court overturned California's
ingenious scheme to require those seeking exemptions from
state property taxes to sign a loyalty oath, reasoning
that such legislation shifts the burden of proof on to
the individual and necessarily has the effect of encouraging
citizens to avoid controversial associations.
A
Florida Act prohibiting 'aid, support, advice, or counsel"
to the C. p. was struck down on the grounds that it was
not "susceptible [to]
. . . objective measurement, " "•^'^ and
the Court used vagueness as the criterion to overturn
loyalty oaths requiring school teachers to swear that they
were not "subversive persons" and that they would 'by
precept and example promote respect for the flag . . ,
reverence for law and order and undivided allegiance to
liftthe government of the United States." in a 5-3 decision
in 1966 the Court made an "apparent" reversal of its 1951
holding that a state had a legitimate interest in dis-
couraging public employees from having membership in the
Communist Party, it ruled an Arizona loyalty oath (which
provided punishment for anyone who took the oath and later
became a member of a proscribed organization) as
unconstitutional.
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A statute, known as the Feinberg Law, required
the New York State Board of Regents to 1) promulgate rules
for the removal of ineligible public school employees;
2) draw up a list of "subversive" organizations; 3) make
membership in any listed organization prima facie evidence
of disqualification to held any position in the public
school system. Although no dismissals had been made
under the law, action was brought to have the statute
declared unconstitutional and to enjoin enforcement by
the Board of Education of New York City in Adler v. Board
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of Education. Justice Minton, speaking for the majority
of the Court, felt that since a teacher works in a sensi-
tive area, shaping the attitudes of young minds toward
the society in which they live, teaching is a vital con-
cern of the state and the terms laid down by the statute
were reasonable, if individuals do not "choose to work
on such terras, they are at liberty to retain their beliefs
and associations and go elsewhere," he claimed.
I" S lochower v. Board of Education (1956) , how-
ever, the Court overturned a conviction of a New York City
college professor who had been dismissed because he had
taken the Fifth Amendment before a Senate committee which
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sought information about his political associations/^^
and in 1958 the Court narrowly upheld dismissal of a
subway conductor and a school teacher. Both invoked the
Fifth Amendment plea when questioned about Communist
party membership, and for the majority such refusal could
be at least partial evidence of unreliability and incom-
petency. The same rationale was applied to the discharge
of Los Angeles County empbyees who failed to answer
questions before the House Un-American Activities Committee
Justice Clark, in the latter case, laboriously separated
the constitutionality of the California Code (which
required public employees to give testimony relating to
subversive activity on pain of discharge) from the Court's
ruling in S lochower by claiming that dismissal for refusal
to testify is a "built-in" inference of guilt and not
allowed, but if the state statutorily declares the same
action to be "insubordination," then such dismissals do
not violate the Fifth Amendment.
In 1967 a Supreme Court much less dazzled by argu-
ments of legislative reasonableness overturned Adler v.
feoard of Educat ion and declared New York State's updated
"Feinberg law" unconstitutional. In Keyishian v. Board
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of Regents of the University of thie State of New York
,
Justice Brennan, speaking for the narrow five-judge
majority, claimed (even though the State in 1965 announced
that no person would be deemed ineligible for employment
"solely" because he refused to sign the disclaimer affi-
davit) that a state's legitimate interest in protecting
its educational system from subversion "cannot be pur-
sued by means that broadly stifly fundamental personal
liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved."
The New York Civil Service law, in seeking to
establish removal procedures for "treasonable or seditious"
behavior, was dependent on an ambiguous penal law in which
the meaning of sedition had "virtually no limit." One
committed a felony in New York, Brennan noted, if he
"publicly (displayed) a book . . . containing or advoca-
ting, advertising or teaching the doctrine that organized
government should be overthrovm by force, violence or
any unlawful means." Breanan asked what would happen to
a teacher who carried a copy of the Communist Manifesto
on a public street. To argue that the statute would not
be applied to arrest that teacher is insufficient, said
Brennan, because it means that the potential effect of
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obscure wording depends on the "conscientious and scru-
pulous" nature of those who would apply the statute.
The essential point, Brennan insisted, is that the teacher
could not know where the line was drawn between "seditious"
and non-seditious utterances and acts. Using Communists
Party affiliation as orima facie evidence for disqualifi-
cation, approved in Adler, was rejected, and the doctrine
that public employment may be denied under "any condition,
regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejec-
ted," according to thenajority because it failed to dis-
tinguish "knowing membership." Justice Clark, joined by
Harlan, Stewart and White in dissent, found Brennan 's
opinion a "blunderbuss" of words, since the majority
struck down a law on the basis of a certificate and other
practices which were no longer in use. To Clark, no
court had "ever reached out so far to destroy so much
with so little."
The effects of Keyishian are difficult to assess,
since it was a close decision, which qneans that a change
in personnel/ or heart, could make it short-term law; but,
as Clark seemed to sense, the majority here was mostly
interested in evaluating the language of statutes such as
i
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the Feinberg Law, even when the safer course of action
might have been to view them as moot.
In 1967 the Court declared unconstitutional a
Maryland law requiring state employees to swear that they
were net subvers ive
,
and in 1968 it struck down a Texas
loyalty oath for state employees, but upheld a New York
oath requiring prospective employees to swear to uphold
the federal and state constitutions. In the Maryland
case. Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority, found
that since the oath required an applicant to swear that
he was not engaged in political subversion, it was uncon-
stitutionally vague because "subversive" as defined by
Maryland statute included attempts to "alter" the govern-
ment. On the other hand, to Harlan, and Stewart and
White who also dissented, the Maryland oath was a meti-
culous attempt on the part of the state to conform to the
requirement set down by the Court in 1951 in which oaths
which sought to bar only those who seek overthrow of the
124government were sustained. The majority's focus on
"alteration," according to Harlan, "artistically avoids"
past doctrine, and the only thing which shone through the
majority's thinly-veiled legal reasoning was that it did
"not like loyalty oaths."
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The U8e of loyalty oaths in federally-assisted
programs aimed at the general welfare was also not over-
looked by Congress as a technique to rid the nation of
subversion. Loyalty oaths for students seeking aid under
the National Defense Education Loan Act were required
until numerous private educational institutions refused
to participate in the program and Congress repealed the
provision in 1962. Until 1965 numerous programs under the
Economic Opportunity Act required s disclaimer oath, and
a loyalty oath can statutorily be required for citizens
seeking benefits under the Medicare Act of 1965, but the
Department of Health Education and Welfare has decided
not to use failure to answer the disclaimer question on
125the application form as a basis for disqualification.
Even though numerous private associations reflected
concern over "loyalty" and "Americanism" in the 1950 's,
such as the Westchester County American Legion attack on
both faculty and students of Sarah Lawrence College as
being "strongly communist-tinged," the ACLU felt that the
roost dangerous over-reaction on the part of private groups
in the year 1951 involved the loyalty oath restrictions
of numerous Bar Associations which sought to disbar
126
attorneys who commit "acts of disloyalty."
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The denial of admission to the bar in order to
become a practicing attorney has also raised free speech
issues when the refusal is based on the applicant's per-
sonal beliefs or association or his refusal to answer
questions about such matters. The Supreme Court has held
that admitted membership in the Communist Party cannot
be the sole criterion for "bad moral character," but it
has also ruled that while bar examiners cannot construe
the silence of an applicant to constitute bad character
or disloyalty they may, if they specify clearly that
answers are required because they have substantial rele-
vance to his qualifications, deny admission (to the same
applicant) because of non-cooperation, or simple stubborn-
127
ness.
What makes the entire issue of loyalty programs
and employment an eepaciaXly difficult problem is that
very few people insist that there is a constitutional
right to employment, public or otherwise, in the sense
that such employment cannot be proscribed except for some
criminal offense. Government can certainly insist on cer-
tain attitudes, even political, in certain of its func-
tions, especially those directly related to national
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security. But two factors emerge as extremely important
in discussing loyalty dismissals. The first is that
public employment in the modern welfare state, which
increasingly includes more and more citizens, and this,
together with some sort of loyalty test for the other ser-
vices of the welfare state, could create an informal net-
work of "punishment" that would be broader in scope and
effect than any criminal legislation. The second factor
is that while no one may have a right to a job, and that
ordinary dismissal is not and should not be considered
"punishment," dismissals for reasons relating to loyalty
or security, as Pritchett has noted, take on the charac-
ter of punishment because of the social stigma attached
to them. Being discharged for simple incompetence,
regardless of task, need not imply that the individual is
unsuited for other tasks, but a discharge for "loyalty"
carries with it the same kind of "character" implications
that a person would inherit if he had been convicted of
criminal conduct, and in some cases social sanctions
128
would probably be more severe.
The impact of loyalty security programs is pro-
bably greater than nost realize. Arval A. Morris has
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stated that as of 1958 a few more than 1,600,000 pro-
fessional people (scientists, teachers, lawyers, engineers,
etc.) had occupations dependent upon their ability to
meet some type of loyalty criteria. To these he added
seven and a half million people in federal, state and
local government plus four and a half million people who
are required to meet industrial security tests. As applied
to a work force of 65 million this 'means that at least
one person out of five, as a condition of his current
employment, has taken a test oath, or completed a loyalty
statement, or achieved official security clearance or sur-
vived some undefined private scrutiny." He also noted
that about 11,500 people, of which the largest single
group involved private employment in firms which received
federal contracts, had failed loyalty tests. Statistically
this worked out to the barring of one person in 2,500 on
security grounds. Between 1948 and 1958 approximately
500 teachers, including primary, secondary and college,
were dismissed because of refusal to answer specific ques-
129tions or take loyalty oaths as conditions of employ ment.
Congressional Investigations
Perhaps the most controversial of all techniques
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of official government to protect itself from subversion
surrounded the uses and abuses of Congressional investi-
gatory power by such celebrated committees as the House
Un-American Activities Committee (not the House Committee
on Internal Security) and the Senate Permanent Sub-Committee
on Investigations under Senator Joseph McCarthy of
Wisconsin. While many of the complaints against these
committees involved questions about the extent of
Congressional power, the nature of the contempt power, and
the self-incrimination privilege; the most general
objection was the "trial" atmosphere that pervaded the
committees' investigations, the "exposure" techniques
which guaranteed attention in the media and the personal
aggrandizement of committee members. Inquiry into
individual beliefs ranged far beyond any conceivably valid
legislative purpose and brought charges that Congress was
doing by investigation what it could never achieve by
laws which would have been constitutional. Similar charges
were levelled against committees in numerous state legis-
latures.
The Supreme Court never declared such investigatory
committees unconstitutional (although it came close) , but
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usually chose to overturn contempt citations on grounds
that Congress, or state legislatures, had to limit
inquiries to things which were pertinent to the committee's
mandate. Since a committee such as HUAC had a mandate
which was so broad as to be practically meaningless, the
Court could have easily voided all contempt convictions
from such committees on grounds of an unconstitutionally
vague mandate; this looked like the probable direction of
130the Court in 1957. The desire of the Committee to
"expose" subversive elements had long been opposed by
the ACLU as an illegitimate goal, and in one case, which
they sponsored, they raised this issue, but also sought,
unsuccessfully, to have the case turn on the legality of
compelling testimony from anyone about the activities of
others
.
By 1959, reacting to Congressional threats to
curb its jurisdiction as well as considerable public
criticism, the Court swiftly retreated and sustained con-
tempt convictions on both the state and federal level and
suddenly found the authorizing resolution of HUAC clear
enough to warrant response from hostile witnesses who
invoked the First Amendment rather than the Fifth Amendment
132
as their rationale for refusing to testify. After
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these decisions, the ACLU began a massive campaign to
influence public opinion, including the placement of
magazine articles, distribution of hundreds of thousands
of copies of newspaper articles, editorials, testimony,
and public statements as well as a filmed television debate
between HUAC and anti-HUAC spokesmen. HUAC itself did
much to structure the dialogue, however, by sponsoring the
film Operation Abolition (about a student demonstration
against the Committee in San Francisco) which gave local
ACLU affiliates numerous opportunities to argue for, and
133occasionally get, "equal time." After 1961, however,
the Court seemed to return to its more restrictive cri-
teria for the pertinence of legislative inquiry by
134reversing numerous contempt convictions.
Travel
Denial of passports to citizens because of Communist
135Party membership, as already mentioned, was voided by
the Supreme Court, but the government's interest in
refusing to issue passports to any citizen to travel to
136
restricted nations was upheld by the Court in 1965.
The State Department could refuse to issue passports to
those wishing to travel to restricted areas, but it could
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not prosecute those who had passports and went anyway,
according to a decision in 1967.^^"^ Later in the same
year a Federal Court of Appeals ruled that the State
Department could not deny a passport to individuals (such
as Staughton Lynd) who had previously violated area
restrictions and who wished to travel to a non-restricted
area (even if they intended to proceed to a restricted
area from the non-restricted area)
.
"Disloyalty" Sanctions Against Aliens
Deportation and denaturalization proceedings are
another governmental alternative to punish the subversive.
The Supreme Court sustained deportation orders against an
alien for past rnerabership in the C. p. and upheld several
post-war denaturalization proceedings with only Justices
Murphy and Rut ledge claiming in dissent that the govern-
ment's power to naturalii^e did not connote a power to
139denaturalize.
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 took
over some of the categories of the Subversive Activities
Control Act and added some others but generally had a
mitigating effect because it provided alleviations for
persons who had joined the proscribed organizations
326
"... involuntarily, or while less than sixteen years
of age, or for the purpose of obtaining eraployraent or
the essentials of living, or who had for at least five
years prior to application for entry actively opposed
the doctrines of these organizations. • . ." The people
wishing to enter the United States as aliens who fell
into any of the above categories could be granted visas
if the appropriate consular officer and the Attorney
General found it to be "in the public interest
Deportation for past membership in the Communist
party was again upheld by the Supreme Court in 1952, and
in 1960 the Court approved the deportation to Finland of
a 5 2-year-old alien who had lived in the U. S. since
childhood on grounds of his Community party membership
141between the years 1937 and 1939.
Conclusion
Free Expression and National Security
What is immediately apparent after surveying the
plethora of federal and state legislation, as well as
loyalty oaths and loyalty-security programs designed to
protect the nation from domestic subversion, is that
Americans take the problem of "subversion" much more
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seriously than the English. To some extent the duplication
of legislative effort on the state and federal levels
reveals overlapping jurisdictions and competition for
favorable public attention. But the pervasiveness of the
concern about domestic subversion in the United States
was much greater than in England during the same period,
and there seems little evidence to indicate that the
danger of subversion in America was in fact greater than
in the United Kingdom.
Harold M. Chase, in trying to assess the nature
of what the public felt to be a serious "Communist menace,"
concluded that there was no significant internal threat
of Communist revolution in the post-war period. Official
estimates of Communist Party strength in the United States
indicate that there were never more than 100,000 Party
members in the nation, and that membership had progressively
declined from a high point in 1932. j. Edgar Hoover
estimated that Party strength went from 54,174 members in
1950 to 23,000 in 1954. Mr. Hoover, however, had con-
sistently warned that the size of the Party was relatively
unimportant because of the enthusiasm and discipline with
which they pursue their objectives. In 1947 he revealed
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a statistic which, if not startling, was at least
designed to be startling, to the effect, "That in 1917
when the Communists overthrew the Russian government there
was one Comraunist for every 2,277 persons in Russia, m
the United States today there is one Coiamunist for every
1,814 persons in the country." Chase was quick to note
that the use of these figures to show that there were pro-
portionately more Conununists in the United States than
there were in Russia in 1917 implied a belief that the
total situation in Russia then and in the United States
after World Viai IX were analogous. A belief that the
situations were analogous. Chase noted, would have to
mean, among other things, that the FBI was as inefficient
as the Czar ist police? that economic conditions in the
United States made people ripe for revolution; and that
a significant number of Americans would have helped to
perpetrate a coup, chase concluded that none of the three
propositions could withstand examination, and that there
was no danger from Coimnunists in the United States in the
142
sense of probable revolution. But events, such as the
Hiss inquiries, the Rosenb^arg trial, etc., despite all the
spectacular demagoguery and hysteria, did reveal that
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secret papers were ending up in places they ought not to
be, and that the danger of espionage and sabotage was
real, if not as vivid as sorae members of Congress thought.
Statutes such as the Smith Act and the Internal Security
Act were aimed primarily at the prevention of revolution
by abridging important liberties which were "a greater
danger to the nation than the unlikely revolution they
(were) intended to prevent," while the failure of Congress
so solve such problems as the easy illegal entry of any-
body (especially Russians) across the Mexican border led
Chase to conclude that the national government has "too
frequently fought the wrong battle in the wrong place."
Chase was extxemely critical of President Truman
and the Democratic leaders of Congress for responding to
criticism about loyalty and security in the administration
only with the "red herring" argument. In 1947 and 1948,
when a security problem began to be evident, the nation
was still relatively calm about the Communist threat. For
Chase, in the myriad of wild charges by the Un-American
Activities Committee, there were occasionally serious and
"foreboding revelations," and he blamed the Democratic
leaders for failing "to face up to the realities of the
Communist threat."
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They evidently felt compelled to deny any and
all evidence of Communist infiltration in
order to discredit the wilder allegations about
the motives and loyalties of the Democrats.
Consequently, there came a time when every
revelation, no matter how substantial, like the
warnings received about Alger Hiss, was dismissed
as 'red-baiting.
• of course, the excesses of
those searching out the Communist menace were
a real provocation, but hindsight makes it
clear that the intransigence that refused to
allow an objective examination of the evidence
from whatever source derived was dangerous to
the nation and injurious to the Democratic Party.
The American concern over subversion and disloyalty
obviously involved and involves more than simple disagree-
ment about the nature of a supposed threat to national
security. The fact that conviction under the Smith Act
could have such subsidiary consequences as denial of burial
in Arlington Cemetery even if the deceased was a decorated
144World war li hero would seem to indicate that the issue
went far deeper than merely the defence of the nation
—
as deep as the defence of an appropriate national character.
The pluralistic nature of the American polity, together
with its "plebicite" notion of democracy, has always
created fertile soil for a nationalistic demagogue who,
because Americanism could not be translated as a culture,
religion, or race, capitalized on an immigrant population's
propensity to over-identify with available symbols and
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translated "sense of nation" into a common idea system
rather than a common background. To belong to the nation
means to believe certain things (or more accurately not
to believe in certain things) rather than simply to reside
in a common territory. The English perimeter of nationality,
since it involves race and religion as well as geography
and long history, is arbitrary, but it is also relatively
clear and final. The American notion of national self
—
more open, fluid, even egalitarian—was, during the early
1950*8, to belong to a certain segment of public opinion.
But American nervousness about loyalty was also
more than (or less than) a side effect of ethnic pluralism.
For reasons which Louis Hartz has tried to give the most
cogent explanation, the very narrow width of the American
political dialogue (when compared to that of Europe) also'
created factors which were curiously to make the narrow
145dialogue narrower still. The historic enunciation of
the value that opposing points of viev/ are necessary to
democracy also created a very restricted view about what
was legitimate "loyal opposition." Much of the "second
red scare" was a curious blend of nationalism, a restricted
view of "legitimate" criticism, and old fashioned dirty
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politics. To view your political enemies as "treasonous"
was not beyond Jefferson, let alone Joseph McCarthy or
Martha Mitchell.
When the Supreme Court by unanimous action in
1966 reversed the Georgia state Legislature's attempt to
exclude Julian Bond from membership (even though appro-
priately elected) because he had opposed the federal
government's policy in Viet Nam and the Selective Service
system, it was curbing a deep American instinct to narrow
the political competition by making it illegal. Georgia
had argued that, by majority vote (thereby making it demo-
cratic)
,
it had a right to exact a higher standard of
loyalty from its legislators than it could perhaps con-
stitutionally require from ordinary citizens, but the
action vaa probably motivated by considerations of race
as much as those of loyalty. ^"^^ V. 0. Key once suggested
that the highly charismatic demagoguery of southern one-
party states was caused by the lack of party opposition
and the resultant "muIti-factional" internal politics
which placed a premium on attention-getting devices for
electoral success. The fact that the American political
system, as well as its culture, is highly fragmented
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(multi-factional)
,
could place a premium on demagoguery
in national politics. The usual assumption is that the
multiplicity of forces involved in national politics leads
to moderation rather than excesses. But rau It i-factionalism
can also tempt politicians to adopt an extreme and vola-
tile style which exploit symbolic conflicts and achieve
consensus by transcending "mundane" political issues and
focusing on emotive, symbolic (and even romantic} ques-
tions. Civil liberties questions are primarily tyinbolic
issues
. Since McCarthy was the first truly national
demagogue, in a nation which abounded in flamboyant regional
political leaders, the issue by which he gained national
prominence emerges as especially important.
Psychologically, if not logically, the subversive
hunts merged with class politics. The career of Senator
McCarthy was in no small way a manifestation of hostility
to elite politics (the State Department, Harvard, etc.)
and loyalty oaths and scrutiny of teachers had heavy over-
tones of simple anti- intellectualism and the suspicion that
"bookish" types felt they were "more than equal."
The entire judiciary, as well as the Supreme Court,
while balking at times under congressional threats and
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internally divided about their proper role in all this,
nonetheless emerged on the whole as a critical libertarian
force. While structurally the Supreme Court is supposed
to play a more important role than courts in the United
Kingdom, it could have played a much less spectacular role
than it did; even in the cases which deferred to legisla-
tive reasonableness, the vigorous dissents were at least
a source of literary inspiration for libertarians.
While rarely striking down legislation in this
area on its face, the insistence that the Smith Act dis-
tinguish between mere menibership and "active" membership;
that the Internal Security Act's registration provision
roust be "voluntary" in order to avoid violating the Fifth
Amendment; that the State Department's right to establish
restricted areas doesn't include the authority to enforce
theiji, were not-so-subtle techniques to void the original
intent of such legislation and policy.
Speech and Public Order
The problem of trying to elucidate a criterion
for a general problem based on the Supreme Court's experience
with several specific cases is not only that each case is
different, but that different Courts and occasionally the
II
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same Court will approach the problem on different "levels."
i
C. Herman Pritchett, for example, has suggested that the
Court's approach to breach of the peace problems reveals
three different "stages" of judicial analysis. In this
typology the Court decides first whether the speech involved
enjoys constitutional protection at all; second, whether
the ordinance used is valid, i.e., narrow and not per-
,
mitting overbroad discretion; and third, if the law is
'
valid, both on its face and as applied, and the speech
is protected, whether the danger to the peace is sufficient
to override the claims of constitutional protection.
Presumably the Court would use the Chaplinsky list to
i
establish whether the speech had sufficient social utility
to claim First Amendment protection. If the speech is '
held not to be lewd, obscene, profane, libelous, insulting,
or inciteful, then attention is turned to the validity
of the statute in question. Cases such as Terminiello
;
i
can be viewed as stopping at the second level, with the ^
dissenting Justices vigorously arguing that the Court ^
should move to the third stage and analyze whether a breach
of the peace was imminent. Stage three involves a factual
assessment, which Pritchett implied the Court used in
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Peiner, but in cases such as Edwards and Cox, the Court
chose to dispose of the problem within the context of
stage two.
Since stage three involves the probability of
violence, the Court faces the awkward problem of substitu-
ting its assessment of a condition for that of the police
or jury, if the issue is disposed of at levels one or
two, the government's assessment of probable violence, be
it correct or incorrect, is not germane.
Cases such as Adderly v. Florida can be viewed as
a variation of Pritchett's third levol, wherein the
justices balance the utility of what would normally be
constitutionally protected speech against the community's
interest in tranquility as well as the prevention of dis-
order. Black in this case did make reference to the
"danger" presented to the jailhouse, but the real crux
of the matter for him was that places such as jails,
libraries, etc., have functions other than the facilitation
of the exchange of ideas.
Thus the decision to analyze the problem at any
of these stages or any of their variations can have great
consequences for the holding in particular cases, because
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it is at this juncture that the Court decides What it is
deciding, its answer to this question is frequently more
important than its decision within a particular level,
since disagreement within a level tends to be so minimal
as to make the conclusion almost pre-ordained.
With the exception of the decision on group libel
and the symbolic speech cases, the Supreme Court was
fairly consistent in insisting that some concrete evidence
of probable disorder, beyond simple apprehensiveness on
the part of authorities that a particular event could
lead to disorder, was necessary before speech could be
constitutionally intercepted, it usually did this by
insisting that the legitimate aim of authorities could
be achieved either by more narrowly drawn statutes, or in
the case of Jehovah's Witnesses in Lacona, Iowa, or anti-
Semites in Chicago, better police protection for the
target of the community's hostility. In some cases, such
as Black's dissent in Feiner or the majority's opinion in
Edwards or Gregory v. Chicago , the judges vere quite
wilUng to impute unconstitutional motives to the local
police—or simply disagree about the explosiveness of the
situation. Even though Justice Black was making it clear
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that the "whim
. . . of . . . grievance bearers" was not
to take precedent over the coimnunity 's interest in tran-
quility, the basic dispute in the court involved where
speech may take place, not the content of the speech.
Keyishian was an example of the Court leaping to bring a
case into First Amendment territory, and Bell v. Maryland
demonstrated very creative use of jurisdictional rules to
protect a group for which the majority had obvious sympathy.
The only exceptions to the Court's general pattern
of negating governmental and private action when it either
interferes directly with speech or has a "chilling effect"
on the spirit of free discussion are the upholding of the
validity of the concept "group libel" (which even though
infrequently used is still a notion with great restrictive
potential) , and the apparent sanctity of the flag and
draft cards. Since Americans from the time of Garrison
have been attracted to small-scale arson as a technique to
dramatize their complaint, such statutes could receive
widespread use in the future.
While there was also a propensity for English
libertarians to play a political role, i.e.. that of
defender of the individual citizen against the power of
339
government or the vociferous majority, this role seems
to be accentuated in the American context. The generally
more "legalistic" political environment (and the more
politicized legal environment) in the U. S.j the role of
the judiciary and judicial review? the perpetual juris-
dictional jealousies created by a federal system? and
checks and balances in the national government, are no
doubt factors in conditioning this "adversary" role.
Whether the role produced a certain "conception" of civil
liberties or the conception of civil liberties in America
helps produce this role is less important than the penchant
to view the problems of individual liberty in an "adversary"
context.
Even some of the judicial analogies about civil
liberties: "the free marketplace of ideas," "sword of
state" pitted against the "shield" of the Bill of Rights,
indicate a basic referent steeped in attempts to delineate
legitimate rules of conflict, rather than in rules to
facilitate communication through speech. The English per-
ceive freedom of speech as a value of interaction—Americans,
as a value of collision. This is a subtle difference which
certainly cnnnot explain all dissimilarities, but it may
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have subtle consequences which over an extended period of
time can have great impact.
The traditional libertarian response to the
threats of espionage in the 1950 's, as Chase pointed out,
wag to claim that conservatives were engaging in their
traditional role of claiming that their enemies were sub-
versive. Standard response A (enemy within) brought
standard response B (no enemy within)
. The adversary
syndrome encouraged a network of affirmations and denials
which acted to increase the atmosphere of hysteria because
groundless accusations became merged with legitimate ones.
This had the disastrous two-fold effect (depending on
public opinion) of either validating all claims about an
internal danger or validating none.
A similar "set response" characterizes some of the
American libertarian response to New Left "confrontation
politics" and black revolutionary movements. The auto-
matic assumption that every indictment against a Black
Panther or Yippie is a governmental attempt to truncate
the American political spectrum, is more than the simple
assumption of innocence until guilt is proven, it is the
assumption that guilt cannot be proven, which inevitably
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leads to a hostility to trials per se.
One of the effects of this posture toward problems
of individual liberty, for example, is that it lends
itself more easily to a "fixed role" in which the liber-
tarian response is more likely to be doctrinaire than
illuminating. When the adversary conception of civil
liberties springing from a "suspicious" as opposed to a
"deferential" polity is the perennial response to problems,
it can quickly lead to a network of allegations and
denials, which can transcend, and many times avoid, real
problems
.
CHAPTER VI
OBSCENITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Obscenity, Official Action an^ the Law
P'-^^^^c Pressure for Censorship
While our concern will be focused on official and
unofficial attempts to prevent the public distribution of
material felt to be harmful because it violates acceptable
notions of sexual propriety, it is important to realize
that in the United States, as in the United Kingdom, there
are many other rationales which can motivate attempts to
stop the distribution of a particular work. Movies in
particular have been the target of censorship on grounds
not related to obscenity: In the 1950 's Jewish groups
protested the "anti-Semitic overtones" of the British film
Oliver Twist so vehemently that it was withdrawn from the
market for a year. The American Humane Association
protested the depiction o f cruelty to animals in The Brave
Balls ? the NAACP objected to Birth of a Nation
. The
Catholic War Veterans resented the depiction of Catholic-
ism in Bicycle Thief . The American Legion picketed
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Spartacus because of its "revolutionary message" and
were even successful in stopping exhibitors in New
Jersey from showing any films of Charlie Chaplin because
of his "left-wing affiliations." Numerous groups boy-
cotted Ingrid Bergman movies because of her "lax morals,"
and a Chicago police chief successfully prevented the
showing of No Way Out on grounds that it might inflame
race relations.^ Simple "objections" of course do not
necessarily discourage either the production or the show-
ing of controversial movies, but frequently the pressure
of private groups is easily translated into the command
of public officials, such as the celebrated declaration by
the New York City Commissioner of Licenses that the movie
The Miracle was "blasphemous" and would result in the
suspension of the theater's license if shown in the future.
This action, unanimously declared unconstitutional by the
2 .Supreme Court in 1952, is only one of the more ostentatious
manifestations of public and personal pressure to restrain
the communication of political and religious points of
view. When the criterion shifts to sexual candor, the
federal courts and government in general have been more
obliging
.
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Defining Obscenity
"Roth Test "
Between 1942 and 1956 Congress enacted 70 obscenity
laws, and the various states had obscenity laws which dove-
tailed with local licensing procedures all of which, as in
Britain, are supported in principle by international agree-
ments between 50 nations.^ The modern concept of obscenity
in the United States can be roost conveniently traced from a
Supreme Court ruling in Roth v. United States in 1957^ in
which the American standard for obscenity was clearly
divorced from any dependency on the Hicklin test. As early
as 1934 lower Federal courts were holding that the Hicklin
rule should not apply to the importation of such works as
Joyce's "Ulysses" because, according to Augustus Hand, the
work was sincere, erotic material presented was not the
dominant theme of the work, and taken as a whole it did not
have a libidinous effect.^
Roth, which concerned the conviction of an individual
for violation of the federal obscenity statute prohibiting
the mailing of any material which is "obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy.
. .or indecent" on pain of a $5000 fine
and/or five years' imprisonment, was to lay down a new
sses
definition of obscenity in
..eeping with the^
decision.
..stice Brennan. spea.in, for the „a,o.ity. up-
held the conviction, but stipulated that the new con-
stitutional teat Of Obscenity is whether the material
appeal, to the "prurient interest" of the "average person,"
applying
"conte„,por3ry cownunity standards" and consider-
ing the "dominant the^e of the material taken a, a whole,"
not isolated passages.
This is a new, and stricter standard which the First
Amendinent requires, according to Brennan, but the concept
••obscurity" itself is not incompatible with the First A.end-
mend because it is one of those "we 11
-defined and narrowly
limited classes of speech" which were listed in Chaplinskv
.
The First Amendment was designed to protect "unorthodox
ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the
prevailing climate of opinion," but obscenity is utterly
without socially redeeming importance. We know this, Brennan
implied, because so many states and nations have made it
punishable. By declaring obscene speech to be without
socially redeeming importance, and by declaring the First
Amendment to apply only to speech with socially redeeming
importance, Brennan effectively took prurient material out
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Of ran.e of the Pi„t Amendment.
..,,.ent about "consequences,.,
such as Whether the material presents any Kind of danger,
clear or otherwise, to the comn^unity, are not germane
because they are questions which are relevant only in
deciding whether speech with social value is outweighed by
other comr^unity interests. Just as libelous utterances do
not require a demonstration of danger to the community,
neither do obscene materials, in this case all of the judges
were willing to assume the "fact" of the obscenity of the
material in question. To the majority the issue was the
proper definition and the relationship to the First Amend-
ment. Black and Douglas, in dissent, did not question the
factual basis of the case, either, but simply argued that
government should be concerned with anti-social conduct,
not utterance or "thoughts," regardless of what they are
labelled. In short, for Douglas and Black there is con-
stitutional protection for obscenity just as for other
speech.
Things were more complex for Justice Harlan, who
concurred in Alberts
, but dissented in Roth , on the grounds
that the standard for obscenity should not be the same
on the state as on the federal level and that the federal
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government was more limited because the dangers of
federal censorship are greater and because the First Amend-
ment applies specifically to federal action, while the
Fourteenth is more vague and leaves states more leeway.
Harlan was not attacking the concept of obscenity but he
urged that on the federal level everything should be protected
except "hard-core pojjaography, " which, he felt, could not
characterize Roth's wares.
The Roth test, it should be noted, was more a theo-
retical formulation and defense of the concept of obscenity
than a concrete application. Lower courts had to assess the
same material under the Roth standard; but they often dis-
agreed about the proper conclusion, as when Henry Miller's
"Tropic of cancer" was declared not obscene in California
but obscene in Florida. The Supreme Court held the work not
to be obscene but was extremely divided on a rationale,
with Brennan and Goldberg claiming that it did not meet the
^oth test; Black and Douglas arguing that no book could be
reached by injunctive proceedings (or any other); and
Stewart arguing that obscenity is limited to hard-core
pornography,^
The ACLU's response to the Roth case took the form
°' a policy formulation by the national Board in 1957
in their view all expression shoula
.e protected by con-
stitutional guarantees of free speech a„^nd press and there
should be no special cateaorv of «vg y obscenity or pornography
to Which different constitutional tests apply.
It the':::"I:*L°"^^' - statute^n very least, must meet the reani,-*
that Vf'^'"'*^"^^^' re"?r:"-
obs';„e if^'T r'"''' ^« "^1'' *o beO cen , t must be established beyonda reasonable doubt that the materialpresents a clear and present danger ofnormally inducing behavior which validlyhas been made criminal by statute. 8 ^
in-plicit in the Union's approach to this problem is
that the relationship between allegedly obscene literature
and anti-social conduct is tenuous; that standards designed
primarily to protect youthful persons should not be Imposed
on literature or entertainment available to adults; and
that the problem (what little of it is left) should be
handled by individual prosecutions in which obscenity would
be a judicial determination rather than "advice" from a
public or private board,
^
The ACLU's claim that obscenity statutes should
"nly be applied to material which demonstrably incites
anti-social action, while never embraced by the Supreme
court, was on occasion, succeasful on the local level.
In 1958, for example, the ACLU of Northern California,
while handling the defense of a bookstore owner who sold
Howl and Other Pgenis, by Allen Ginsberg, convinced San
Francisco M^^nicipal Judge Clayton Horn that the proper
test of obscenity was whether the material "presented a
clear and present danger of inciting anti-social action.
" Patent Offensiveness "
While the Roth holding was "liberal" in the sense
that serious works of art could no longer be judged by the
effect of isolated passages on the most easily corruptible
person legal minds could imagine, it also tended to raise
more questions than it answered. The most immediate effect
was to impose a national standard, which, among other things
would make state statutes aimed at "portraying sexual
immorality in a favorable light" (New York's rationale for
banning the film version of Lady Chatter ley's Lover )
unconstitutional because such legislation restricted an'
11
'Idea." But the exact meaning of Roth became the issue
12in Manual Enterprises v. Day in 1962? the mail distri-
bution of a magazine designed to appeal primarily to
homosexuals was stopped when the Postmaster General barred
it from the
.ails. The court, in this case, granted
in:)unctive relief to the publishers, but once again could
not form a majority agreement on the rationale. The
separate opinion of Justices Harlan and Stewart argued
that While Roth made "prurient interest" the key test for
obscenity, it was not the sole test, and in keeping with
what they believed to be the purpose of Roth, i.e., to
tighten obscenity standards, they urged that before
material could be adjudged obscene it must also be "patently
offensive." Patent offensiveness was reauired, according
to Harlan, because without it many worthwhile works could
be deemed prurient and withheld from the public. The
particular work in question, even with nude photographs of
male models, was "dismally unpleasant, uncouth, and tawdry,"
but not "patently offensive," because it did not clearly
affront current community standards of decency.
"Social Value "
The meaning of "socially redeeming importance" as
well as the relevant community in the phrase "contemporary
community standards" was "clarified" by the Supreme Court
(and in the process greatly altered) in Jacobellis v. Ohio
in 1964 when a state obscenity conviction for the showing
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the HI.
reverse..l3
contusion i„^
„^^^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^
was
,
test for obscenity or si»ply explanation of why
Obscenity was not constitutionally protected. i„ which
case something ™ight have so.e social value but still be
Obscene, xn this case, however, Brennan ™aae it clear that
a wor. had literary, scientific, artistic or other social
importance, it was protected by the First A,„end™ent. Courts
could not weigh something's social utility against it,
prurient appeal because if it had an^, social value, it could
not be obscene. The majority also indicated that cor«unity
standards implied the "society at large."
Stewart, in his concurrence, again insisted that
Obscenity statutes can only ban "hard-core pornography,
"
and in a rare instance of total judicial candor, said he
probably could not define "hard-core pornography, " "but I
know it when I see it.
. . ,
In 1966 the Supreme Court turned its attention to
clarifying what it meant in its various judicial elaborations
on the Roth standard, in a case involving civil proceedings
aoainst the book Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure in Massachusetts
in which the state supreme court conceded that the book may
352have haa so., literar. val.e that this
.la not it
sufficient social i^po.tance to .e p.otectea speech, the
supreme court reiteratea formally three inaepenaent
atanaaras for obscenity.
..,tiee Brennan, spea.i„,
the
.a^ority, explained that before material could be
labelled obscene it mast be (l) witho,,^ =^1.; nout any socially
redeeming value (from Jacobellis
) , (2) must appeal to
prurient interest (as explained and qualified in Roth),
and (3) must be patently offensive (from Manual Enterprises).
These criteria are to be applied independently, not with
reference to one another, according to Brennan, and even
a
-modicum of social value" prevents a work from being
obscene. The work also must be judged in terms of the
audience to which it is expected to appeal.
Justices Clark and White, in dissent, felt that
the social value test was not an independent criterion, and
Clark even quipped that such a standard protects "well-
written" obscenity and intercepts only poorly-written filth.
"Average "
On the same day the Court rendered a short clari-
fication of what "average person" meant in the attempt to
establish prurient appeal. Mishkin v. New York involved
the conviction a publisher of a
.aga.ino catering to
publication wouia not have prurient appeal to the "average-
person because it was designed for those with ™re bizarre
and morbid tastes. Justice Brennan and four other Justices
sin-ply qualified Roth to include the prurient interest of
the group „K>st likely to receive then,, and the conviction
was sustained.
"Pandering "
The third and most spectacular of the Supreme
court's 1966 rulings was the affirmation of the conviction
Of Ralph Gin.burg, publisher of Eros magazine for using the
U. S. mails to distribute obscene material. 15 Gi^burg
engaged in several sales gimmicks, such as seeking mailing
privileges from the postmasters of Intercourse and Blue
Ball, Pa., and a "money-back-guarantee" if one of his
publications
- The Housewife's Handbook on Selective
Promiscuity
-
failed to reach a purchaser because of Post
Office censorship—none of which helped establish his
serious artistic purpose, in the minds of the federal
judiciary. Even the government admitted that the magazine,
as well as the books advertised in it, were not clearly
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Obscene under the Court previous standards, but a five-
n-an majority held that in close cases evidence of con».ercial
exploitation of non-obscene material could substantiate
the charge,
Jastice Brennan, speaking for the majority, found
Ginzburg's advertising approach permeated with the "leer
of the sensualist;" this was sufficient to establish an
intent to sell material based on its salacious appeal, and
this "sordid business of pandering" enjoyed no First Amend-
ment guarantees. By adding the criterion of pandering,
Brennan took a large step toward negating the restrictive
scope of obscenity laws which he and the Court had pains-
takingly tried to establish with its "prurient," "patently
offensive," and "no social value" rules.
Pandering became not only the fourth test, but by
implication overrode the other three. The concept emerged
in an entirely new context where the heart of the offense
is not producing a particular thing which is obscene, but
selling any material by implying it has prurient reward.
As a criminal offense obscenity moves from corrupting minds
to specialized kinds of false advertising. The clear intent
of the majority, which received considerable support from
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such venerable opinion producers as the New YorK Tin^
editorial board, was to get at the "business" of pornography,
They were much less concerned with the material itself,
and more interested in the profiteering, which most agree
is considerable, which results in attempts or promises to
satiate the prurient interests of those willing to be, or
already, corrupted.
The ACLU Of Pennsylvania, in its amicus brief before
the u. s. Circuit Court of Appeals in the Ginzburg case, did
not argue with the finding that Eros was obscene (i.e., that
it did pander) but challenged the conviction on the ground
that Ginsburg's various enterprises had some socially
redeeming importance and that the severity of the sentence,
five years' imprisonment and a $28,000 fine, would inhibit
other publishers of material dealing with love and sex to
an extent which woiiia eremite de facto hostility to the
First Amendment.
Justices Black, Douglas, Harlan and Stewart all
wrote separate dissents, with Harlan arguing that the
federal government can ban only "hard-core ^ronography .
"
The dissents of Douglas and Stewart were extensions of
some of the points made in one of the angriest dissents
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Justice Black, who authored many, ever penned. Even
if one is prepared to overlook the fact that the federal
government is not constitutionally empowered to prohibit
any expression of speech or ideas (which, according to
Black should have been enough to reverse this case), the
fact still remains that "neither Ginsburg nor anyone else-
could possibly have known pandering to be a federal offense
since there was no such crime until the majority of his
brethren created one in disposing of this case. Brennan
had cited united States v. Rebhuhn (1940)17 a case involv-
ing pandering by authors of works describing sexual
aberrations designed for psychiatric and anthropological
scholars. Even that prosecution was unsuccessful. For
Black the introduction of a new, hopelessly vague standard,
in an area where government has no business anyway, gave
unbridled discretion to the judge or jury which tries an
individual for obscenity; the fourteen separate opinions
handed down in the cases of Ginaburg
, Mishkin , and Fanny Hill
should make it abundantly clear that "not even the most
learned judge, much less a layman, is capable of knowing
in advance.
. .whether certain material comes within the
area of "obscenity" as that term is confused by the
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Court today."
Black, in an apparent attempt to deal with an
exasperating situation, even suggested that the lack of
certitude in this aspect of criminal law was great
enough to warrant clear censorship to avoid compounding
constitutional transgressions.
As bad and obnoxious as I believe
governmental cenr.'^rship is in a Nation
that has accepted the First Amendment
as its basic ideal of freedom, I am
compelled to say that censorship that
would stamp certain books and literature
as illegal in advance of publication or
conviction would in some ways be prefer-
able to the unpredictable book-by-book
censorship into which we have now drifted.
Variable Obscenity
Even when one puts to use the four parts of the
Court's complex formula for obscenity, one question still
unanswered is: "Can a state set more restrictive standards
for minors by prohibiting the sale to persons under 17
years of age of material >7hich appeals to the prurient
interest of minors; is patently offensive to the prevail-
ing standards in the adult community as to what is suitable
material for minors; and is utterly without redeeming
importance for minors New York State, which had such
a "variable obscenity" statute, received approval from the
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Supreme Court in Ginsbexa v. New York in 1968.18 ^he
issue in this case was not the fact of obscenity, since
the defendants made no challenge on this ground, but simply
whether a citizen's freedom to read can be made to depend
upon age. Such an adjustment of the definition of obscenity,
according to Brennan and the majority, simply brings the
concept in line with "social realities" by permitting
assessment of the material U terms of a specific age group.
That the well-being of children is within a state's con-
stitutional power cannot be questioned, and while parents
are primarily responsible for their children, they are also
entitled to the support of laws "designed to aid in the
discharge of that responsibility."
In a separate concurrence. Justice Stewart warned
against a "doctrinaire, knee-jerk application of the First
Amendment." The basic value of the First Amendment is
that it guarantees a society of free choice, bat such a
society presupposes the capacity of its members to choose.
A juvenile audience, because of lack of development, is
like a captive audience, i.e., not possessed of that full
capacity for choice which the First Amendment presumes,
and che same rationale which permits government to regulate
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-oand truces can sustain the regulation of the reaain,
matter of minors.
Douglas and Black dissented, with their traditional
Objection to the notion that obscenity is unprotected by
the First Amendment, and Fortas dissented on the ground
that the court should have tackled the question on whether
the n,aga.ines were in fact obscene. Obscenity ,^y be
variable, but so ™ay abridgement of constitutional rights.
Fortas warned.
It was unfortunate that neither the defendants
nor the judges decided to challenge the fact of obscenity,
because New York had a concrete and reasonably clear
(as these things go) statutory definition of obscenity which
made it an offense to depict,
. .female.
. .buttocks
with less than a full opaque covering, or the showing of the
female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of
any portion thereof below the top of the nipple.
. .
Such precision gets away from the Court's attempts to make
prurient relate to the total milieu of sexuality, and if
reviewed by the Supreme Court would have led either to a
reassertion of the basically "attitudinal " as opposed to
the anatomical approach to prurience, or at least have
called forth Justice Brennan's views on the exact status
of the areola.
Some interpret Ginzburg and Ginsberg to be judicial
reactions attacks on the "permissiveness" of the
warren Court, but in the 1967 term, for example, the Court
reversed thirteen state and federal obscenity convictions -
one of which concerned a ten-year sentence for sending
obscene material through the u.ails. But the court also
sustained a ban of a film which it viewed as hard-core
pornography and the conviction of a sculptor who dis-
played life-sized erotic sculpture in his yard.^^ Even
"variable obscenity, " the Court insisted, must not be so
vague as to give unfettered discretion to local authori-
ties to determine what minors shall think. In 1968 the
court struck down a city ordinance which empowered a motion
picture licensing board to ban exhibition of films to minors
in which the portrayal of brutality and sex would tend to
incite crime and encourage sexual promiscuity among youths.
Such undefined terms as "sacrilegious" and "sexual promis-
cuity," the Court held, made the ordinance defective because
on
of vagueness,^
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Possesaion
In Mann v. Ohio^^ the Ohio affiliate of the ACLU
submitted a brief which sought to have the case overturned
by strikinr as unconstitutional the state statute pro-
hibiting possession of obscene material. Although some
of the justices indicated skepticism about the law's broad
scope, the Court disposed of the case on Fourth Amendment
22grounds. But in 1969 the Supreme Court, in Stanley v.
Georgia , reviewed a state statute which punished possession
23
of obscene matter. This attempt to get at the problem
through the consumer was found unconstitutional becavise
the Fourteerth Amendment prohibits the making of mere
private possession a crime. The material in this case con-
sisted of films which state officers seized after federal
and state agents had found them in the defendant's home
which they searched pursuant to a search warrant issued
to investigate the defendant's alleged bookmaking activities
There were no dissents in this case, and the concurrences
of Stewart, Brennan, and \<Jhite were based on illegal search
and seizure and inadmissible evidence considerations.
Justice Marshall, however, expressing the view of six
members of the court, claimed that while Roth did declare
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that obscenity is not protected speech, it meant this
in the context of government's "important interest" in
regulating commercial distribution of obscene material.
Without really explaining why government's interest, if
that substantial when dealing with commercial distribution,
could not also extend to private possession (since the
material still lacks social value, etc.), Marshall simply
asserted that the First TUnendment guarantees the right to
receive information and ideas regardless of their social
worth. While it could easily be argued that preventing a
citizen from being sold such material would also violate
the First Amendment, Marshall indicated that the basic right
of privacy was also involved and quoted Justice Brandeis'
dissent of 1928 which claimed that the "right to be let alone"
was "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilii'ed man."
Stanley was an interesting case because there were
"dicta" which indicated that the Court looked at this
question the way Black and Douglas would have handled all
obscenity cases. Marshall asserted, for example, that the
state had no right to control the moral content of a person's
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thoight, and Georgia's claim that exposure to obscene
ir.aterial could lead to deviant sexual behavior ^x\6 crimes
of sexual violence had "little empirical basis." Marshall
also reintroduced the clear and present danger test to the
discussion by claiming that although Roth had made such
considerations clearly irrelevant, if the issue involved
private possession the state must establish a clear
probability of anti-social conduct. The rationale for
requiring different r 'les for private possession as opposed
to distribution and sale was that in the latter case there
was the risk that material might fall into the hands of minors
or that the "material might intrude upon tho sensibilities
or privacy of the general public." The argument here,
which Marshall implied but did not spell out, is presumably
that distribution, sale, and all related advertising are
"public" dimensions and therefore fall under public regulation,
if not public taste; whereas obscene material in the home
effects only individuals, not the general public. While
this is a quite reasonable distinction, since even a liber-
tarian with the most libertine of tastes should not object
to such things as regulation of advertisements outside movie
theaters where the public is n.-?.r^ of the semi-captive street
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audience, it is an interesting development because it ia
almost a total reversal of the original motivation of
obscenity statites. As Louis Henkin has pointed out,
"obscenity is not suppressed primarily for the protection
of others. Much of it is suppressed for. . .the salvation
and welfare of the 'consumer.' Obscenity at bottom is not
a crime. Obscenity is sin."^^ The holding in Stanley
would seem to indicate that the Supreme Court has divorced
the concept from its luasi-religious basis and made it a
crime directed at a partic ilar form of public interaction,
most generally described as pandering. Just as in English
law, where the activity of corrupting is considered criminal
even if being corrupted isn't, the American concept is
directed at exploitation of pruriejnit material rather than
prurient material itself.
Methods of Control
While always reaffirming the validity of the con-
cept of obscenity, the Supreme Court has made numerous
rulings about the methods authorities may use to combat
that which is patently offensive. It insisted, for example,
that a state cannot prohibit the selling of works to the
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general pablic on the grounds that the works would be
harmful to minors. ^5 In the same year, however, it approved
the use of injunctive proceedings against the sale of
obscene material. 26 ^ smith v. California (1957) the
Court struck down a city ordinance because it did not
clearly specify that a bookseller must knowingly sell
obscene material and therefore it failed to meet the proper
"scienter" requirements.'^^ Requiring a bookseller to inspect
personally all the works he sold, the Court reasoned, placed
an unrealistic restriction on the free flow of ideas. In
this case the Court also scolded the trial court judge for
refusing to allow expert testimony as to the fact of obscen-
ity. Since the offense is dependent upon an assessment
of prevailing community standards, etc., this question can-
not be answered without expert testimony, and a denial of
such testimony, according to Justice Frankfurter, violated
due process.
In 1963 the Court dealt with one example of the
numerous "infoinmal" sanctions applied by various pressure
groups on booksellers to discourage them from handling
certain publications. In Bantam Books , Inc. v. Sullivan ,
the issue was the propriety of Rhode Island's Commission
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to Encourage Morality in Youth, a legislative invention
charged with "educating" the public about obscene pub-
lications. Part of the curriculum in this educational
endeavor consisted of notifying book distributors that
certain material handled by them had been found objection-
able for sale to minors. The notification, on official
stationery, thanked the distributors for their cooperation
in this matter and reminded the recipient that the commission
had a duty to recommend prosecution of the sellers of obscene
material. The Commission claimed that it was merely advising
distributors, not engaging in censorship, but a majority of
the Supreme Court found that such "advisement" was motivated
by a desire to use the threat of criminal sanctions to
achieve what probably could not be achieved by the criminal
sanctions themselves and avoided any of the procedural
safeguards of criminal proceedings.
Even though the Court had approved of injunctive
proceedings when a trial quickly followed the seizure of
material, it was quick to declare defective proceedings
in Missouri which gave police the power to seize publications
with warrants based simply on complaints rather than any
29
specific description of the material to be seized.
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In 1964 injunctive proceedings were again reaffirmed
when they involved genuine judicial supervision of specific
material to be seized, but the Supreme Court also required
the hearing on the question of obscenity to take place
before warrants were issued rather than after « thus tighten-
ing the restrictions on confiscation of material.
Obscenity and Movies
The status of motion pictures in American law differs
somewhat from other modes of expression because of an early
constitutional history, dating back to 1915, in which they
were not viewed as either the "press" or as "organs of
31public opinion." This insistence that movies were more
entertainment, but also entertainment "capable of evil,"
withdrew the cinema from First Amendment considerations and
was the basis of prior restraint in this area. Some dicta
by Justice Douglas in a 1947 decision, however, indicated
a willingness of at least some of the justices to consider
movies as equal to newspapers and radio as protected media
32
of thought. In Burstyn v. Wilson (supra) the Court was
willing to call movies a "significant medium for the communi-
cation of ideas," but the holding was restricted to the negation
of censorship based on the belief that the material is
"sacreligioas." But in 1961 a narrow majority of the
Court, in Times Film Corporation v. city of Chicago
,
reaffirmed by implication the unequal status of films by
holding that prior censorship per se was not unconstitutional.
This was not a clear ruling, since the defendant sought an
injunction to prevent a Chicago censorship board from
preventing him from showing films which he refused to sub-
mit to the board for approval, and the majority seemed to
rely partially on the notion that no abridgement of a right
would be clear until pictures had been submitted to the
board. Such a rationale presumed, however, that a state
has some legitimate interest in reviewing motion pictures,
and the majority alluded to obscenity as perhaps the only
proper object of prior restraint. Justice Clark, writing
for the majority, seemed to justify the holding in the case
by invoking the doctrine that films were not subject to the
same rules as other methods of expression and that have
some latitude as to how they shall deal with films. Chief
Justice Warren, joined by Black, Douglas and Brennan, did
not agree that the distinction between film and other media
rose to the dignity of a constitutional matter; they viewed
the majority's holding as an endorsement of censorship.
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The Times Film ruling was upheld in theory but
greatly limited in practice when the Supreme Court established
elaborate procedural requirements for film censorship in
Freedman v. Maryland in 1965.^"^ Since refusal to submit
films to censorship boards had failed to force the issue of
prior restraint of films squarely before the Court, the
tactic this time was to show the movie anyway. This con-
viction was overturned because, on the appellate level at
least, the argument of the defense was not that there could
exist no prior restraints on movies, but that the particular
Maryland procedure was an invalid prior restraint because it
presented "a danger of unduly suppressing protected expression,"
Justice Brennan, for the majority, found the Maryland system
defective because it contained no time limit for completion
of review and the elimination order did not provide for
judicial participation or the assurance of prompt judicial
review. "Unlike a prosecution for obscenity," Brennan
stated, "A censorship proceeding puts the initial burden
on the exhibitor or distributor," and the burden actually
is on the censor to prove that a film is unprotected.
The Court also required censors to seek a restraining
order if they wished a film banned, so that their actions
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would not, even in a de facto sense, have the effect of
finality, and the procedure must assure a quick judicial
decision. Justices Douglas and Black concurred, but argued
that no type of censorship,
"speedy or prolonged," is
permissible in a nation guided by the First Amendment.
Chicago's attempt to enjoin the showing of such
epics as "Rent-A-Girl" and "Bod^ o_f a_ Female" with a censor-
ship ordinance it felt was written in accordance with the
Preedman rules was overturned in 1968 when the s ipreme Court
found the procedure to lack the necessary promptness or
guarantee of a final judicial decision. ^5
Even though a majority of the justices have been
unwilling to move against a state's power to censor motion
pictures, they have done things which greatly weaken it.
For example, they have consistently stated that the con-
stitutionality of laws imposing prior restraint is more
°^^P®^^ that of laws which simply provide for subsequent
punishment on grounds of obscenity. The burden is heavy in
normal obscenity prosecutions, and the same standards for
"what is obscene" apply to movies, and the procedural require-
ments laid down in Freedman increase the load on the state's
LS
machinery to justify its intervention.
There is some judicial authority stemming from
lower federal courts indicating that Taws seeking to
regulate motion pictures may distinguish between what is
acceptable to adults and to children. But the Supreme
Court in 1968 struck down a city ordinance which classified
films as "suitable for young persons" (under 16) and "not
suitable for young persons" and required a special license
for the "not suitable" films. The definitions of what
constituted "not suitable" things was unconstitutionally
vague, according to the Court, and having the vagueness
divided into two categories did not make it less objection-
able. If a statute is not otherwise vague, variable
obscenity would also apply to attempts to regulate films
prior to showing.
Reaction to the Judicial Approach to Obscenity
Congress
Reactions to the Court
Congress gave forth occasional rumblings of protest
about the number of obscenity decisions overturned by the
Court. Senator Everett M. Dirksen, in the context of the
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battle over the nomination of Abe rortas for Chief Justice,
proposed an amendment to legislation
,to ban the interstate
»ail order of firearms, which would hav. stripped the Supreme
court Of the authority to review ^ury findings in federal
and state obscenity prosecutions. This move was unsuccessful
but received enthusiastic support from such notables as
Ohio-s Prank Lausche. who claimed that he had not seen any
Of the material the Court had held not to be obscene, but
"senators have told me about them and what they say is
unbelievable. "^^
In 1967, however. Congress enacted legislation
designed to give members of the public who received un-
solicited "pandering advertisements" a recourse to enjoin
specific delivery. Under this act if a person receives
material he believes to be obscene or advertisements based
on an obscene appeal, he may request the local postmaster
to direct the advertiser to stop sending him the material.
If the sender continues to send the material, procedures
for obtaining an injunction to stop delivery to the pro-
testing individual were established. Proponents of this
legislation argued that the act imposed no censorship
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since it deals only with unsolicited mails and enhances
the individual righ-. of privacy. The ACLU opposed the
act on the grounds that it gave the addressee the power
to make the decision about what is obscene and what he
shall receive. Lawrence Speiser, director of the Washington
office of the ACLU, justified his attack on the law by
making a clumsy analogy to the danger to freedom of speech
if an addressee could take action to prevent the delivery
of offensive circulars. In addition to the fact that
that was not the issue with this law, it is extremely
dubious that the First Amendment requires citizens to un-
conditionally accept the presentation of all points of view.
The right to speak may in a general sense imply a right
to be heard, but it is not necessarily illiberal to suggest
38that this obligation is moral in nature, not legal,
and that it does not involve the right to a captive
audience
.
Pornography Commission
The Federal Commission on Obscenity and Pornography
appointed by the Johnson Administration had some volatile
hearings during the process of drawing up its report, such
as when a leader of the "Underground Press Syndicate"
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dumped a cheese pie on the head of Commission member
Professor Otto N. Lar8en;39 ^he most spectacular event
was the report itself. The majority of the Commission,
led by William B. Lockhart, Dean of the University of
Minnesota Law School, concluded that pornography was not
harmful to individuals and that legal controls for adults
were unnecessary. It recommended the repeal of all Federal,
state, and local laws pertaining to "consenting adults"
who wished to obtain a prurient experience, but voted to
retain legal restrictions on public displays, unsolicited
mailings and distribution to minors. Charles H. Keating,
Jr., a Cincinnati attorney, founder of the Catholic Legion
of Decency and President Nixon's only appointee to the
Commission, led the six dissenting members and even obtained
a temporary injunction preventing publication of the major-
ity report. The majority report, however, was "leaked" to
the press anyhow, and Keating 's rebuttal consisted of the
charge that the Commission's reconanendations could lead to
41
"paganism and animalism." Keating also happened to
mention that he believed himsejf to be the "only ordinary
citizen" on the Commission, and Attorney General Mitchell
and Robert Finch joined in condemning "counsels of
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irresponsibility." vice Pre«i-r?*.r.4. ay. V resident Agnew chalked the
report up to the "radical liberals," who
''-'^'''''^^^^^^^^^^^^irito a lather over
shortage of nutrients in achild s box of Wheaties-but who cannotget exercised at all over the same child's
constant exposure to a flood of hard corepornography that could warp his moral out-look for a lifetime. 42
Herbert L. Packer, writing in Commentary
, found the
Report to be of little value to either aide in the control
Of pornography controversy .^3 The dissenters, he claimed,
based their case on anecdotal reports by police about the
danger of pornography, and the majority invoked lengthy,
but frivolous, behavioral data which tried to establish
such irrelevant facts as: (1) only two per cent of those
interviewed found erotica to be an important national
problem; (2) most Americans believe erotica harmful to
others; (3) most believe erotica is not harmful to them;
(4) the attitude about the harm of erotica correlated
positively to age (older), low education, and political
conservatism. The behavioral responses to erotica were
based primarily on second-hand data in that people were
asked their recollections of their reactions to pornography.
Another study compared a group of convicted rapists with
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a group of non-criirinals and concluded that the mean age
of first-exposure-to-erotica is slightly higher for rapists
than for college students and members of men's clubs,
which Packer thought not very relevant to anything.
One study actually sponsored by the Commission
caused a row when some Congressmen learned that funds they
had allocated were financing an experiment at the University
of North Carolina in which 23 male udents were exposed to
erotic material while hooked up to a device which measured
heart rate, urinary acid phosphates, and condition of the
subject's penis. This particular data indicated, according
to the researchers, that physiological reaction to erotica
decreased as subjects became satisfied with erotica. In
short, neither side proved anything, but the liberals were
the more sophisticated about not proving anything.
Pressure Groups
The best known, and perhaps most highly organized,
group supporting government restriction on grounds of
sexual (and sometimes when coupled with the concept
sacrilege, religious /political) impropriety is probably
the Catholic community. However, the pressure in this
direction is by no means confined to Catholics. Numerous
Protestant groups, local Councils for Decent Literature
(which can have a secular base), pta's, women's clubs,
and fraternal orders combine with the formal mechanisms
of state legislatures, courts, license commissions, censor-
ship boards, as well as internal industrial codes, indirect
pressure upon theaters, bookstore owners which, together
with picketing and boycotts, all coalesce in an attempt
to condition American sexual mores.
Pressure from private groups which can have the
same effect on authors and filmmakers as governmental
censorship posed a delicate problem for the ACLTJ. When
cardinal Spellman, for example, not only urged Catholics
to refrain from attending The Moon is^ Blue , but also urged
a continuing boycott of the theatres where the film was
shown in 1951, the Union expressed concern. The simple
expression by any individual or group of disapproval of
any film or book or any attempt simply to dissuade others
from buying it was defended by the Union as being within
both the letter and the spirit of the Constitution.
The ACLU also recognizes, as far as
legal right is concerned, the use of such
orderly and lawful means as peaceful and
unobstructive picketing and the organization
of a specific and primary boycott, even when
they imply some degree of coercion. How-
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ever, m view of the fact that thefield of communication differs sig-
nificantly from the general field ofindustry and commerce, the rjnion actively
opposes, as being especially contrary tothe spirit of the Constitution, the use
of such means in the following ways- (1)
as pressure, or explicit threat thereof, atany time prior to the actual offering of a
motion picture, etc., to the public; and
(2) even after the actual offering to thepublic, in the form of a general or second-
ary boycott—designed, for example to close
a theatre entirely or close other theatres
whose proprietors ally themselves with the
proprietor of the first theatre. The ACLUbelieves that intimidation and reprisal
have no place in the field of ideas. '^'^
In November of 1955, after the Rom^-^n Catholic
Bishops announced an intent to revive the Church's campaign
against indecent pictures, some segments of the movie
industry reacted to the Catholic Bishops in an attempt to
counter their impact on public opinion. Dore Schary, then
executive head of Metro-GoIdwyn-Mayer (also a member of
the advisory council of the Southern California ACLU), while
emphasizing the right of the Bishops to crusade against the
morally objectionable, expressed a hope that they would
respect the rights of others to make movies as they saw
fit. Variety
, the weekly show business publication, did
an extensive series of articles on local Motion Picture
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Councils, whose original function was to make positive
recommendations about films which they regarded as
especially edifying or entertaining, which claimed that
Catholic members of the Councils were trying to persuade
the group to issue condemnations of films judged unworthy
by the Legion of Decency.
In some communities the Legion of Decency effectively
organized parts of other associations to apply pressure on
both law enforcement officials for more stringent appli-
cation of obscenity laws and against boo^ .sellers and movie
theater owners to stop the sale of material they considered
objectionable. Many Parent-Teachers Associations, for
example, delegated this sort of function to "Catholic Mothers
Clubs. ""^^
The Legion of Decency characterized the film
Baby Doll as "morally repellent both in theme and treat-
ment" and placed it on its "condemned" list in 1956. Cardinal
Spellman gave the effort a boost by personally appearing in
the pulpit to warn Roman Catholics in his diocese that tho
viewing of such a film would constitute the commission of
a sin. In Albany, New York, there was a 6-month ban on
attendance by Catholics to all films in all local theaters
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which had shown Baby Doll ? Connecticut Catholics were for-
bidden to attend showings r newspapers in Syracuse and
Troy, New York refused advertisements for the film? a
New England theater chain refused to book the film? in
Jackson, Tennessee the distributor was warned by the city
council and Gary, Indiana, refused to allow the film to
be shown. The ACLU, in several statements daring this
episode, enjoyed pointing out that attendance at the same
film was only restricted to adults by Bishops in France
and England-^^
In the 1950 's cities such as Baltimore and Chicago
used the 500-title list of the National Organization for
Decent Literature as a guide for book and magazine dealers
when the communities began drives to eliminate the causes
of juvenile delinquency.
The "unremitting war" of the American Roman
Catholic Bishops against obscenity was expanded when the
Catholic V7ar Veterans joined with the NODL, the Legion of
Decency and the catholic Mothers Clubs in 1957. The cm* a
particular assigrraejat included a nationwide campaign
to banish books by more than 40 writers from public school
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libraries which led to numerous local incidents.
In 1957 the Union issued a statement charging the
NODL with attempting to institute de facto censorship in the
United States and taking actions "seriously violative of the
principle of freedom." The ACLU emphasized that it did not
"presiame to object to the NODL advising communicants of
the Roman Catholic Church about any publication, but the
1957 statement which was also signed by 150 persons promin-
ent in the fields of publishing, literature, education and
the arts, charged that NODL black lists, general boycotts
and its "certificates of compliance" to local booksellers
resulted in "the judgment of a particular group.
. .being
imposed on the freedom of choice of the whole community. "^°
Not all of the tactics of the Legion of Decency and
the NODL are accepted by the Catholic community, however.
John E. Fitzgerald, an editor of a Catholic weekly, has
long insisted that film classification schemes should be
binding only on those who wish to be so bound; i.e.. Catholic
classifications for Catholics. Another C?*tholic spokesman,
J. D. Nicola, a lay member of the Legion's board of con-
sultants, publicly stated in 1959 that he felt that
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classifications which went beyond simply attempts to
separate films not suitable for minors "may create more
problems than they solve, "''^
The catholic Church of course has no monopoly on
the concern for things decent. The Churchmen's Commission
on Decent Literature, a national Protestant group organized
to combat objectionaEj'ie literature, proposed the establish-
ment of "voluntary review boards" along with a published
checklist naming specific publications it viewed as obscene
in order to combat newstand obscenity. Most of the Commission
members were associated with evangelical churches and,
according to the ACLU, the National Council of Churches
had not given the group its endorsement.^^
The Citizens for Decent Literature, a secular group
favoring stronger measures against obscentiy, was formed
in Cincinnati in 1958 and inspired more than 100 similar
groups in all 50 states. The organization has 17 units
in Ohio, 14 in California, and eight each in Indiana and
Illinois. Prominent religious and political leaders are
frequently listed as local sponsors, as in Portland,
Oregon, where the group was called the Mayor's Committee
for Decent Literature.
383
The CDL does not view itself as engaging in
censorship, "merely the exercise of every citizen's right
to stand up and be counted, to state his belief in what should
be allowed and prohibited in society." Publication of lists
of "objectionable" works, with the plea that police ,se such
lists in local clean-up campaigns, is the groups most wide-
spread technique. Letter-writing campaigns to public
officials and trial judges as well as attendance at obscenity
trials are also sometimes used. The latter brought about
judicial rebukes and threats of contempt citations in
Cincinnati and Indianapolis. The Buffalo Youth Board's
Salacious Publications Committee reportedly contained two
policemen who "sugg-sted" to retailers that they remove
offending magazines and books to avoid "running into
trouble.
"
In 1958 the ACLU complained of private pressure
group tactics in Oklahoma City, where the chairmm of a
citizens' volunteer committee said his group would ask
retailers to sign a public pledge refusing to soli "indecent"
magazines. He proposed to turn over the names of those
declining to sign to the county attorney for "whatever
action he deems proper." The Union also expressed concern
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over a massive letter-writing campaign to trial judges
while hearing obscenity cases in Cincinnati. One judge,
the ACLU reported, withdrew from hearing three scheduled
obscenity trials because of the amount and nature of his
raail.^'*
The ACLU and the NYCLU successfully countered a
tactic of the Post Office Department in 1959 when all post
offices in New York's Nassau County had posted reprints of
an editorial by the Rev. Daniel Poling, editor of The
Christian Herald
, which opposed the circulation of the
unexpurgated version of Lady Chatterley' s Lover
. The
response to the protest was an order removing the Poling
reprint as "not in accord with postal regulations" and the
pledge that "henceforth (officials) should not post state-
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ments by private individuals."
Although the ACLU is opposed to pre-censorship in
any form, in 1960 it considered a new law, which limited the
power of the Postmaster General to impound mail allegedly
connected with the sending of obscene materials by requir-
ing him first to sed< authority from a Federal District Court,
as a "qualified victory." In the Union's view the measure
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thwarted attempts by the Postmaster General to "Increase
his vast and often abused powers and deprived him of his
previous power to impound mail by his own fiat."^^
One interesting example of the determination of
groups interested in controlling the flow of "smut," as
well as their power to translate their wishes into formal
community sanctions, was a case decided by a federal
District Court which sought to use the letter of the law
to harpoon any First Amendment "spirit." Lower federal
court rulings had voided any ordinances which expressly
prohibited the showing to adult audiences of films which
were not suitable for children. A federal District Court
was asked, in 1968, to review a city ordinance which got
around these rulings by simply making it illegal for any
theater to show "adult" movies to minors and then making
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it illegal for any theater to deny admittance to minors.
The city argued that such a denial was "discrimi.iating and
against public policy and good morals." The Court, comment-
ing that the "adult moviegoer may not be re8tri::ted to
the pablum in Mary Poppins , " reasoned that such legislation,
in addition to being vague, tried to achieve a result which
went beyond the child and reached into the protected realm
58
of adult ideas.
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Philadelphia was the site of a literal "bookbarning"
in 1963 when a group of concerned clergymen burned some
magazines they found offensive in order to dramatize the
beginning of a local boycott against the sellers of indecent
literature. The ceremonial fire, attended by the local
police commissioner and the superintendent of schools,
was denounced by the ACLU as "an obnoxious symbol of in-
tolerance and bigotry, reminiscent of Hitler and
Savonarola, "^^
A Texas community had a law which penalized both
the owners of movie theaters who admitted minors to certain
classes of films and the parents of the minors. In 1959
six large bookstores in San Francisco received bomb threats
from a group dubbing itself the Vigilante Committee for
Decent Literature, but usually the pressure to clamp down
on the flow of obscenity is less flamboyant.
All sorts of private groups which are organized to
protect and further other interests can become involved in
the struggle over obscenity. The American Book Pviblishers
Council is a trade association which has a vested as well
as libertarian interest in reducing controls over published
material. In 1957, for example, the Council issued a public
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warning to the chief of Police in Springfield, Vermont,
that his reported circulation of the NODL list to book-
dealers with instructions to stop selling listed volumes
was illegal.
A proposal in 1963 by a Maryland Junior Chamber of
Commerce group to establish a national Jaycee "seal of
approval" to drug stores which do not . .expose young
people to pornography, " established a dialogue between the
National Junior Chamber of Commerce and the ACLU. The
ACLU stated that it felt "a seal of approval for books.
. .
particularly obnoxious because it is a weapon that leads to
widespread censorship.
. . . Thus the will of a private
organization by means of economic sanctions, is imposed
in the highly sensitive field of communication."
The MJCC eventually decided against issuing any
62list of undesirable magazines.
Obscenity and Social Reality
Part of the reason obscenity is taken so seriously,
of course. Is that it deals with sex, and sex is taken
very seriously, at least in legal codes. As Fred P. Graham
once slightly over-stated the case:
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. .
.it Is only a slight exaggeration to
say that currently all sex but face-to-face
relations between spouses is criminal in
this country. Non-connubial hanky-panky
is outlawed 'inder fornication and adultry
statutes in 48 states. The two holdouts
are Louisiana and Tennessee. (The presumably
wider opportunities for lechery in these two
states, however, are dimmed somewhat by the
fact that the age of consent for females is
set at 21.)
. .
.The situation is particularly critical
in Kansas, where an overzealous swain can get
one to five years at hard labor for enticing
a woman for thrpurpose of fornication—even
if the enticement is not successful .^-^
But anyone who has been in the central part of almost
any American metropolitan area should be aware that probably
no aspect of American life has changed as radically as the
apparent decline in the de facto concern over obscenity,
A cursory glimpse of some bookstores and movie theaters
which not only "pander" but try very hard to deliver on
their promises makes the issue of obscenity in courts and
legislatures seem largely academic.
Maryland is the only state still to have a movie
censorship board, but six states had such boards until the
1950* s, and over 200 cities had review boards. Frequently
these boards required fees from the movie industry itself
to sustain their operation, and in 1950, for example, the
industry paid about $1,800,000 in fees and expenses to
comply with state and local censorship boards.
The application of obscenity statutes is highly
sporadic and seen,s to be largely a periodic gesture on the
part of Officials to remind society that it is still viewed
as a legitimate target of legal action. Occasionally the
gestures are successful, as when customs officials seized
I am curious (Yellow) when first imported from Sweden at
the end of 1967. A federal appellate court ordered it
released in November of 1968. But the Supreme Court sus-
tained a state holding that the filrwas obscene. Andy
Warhol's 31ue Movie, labelled by Vincent Canby as the film
version of Warhol's boredom with life, was not only seized
by the New York city police, but the theater manager, the
projectionist and the ticket seller were arrested for
possession of obscene material.
The live theater has probably been the recipient
of the most "change" in the spectacular shift in conventions
about sexual candor and nudity. But along with this new
mode of "expressiveness" came some degree of consensus that
theatrical nudity was not only not prurient, but even anti-
erotic
. For example, Walter Kerr's unfriendly review of
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"Oh Calcutta" concluded that Kenneth Tynan's attempt to
explore the "trick wonderland of sex" was a disastrous
failure because the medium of the live theater is itself
hostile to nudity and simulated sex play because it places
what ar3 almost inherently private acts in a public context.
Even if the only goal of "Oh Calcutta" was to be pornographic,
it must fail, according to Kerr, because it is anti-erotic.
It is anti-erotic because the sexual act itself possesses
an autonomous quality which cannot tolerate even partial
inattentiveness
. On stage an actor is always doing some-
thing else (acting), and the totally open confrontation
which is the glory and distinguishing mark of the live
theater means that when sex is introduced, it "Asserts
itself for what it is, exclusive, and thereby ruptures the
nature of the event." In literature, Kerr claims, sex
is only described by words, and thie words protect this
exclasiveness. Film is much less exclusive but still more
so than the live theater, which may be Incapable of produc-
ing erotica,
Legitimacy of the Concept "Obscene "
Argument of "Democratic Will "
Those who argue that the state has no interest in
relating anything, including prurient material, unless
it can be demonstrated that some overt, harmful con-
sequences will occur if action is not taken fsuch as
Justice Douglas) are simply enunciating the central tenet
of classical liberalism. The charge that this same formula
is not applied to economic regulation overlooks the point
that this exception is usually made in the name of some
egalitarian principle, and the rationale for making obscen-
ity part of the list of exceptions can hardly be related
to egalitarianism.
Some vrtio are opposed to any attempt to regulate
pornography are still opposed to the apologetics for
pornography, either in the form of arguments that it is a
beneficial "escape valve" for the lonely and alienated
(which is just as unprovable as assertions about its harm)
or "aesthetic" defenses of pornography. Stanley Kauffmann
argues that when true pornography (as opposed to erotic
material) is stripped of its intellectual cant and the
veneer of education which it frequently uses to establish
its credentials to be explicit, it emerges as an exclusively
masculine form of vindictiveness. It is ". . .a species
of male revenge on our social systems of courtship and
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monogamy
.
. .
time out from civilization .... brutal.
. .
But the conventional view of most libertarians is
that while the concept may have some utility as an aesthetic
term it is not a valid legal concept. Not liking the
concept and deciding who can authoritatively get rid of the
concept are different questions, however, and some fall
short of calling the concept constitutionally invalid on
the grounds that the redress should be legislative rather
than judicial. Alexander M. Bickel, for example, would
agree that the American law of obscenity is in shambles,
but finds the cause of this condition to be in the willing-
ness of the Supreme Court to intervene in a policy area.
What the judges have managed to do in the obscenity cases,
according to Bickel is to substitute their subjective
reaction to salacious material for that of the legislators,
prosecutors, police or jury. Since obscenity is not and
should not be protected speech in Bickel *s view, invoking
the First Amendment is misplaced, and without such
invocation the Court has no grounds for claiming jurisdiction
over such questions. Bickel does think that criminal
obscenity statutes are sufficiently vague for the Supreme
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Court to declare them unconstitutional on due process
grounds, because to dispense criminal punishment consti-
tutionally the offense must be clear. But other attempts
to control the flow and direction of obscene material in
a society, while unwise and probably ineffective, are,
for Bickel, constitutional.
• . .1 do not argue for censorship. I
would wish I think I would wish
anyone to have the right to publish or
show anything that anyone else may want
to read or see, and we would take our
chances. But I don't know where to find
reasons convincing enough to be enshrined
as constitutional law for compelling others,
who may be in a majority, to wish as I do.
I should hope a majority could be persuaded
on prudential grounds that a lot of censor-
ship is unwise, and ineffective to boot,
and that a little goes a long way. But the
constitutional problem of obscenity, the
question of whether and how judges are to
decide what a community must tolerate and
what it may censor is, I maintain, a
baffling one, to which the solution escapes
me. 69
The viewpoint that literature and films ought to be
beyond governmental regulation because no clear relation-
ship to anti-social conduct can be proved, is, for Bickel,
slightly beside the point because many other people believe
there is a connection between crime and obscenity. They
cannot prove it, but "libertarians" can't prove their case
either. Many people, including those who resent regulation
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in the name of obscenity, are in favor of intervention
to curb the portrayal of violence in movies and comic
strips, which Bickel feels reflects a curious one-sided
anxiety about crime. Richard Oilman's defense of this
apparent inconsistency on the grounds that witnessing
aggressive acts has no sublimated manifestation short
of violent acts, whereas sexual tension, because of
masturbation, is capable of expression without injuring
others is, to Bickel, "a hilariously solemn explanation."'^^
Bickel suspects that some may find such sublimation "not
fully satisfying," and that Gilroan's point of view reflects
a quite widespread belief, shared by those who are con-
cerned about obscenity, that mankind learns from what he
reads and now and then acts upon what he learns. The
concern, he argues, is the same—a concern for the "aesthetic
. . .style and tone of society," which is not very different
than the concern with pollution, traffic jams, national
forests and open seashores. The mores of a community,
where they concern the entire community ^which publicly
circulated material does—are frequently regulated by law.
While too much regulation is bad, and we should learn to
tolerate the deviant and eccentric, to regulate taste is
not unconstitutional, and in a democracy, Bickel implies,
is even to be expected.
To the more pristine libertarians, who would argue
that ^o type of expression, be it aggressive or prurient,
should be subject to regulation because it is not conduct,
Bickel argues that distinctions between conduct and speech
are convenient but also arbitrary. Regulations of many
sorts which regulate "aesthetic" things treat expression
and conduct as synonomous, and the only democratic con-
stitutional grounds for interfering with the community's
desire to establish such standards is when the speech is
"political" in the sense of being essential to the
communication of ideas.
"Quality of Life " Argument
Not all defenses of the concept "obscenity" by
liberals take the form of deference to majority will.
Arguments such as Bickel 's usually assume that obscenity
statutes are unwise, but allowable, in a democracy, and
are usually bolstered by a defense of judicial review
(interference) related to an essentially democratic
rationale, such as the maintenance of an open political
process, Irving Kristol has defended the concept of
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obscenity and its legal sanctions by claiming that total
sexual candor is not merely a convention of puritanical
societies but a reflection of a "unique sense of privacy"
which characterizes all cultures and is indigenous to the
human race.^^
Kristol, after noting that genuine obscenity is
"sexism" and dehuraanization of sex into simple copulation
rather than an emotional relationship, hypothesizes a
situation in which a well-known man had an excruciating and
ignominious death which was televised for our enjoyment.
Our reaction, Kristol hopes, would be that such a perform-
ance would be an undefensible invasion of privacy that it
would be obscene. The same is true of sex, according to
Kristol, but he neglects to mention the rather critical
fact which helps to make his hypothetical analogy irrelevant;
namely, that neither the performer or the performance is
voluntary. This point doesn't especially bother Kristol,
however, because the root of the problem (for the liberals
opposed to obscenity legislation) is a misunderstanding
of the true nature of democracy. Any conception of democracy,
he asserts, which views the ideal government as nothing
but a set of rules and procedures fails to see that the
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purpose of any political regime is to achieve some version
of the "good life" and the "good society." While such a
statement fails to distinguish between a political regime
and a political system. Kristol would reject such distinctions
as an example of what he calls the "managerial" conception
of democracy; i.e., one void of non-procedural content."
The older, truer (and more Greek, even) meaning of democracy
is self-rule. This presumes, Kristol says, that the "self
is worthy of governing, " and requires an obligation not only
to educate the individual self in "republican virtue," but
that the public not be governed by "the more infantile and
irrational parts of themselves." Those who desire the
good life and not simply a system which has as its goal
.
.the endless functioning of its own machinery," must
favor censorship. It has not been impossible for liberals
to accept the notion that consideration for the "quality
of life" necessitate restrictions on individual freedom
ranging from economic restrictions to abolition of cigarette
advertising on television. The issue, he insists, is not
censorship, but whether the proposed censorship is "liberal"
or "repressive." Censorship of pornography is essential.
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Kristol holds, for two different kinds of reasons; the
first relates to the protection of the individual and the
second to the preservation of art. The danger to the
individual, according to Kristol, is that there might be
something as well as total boredom vrtiich characterize, the
condition of those saturated with pornographic experiences.
The basic psychological fact about porno-
graphy and obscenity is that it appeals to
and provokes a kind of sexual regression.
The sexual pleasure.
. .is auto-erotic and
infantile.
, .a masturbatory exercise of
the imagination, when it is not masturbation
pure and simple.
. .
.infantile sexuality is not only a
permanent temptation for the adolescent or
even the adult—it can quite easily become
a permanent, self-reinforcing neurosis. It
is because of an awareness of this possibility
of regression toward the infantile condition,
a regression which is always open to us, that
all the codes of sexual conduct ever devised by
the human race take such a dim view of auto-
erotic activities and try to discourage auto-
erotic fantasies. Masturbation is indeed a
perfectly natural autoerotic activity, as so
many sexologists blandly assure us today. And
it is precisely because it is so perfectly
natural that it can be so dangerous to the
mature or maturing person, if it is not con-
trolled or sublimated in some way.72
Kriatol goes on to indicate that he thinks the
basic question about obscenity involves "civilization itself"
and briefly alludes to Nietzsche, "everything is permitted
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.
..." and the struggle between nihilism and civilization,
such a detour into philosophy need not concern us, save to
point out that "nihilism" is frequently a philosophical
counterpart to the "international communist conspiracy"
argument. The danger is usually over-rated, and the prou
ponent argues from ad hominem to ad horrendun, .
Kristol's second practical argument is designed to
turn the tables on those whose opposition to obscenity
legislation stems from a consideration of art and the free
development of better art. This argument usually claims
that much significant literature has been or would have
been lost to the censor's pen, but Kristol thinks very few
works of "genuine" literary merit were ever suppressed
(although he doesn't explain how he would know about the
ones that were suppressed). Good literature can even be at
a competitive disadvantage in a society where everything
is permitted, and the desire to curb Gresham's Law in the
interest of good art leads Kristol to justify penalties for
obscenity and censorship in certain areas. The censorship-in-
the-interest-of-art argument is taken less seriously by
Kristol than it might appear, because he concludes with
the statement that he thinks that pornography should be
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illegal and available to those who want it badly enough.
Liberal enforcement, together with the fact that it is
difficult to enforce anyway, will, according to Kristol,
perpetuate the existing under-the-counter pornography trade
which has gone on for centuries. The dichotomy between the
ideal and the real is beneficial to the ideal — this seems
to be Kristol 's argument.
Other Attacks and Defenses
Milton Konvitz, rejecting the point of view of
judicial "absolutists," claims that "some censorship there
must be, " and would prefer that this function ultimately
be performed by the Supreme Court, ^-^ Konvitz sees the
greatest difficulty with the concept as the assumptions about
the effects of obscene material on those who are exposed
to them, and he recommends further research. While it is
certainly desirsQ^le to have constitutional law as well as
less basic public policy based on carefully evaluated data,
the argument that effects of salacious material cannot
be proven and that we should defer to the judgments of
legislatures contains several flaws. First it not only
assumes that legislatures are engaging in vigorous quest
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for data (which is rarely the case), but also that parties
to the dispute are really interested in theissue of con-
sequences. To assert that they should be interested in
this issue has an aura of scholastic responsibility and
a connotation that one is above metaphysical first principles
but is also to wait for perfect information in an area where
it cannot be obtained, and even if obtained would not solve
the problem. Scientifically, as has often been noted,
if one has all the results the decision makes itself?
imperfect information calls for a judgment about what to do
in the interim: a simple desire for more knowledge does not
solve this problem. As we have asserted elsewhere, there
is a problem among American libertarians because of their
doctrinal rigidity. This bad habit does not make them
invariably wrong, however (which can be a kind of rigidity
parading as pragmatism) . With the problem of obscenity
the issue goes deeper than simple "absolutism, " regardless
of which side invokes the procrustian formulas.
Many critics of the Court's obscenity rulings are
upset not only with the vagueness of the concept itself but
with some of the tests the court has established to deter-
mine obscenity, Gerhard Falk, for example, finds the
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"coinmunity standard- aspect of the Roth test an unworkable
fiction in a pluralistic society where there is rarely a
community standard about anything, let alone consensus about
74
sexual candor. Konvitz would argue that while there may
not be community standards before the Court announces some,
after the announcement there are, and the simple fact that
they are judicially created doesn't mean they are inaccurate.
Konvitz believes it would be more honest for the Court not
to pretend to find "a mysterious community standard of the
morally tolerable," but that the Court should not ignore
its duty to create such standards.
Konvitz shields the concept from the cheooge of undue
vagueness by comparing "obscenity" to "negligence, " claiming
that both are terms of "legal art" which are summations of
a jury's judgment about something and expressed as a "fact,"
Obscenity as distinguished from the seditious or the libel-
ous is an attempt, in Konvitz 's words, to work not from
toward a definition.
. .
.the definition is found not in a
verbal formula abstract from the obscene
material, but in the material itself;
the configuration, the Gestalt , that is
•obscene' 'defines' the 'obscene' just
as the facts of an automobile collision
•define' 'negligence,' and just as the facts
of a fair trial 'define' 'due process of law.'
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Another frequent criticiain of the Court's practices
in the area of obscene speech, even by those who do not
believe that obscenity deserves constitutional protection,
is that the complex Roth formula, especially the insistence
that prurience be based on the impact of the work as a whole
on an average person, means that supervision of the formula
makes the Supreme Court a "Super Censor." It was this
inherited role of the Court which greatly bothered Chief
Justice Wp»rren in Jacobellis and led him to suggest that the
Court should require only "sufficient evidence" in the trial
court record rather than the requirement of "substantial
evidence" which would require the Supreme Court to reassess
entirely and evaluate material which had already been
evaluated by either trial judge or jury. Not only can this
lead to substitution of the Supreme Court's judgment for
that of the trial judge or jury and thereby erode the
appellate nature of the Supreme Court's function, but it
is an horribly Inefficient use of the judiciary. Konvitz,
among others, has argued that any "sufficient evidence" rule
would have to forego any review of whether the material was,
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for example, really evaluated as a whole, etc. Since
Konvitz is convinced that there must be censorship, his
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argument is reduced to the question of who can best perform
this function, and his conclusion is that t^e Supreme Court
is better suited to this purpose because it is less sus-
ceptible to pressure groups than states or municipalities.
One of the prices of justifying the concept of
obscenity theoretically is that someone is going to have to
apply it, and while it probably is preferable to have the
Supreme Court make this decision rather than a Chicago
board of censors, it gives to the Court a role which, even
if constitutionally justifiable, is almost impossible to
perform adequately. The Roth standard has the practical
effect of making either obscenity unworkable or the Roth
standard unworkable, because the court cannot supervise its
application in all cases. Konvitz's desire to keep the
ultimate decision with the Supreme Court, and the desire of
others for national application rather than local, has a
similarity to Justice Black's argument for systematic
prior censorship on the "if you must. . .then. . grounds.
The basic question is still "if," and keeping a concept
under control, while certainly not a frivolous consider-
ation, is not a problem if the concept itself is attacked.
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Cone lua ion
The Legitimate Concern
Obscenity and Ideas
Arguments about the harmful consequences of obscene
material usually include assertions about harmful ideas
as part of the consequences. Kristol's fear of the con-
sequences is not only that it will lead to infantile behavior,
but that it will enhance the notion that infantile behavior
is acceptable. Even though the argument is usually phrased
in terms which apparently restrict only behavior, this
"behavior" is highly ideational. Justice Brennan's most
fundamental distinction — the distinction between those
things with socially redeeming importance and those with
none — contains a basic aversion to a particular type of
idea which the court has found difficult to express, but
which probably corresponds most closely with what Kristol
and others label the "dehumzmization" of sex. The exact
content of the "idea" is as elusive as the notion of
prurience, but Stanley Kauffraan has probably come closest
to describing the ideational content of pornography when
he claimed that the complaint that pornography distorts
sex by depersonalizing it is inaccurate because pornography
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(especially performed) tells the truth about sex. vjhat
is this truth, this idea, communicated by pornography?
The unnerving accuracy of pornography, Kauffroan .states, is
its perception that sex
. .is impersonal, that the
complete identification of love with sex is a romantic
fabrication,
Many people, especially women, could not
begin the sex act with partners to whom
they feel no specific attraction, but the
specifics fade as the act progresses, and
it ends in the greatest commonality of
the human race. Porno is ruthless. It
proves that love, or anything remotely like
it is not essential to sex, that love is
an invention and has a limited congruence
with sex.
But my own view is that love is a good
invention, the best idea yet devised for
getting through life with minimal lone-
liness. I suppose that plenty of loved
and loving people go to porno shows
occasionally, but still it can be said
that porno is implicitly an attack on love
by an audience of the insufficiently loved,
who get their revenge by insisting that a
screw is only a screw. 78
Kauffman is quick to add that he does not like to
see the "love-invention" attacked, but he would not invoke
the sword of the state to protect it. Even though the
members of the Court and others have more difficulty than
Kauffman in putting their objections to pornography into
words, their fear, like Kauffman' s, is that obscenity is an
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attack on some root ideas of "civilization." The usual
rationale declaring obscenity not to be apc2ch is that it
is devoid of idea content—that it is the form rather than
the content which is being suppressed, just as political
speeches by sound truck can be regulated because of the
mode, not the content.
Tha Roth test's insistence that obscenity is not
anatomical bat attitudinal belies the theory that censorship
is an objection to an idea. To caution communities that they
roust consider the work as a whole and that sex by itself
is not obscene reflects less of a concern for biology than
for psychology and ethics. It is not actions themselves
which are offensive but the way in which they are treated.
The more removed sex is from the "love-invent ion" to use
Kauffraan's phrase, the more objectionable. The Roth test
may not strike at sex itself , but it does strike at sex
all bjr itself .
Because obscenity statutes are aimed at an idea
and because they are attempts to protect a particular
perception of sex, the argument that they are not speech
oust fail; and the notion that the idea is not socially
redeeming is to be very heavy-handed in the delicate, if
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not always subtle, debate about sexual mores. To state
that pornograj^y, to be pornography rather than something
else, expresses an idea (because it is an idea) is to
recognize that it should be protected speech, but is not
necessarily to wish the particular idea success. One can
hope that it loses favor or simply bores most people and
joins the ranks of numerous ideas which democrats allow
to germinate but hope will die out naturally. This is of
course an "act of faith" of sorts, especially in a time
when there is little evidence to indicate that Gresham's
law bends to qualitative considerations. Whether this
faith negates the "good life" which is the source of that
faith is a question that ranges far beyond the simple issue
of obscenity legislation and into the very heart of demo-
cratic theory. Without exploring the philosophical base,
we can simply say that a Court charged with preserving a
democracy and a democrat could find constitutional, or
if you will, constitutional-democratic grounds for objecting
to obscenity laws.
"Public Privacy "
Those who argue that we should curb attacks on the
"love invention" are mistaken in calling that plea "VJemocratic, "
but they are correct in calling it "popular, " and it is
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"popular" for reasons which go beyond a puritan heritage
and aelf-righteous prudery. What moat people recognize,
and in a curious way what the doctrine of the Supreme Court
in the area of obscenity has come to recognize, is that
the fundamental problem is not "obscenity" however defined,
but an invasion of personal privacy which most people feel
when confronted with pornography. This is not sufficient to
apply legal sanctions against those who want to feel this; those
who want, and often pay outrageous prices, to attack the con-
cept of sex as related to emotion — but it is the best of
reasons to be concerned about the unsolicited invasion of
personal privacy.
One argument sometimes heard for the preservation
of obscenity as a legal concept is formulated in the
question, "If there is no concept of obscenity, what is the
legal charge to be used against those who fornicate in
public parks at noon or who display »pomographic statuses
on their lawn or who display
,
pornography frcm windows,
marquees, etc.?" An eighteenth-century libertarian
could probably assume that there could be much behavior
that wasn't illegal and people still wouldn't do it, but
twentieth-ctntury man is better off assuming not only that
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some people will do anything, but that they will do it
regardless of the state of jurisprudence. Punishment
and control (which at least for this problem should be
enhanced by punishment) should be attempted, and the rationale
is that such behavior invades the "public privacy." "Pablic:
and -private" are in ordinary language used as antonyms, but
the notion "public tranquility" connotes "privacy." The
sense of public privacy which leads us to be concerned about
billboards, ostentatious neon signs, and the location of jet
airports and superhighways is a concern for the "quality
of life, " but the quality as it affects the community,
not simply individuals.
What material a person reads or whether he receives
it through the mails is a private matter. Unsolicited
pornography arriving through the mai Is is an invasion,
and not the only one to arrive by post, of personal privacy.
Salacious advertising, be it from a film or a prostitute,
is an invasion of p .blic privacy because th3 individual
who feels his privacy is invaded doesn't have the same
recourse that he would have if his personal privacy ware
invaded} i.e., not admitting the intruder. Since he is
in public, uhe law invokes what the public defines as its
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Standards of privacy. Regulation of material which
goes to minors could be handled under the s.me concept.
The complaint i. really not that minors win be corrupted
by certain material, but that they might be corrupted with-
out their parents' permission. Presumably if someone
wants his children exposed to pornography he should be
allowed to do so, because it is basically a private matter.
But to have others solicit a juvenile audience to sell
pornography is to interfere with the personal privacy of
others to rear their children in their own wa^r. when the
"others" are diffuse but numerous, the concept which protects
them could be "public privacy" which is simply applying what
are felt to be the community's standards for behavior in
public places. This is almost the net effect of the Court's
rulings in the area of obscenity since Stanley
. This aspect
of public policy would have more credibility, as well as
being more accurate and less capable therefore of abuse,
if it were redesignated "public privacy, " and the ponderous
notion of "obscenity," along with all of its intricate
reformulations, went the way of other legal concepts designed
basically for our theocratic and pre-constitutional past.
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Obscenit
:^ in the American Political Culture
The Suspicious Polity
one feature of Ainerican law on obscenity which
should not be overlooked is that the concept is, unlike the
English notion, restricted to sex. Besides this obvious
difference, it would appear that the American approach to
the problem has traditionally been restrained by the
hostility to the use of political power per ae. which in
this case is manifested in the Court's greater suspicion of
laws imposing prior restraint than of laws providing sub-
sequent punishment*
Fights over the regulation of obscenity as well as
the legitimacy of the concept itself tend to take on a
highly ritualistic quality. Both those who desire govern-
ment to regulate sexual mores and those who believe that
it is not a legitimate area of public control are frequently
more interested in the "symbolic gesture" (either in the
name of "moral integrity" or "liberty") than in concrete
control of certain forms of social Interaction. It is this
symbolic nature of the conflict which brings out ^o much
self
-righteousness on both sides. On the local leVel in
\
\
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particular, it is sometixnes less of a battle over specific
legislation than it is an opportunity for the guardians of
morality and perhaps a traditional life style to square
off against the champions of personal autonoxny and holders
of "modern" belief systems.
Similarly to the polarization and "set response"
which characterizes the conflict about seditious speech,
the American dialogue about tt\e control of obscenity also
reflects a delight in the competition of the struggle.
Adversary role-playing is perhaps even more intense in the
battles over obscenity because both sides have the oppor-
tunity to demonstrate that the other side is either totally
evil or totally silly.
The adversary role-playing in the dispute over the
seriousness of obscenity as a problem and the propriety of
punishment was made especially evident when Lawrence Speiaer,
director of the Washington office of the ACLU, in urging
opposition before Congress to the proposed bill to give a
citizen the option to seek an injunction to stop unsolicited
advertising for pornography, stated:
... we can' t pass laws which could be demgerous
when administered by men of little understanding,
or hostility to liberty, anu trust that no such
men will appear.
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This comnient seemed hardly applicable to the
proposed legislation, but it was a clear indication of the
traditional assumption made by Ar.ierican iiberarians that in
a
-suspicious culture"—steeped in a tradition which is
enthusiastic abaat tlie utility of adversary proceedings—
if government has powers it will abuse thero.
CHAPTER VII
PROTECTION OP CIVIL LIBERTIES IN
TWO CULTURES
Two Aspects of a General Problem
The Legitimate Scope
of Social Control
We have explored the general problem of what forms
of individual behavior constitute the legitimate concern
of government in a democracy by analyzing how two
different societies approach two different problems.
While the problems of seditious and obscene speech do not
exhaust the types of civil liberties problems a society
may have—any more than the United States and the United
Kingdom complete the possible scope of political arrange-
ments in the world—the two problems are central enough
to the theoretical heart of all civil liberties problems
and the two nations are typical enough of advanced demo-
cratic nations, to make some general statements about
comparative civil liberties possible. Both of the problems
can be viewed as "demands" upon government to inhibit
speech on grounds of a particular rationale. This demand
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can stem primarily from public opinion, with government
being more of a recipient than an initiator of such
demands. Other demands can be largely the product of
government's perception of a problem. The policy posi-
tions of government, interested pressure groups, etc.,
on these problems indicate their proposed "solutions."
Secur ity and
Propr ietv
Sedit ious Speech
Seditious speech is a demand emanating from what
is perceived as a threat to national security or public
order. Actually the rationale is the same, i.e., preserva-
tion of order—except that, when applied to such things
as "subversive" groups, the fear of disorder either takes
on the cosmic proportions of revolution, the "disorder"
of illegitimate government, or the disaster of foreign
domination.
Obscene Speech
Obscenity is a demand for restraint on individual
expression with a rationale related to sexual impropriety.
While in Britain the obscene is technically more inclusive,
it is still primarily a desire to punish those who trans-
gress on conventions about sexual candor.
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The English and American approaches to these
problems reflect many common features, because they are
common problems and because the societies are somewhat
alike, but within certain contexts different patterns
seem to emerge in the way the two societies respond to
the common stimuli found in all political orders—the
tension between the establishment of collective goals
and the maintenance of individual autonomy.
vt Norroat ive Standards
Sedit ion
United Kingdom
From a comparative perspective, probably the most
noteworthy feature of English attitudes about seditious
speech is the low salience of concerns about domestic
subversion and loyalty along with the acceptance of the
idea that "insulting speech" is behavior onot deserving
legal protection.
Formulated as a normative proposition, the low-
key reaction of the English public and the government to
the tensions of the cold war indicates a belief that
nationality is not primarily a belief system, but an
accident (or fortune) of birth. This belief made it
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difficult for fears about an "enemy within" to be trans-
lated into a political credo. Having the concept "alien"
connote geography (or color) rather than a political
philosophy helped to sever the notion of "subversive"
from nationality and tended to narrow the scope of fears
about insidious internal forces to matters of conduct
rather than ideas.
The acceptance of punishment for "insulting" and
"provocative" speech, on the other hand, not only on the
part of courts but also on the part of English libertarians
emerges as another major value pattern in the English
approach to liberty. The Britton and Malik cases, which
did not involve the outbreak of violence or disruption,
indicate that the pivotal consideration was the content
of remarks rather that the situation in which they were
made. Lord Parker, in the Br itton case, did talk about
the importance of "circumstances" to the proper framing of
the offense, but his concern was not with the danger the
speech presented (which he assumed from the content) but
whether the speech was sufficiently public to be con-
sidered "speech." Since Parker's attempt to restrict the
concept "insult" to circumstances where there are likely
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to be some people who are actually insulted drew a nega-
tive reaction from Parliament (and he was only trying to
formulate an evidentiary rule for evaluating circumstances),
it would appear that English law is more than willing to
evaluate the danger of the idea rather than tlie danger of
^<^ea in a certain context . Lord Parker's defense of
the legitimacy of punishment for "insulting words" was
based on the analogy to physical assault in which, as he
explained in Jordan v. Burgoyne , "verbal hits" provoke
"revenge" and thereby threaten breaches of the peace. The
"threat" on the public order is not evaluated in terms of
the context of the words but of the effect the judges
think the words would have on individuals in the abstract.
Since the holding in Jordan did not even require that
"insult" be defined with reference to an average, reason-
able man (because the particular audience showed signs of
being atypical and unreasonable) , it appears that the only
time an evaluation of the circumstances in which the words
were spoken becomes germane is when the insult threshold
of the audience is below average. This approach in a
curious way becomes an intricate combination of the
American "gravity of the evil" formula (i.e., evil =
insulting) , with the Holraesian assessment of circumstances
(in terms of their "clear and present danger"), but
the latter is a rule which can only roitigate the amount
of what is already determined to be a grave danger.
Translated into the American vernacular the English judi-
cial formula for determining the proper scope of per-
missible speech could best be called the "evil words com-
pounded by circumstances" test. As a theoretical frame-
work, merging as it does the most restrictive parts of the
"clear and present danger" test and the "gravity of the
evil" formula, this test is a much less libertarian
approach to freedom of speech than that found in America,
if for no other reason than that the American judiciary
tends to use only one restrictive formula at a time.
English libertarians' love-hate relationship with
"insulting words" and the Race Relations Act of 1965,
and their desire to see such charges involed against anti-
semites, fascists and white racists, but not against
equally volatile speakers on the Left, has already been
noted. Such a position by English libertarians indicates
a certain lack of even-handedness, but more important for
our purposes, it reflects the importance of the norm that
speech should be restricted by considerations of "defamation."
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It is irnpcrtant to note, too, that the "compounded evil-
formula was motivated by the same kind of consideration,
and reflects the English emphasis on protecting individuals
from insults and abuse by others. This can be viewed, as
we have stated, as a weighing of competing concerns about
the rights of individuals, with the right to propagate
being subordinate to the right to personal tranquility—
a very specialized variety of the right to privacy.
United States
The very number of loyalty oaths, loyalty-security
programs and the history of the Smith Act, Communist
Control Act, and other federal legislation, as well as
the careers of Joseph McCarthy and the members of the
Subversive Activities Control Board, indicate that
Americans .took the problem of domestic subversion much
more seriously than the English during the same Cold War
period.
In the 1950 's, the absolutist interpretation of
the First Amendment was unsuccessfully to compete with a
judicial theory which held that the extent of governmental
power to limit expression was to be determined in every
case by balancing freedom against the case for order or
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security. This position, initially enunciated by Chief
Justice Vinson in Americen Communications Association v.
Douds, probably received fullest treatment by Justice
Harlan in Barenblatt v. United States and tends to put
society's interest in freedom of speech, press and assembly
on no higher a plane than any other social interest. The
basic notion of the doctrine, as expressed by Thomas i.
Emerson, is, "that the Court must, in each case, balance
the individual and social interest in freedom of expression
against the social interest sought by the regulation which
restricts expression." obviously most criteria the judges
use in evaluating any type of case involve some sort of
"balancing." The clear and present danger doctrine asked
the judges to balance a community's interest in protecting
itself with the constitutional guarantees of freedom of
expression, but at least as the doctrine historically
unfolded, the assumption was that statutes which inter-
fere with First Amendment freedoms are what need justifica-
tion. So the balance, under the clear and present danger
doctrine, and also its surrogate, the preferred position
doctrine, began with the scales tilted in favor of
individual expression. The Vinson Court wished to begin
inquiry into free speech cases with the scales empty.
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But while the "balancing of interests" formula
and the "gravity of the evil" test were to dominate
judicial thinking in the early 1950 's, the late 40 's and
the 1960 's were less rigid periods, and the judicial
standards reflected a desire to discover imminent dangers
rather than probable evils before interference with speech
could be allowed.
Cases such as Saia
, Terrriiniello , and even Feiner
were far different in result and logic from Jordan v.
Burqoyne
. With the exception of the decision on group
libel and the symbolic speech cases, the American bench
has been fairly consistent in insisting that some concrete
evidence of probable disorder (beyond simple apprehension
by authorities that the particular event could lead to
disorder) , is necessary to sustain criminal punishment.
It seems fairly certain, for example, that the events which
brought about the charges in Gregory v. Chicago , or pro-
bably even Edwards v. Simtll C.arolina. wotil<5 not have been
viewed lightly by Lord Parker.
Justice Frankfurter's fear, expressed in Kovacs v.
Cooper, that constitutional doctrine would view any law
touching communication as "infected with presumptive
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invalidity/' seemed to be the operating principle of the
Warren Court.
Implicit in the Dombrowsk
i
decision, for exaniple,
was the warning that the Supreme Court would take judicial
notice of the "chilling effect" caused by threats to
enforce an overly broad criminal statute regulating
expression.
The Supreme Court has apparently recognized that
the statutes which are unconstitutional on their
face or as applied have the potential to generate
fear; to the extent that First Amendment freedom
of expression is involved, the Court will presume
the existence of the fear and the result that
necessarily flows therefrom—the citizente self-
curtailment of his freedom of expression.
Dombrowsk
i
, since it validates in a general way
the proposition that inquiry into the good or bad faith
of a state prosecutor is permissible, lays the groundwork
for an evaluation of the motive behind those Congressional
investigating committees whose inquiries appear to be
geared primarily to gaining the attention of media and
demonstrating to the public the importance of committee
members, rather than the less spectacular toil of legisla-
tive research.
The burden of proof to establish bad faith would
presumably always remain with the plaintiff, but the
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"chilling effect" rationale in Dombrowski represents a
major constitutional decision which could lay do%m the
groundwork for major changes in the Court's approach to
the First Amendment. Most important, the decision repre-
sents a shift in the role of the constitutional litigator
to a position where he can "... take the offensive and
root out all of the unconstitutional portion of the
2
statute m a single proceeding."
The decision also arms courts with the power to
deter any governmental action having a chilling effect
which may prevent a large segment of society from exer-
cising First Amendment rights.
This presumptive invalidity has to be counter-
balanced by a demonstration not only of imminent disorder,
but must meet all the standards of due process, especially
avoidance of vagueness, and must be, in the judgment of
the courts, the only way to solve the problem. If the
threat could have been met with either more narrowly-drawn
statutes or different administrative policy, such as more
police to protect Jehovah's Witnesses, then these alterna-
tive courses of action are required because of the high
status of free speech in the constitutional hierarclyof
values.
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While terms such as "clear and present danger," as
Justice Douglas has pointed out, are sometimes used so as
to negate the possibility of any meaning, the doctrine as
formulated by Brandeis as a standard for evaluating the
constitutionality of statutes rather than a simple evi-
dentiary rule would seem to describe the presumptive
invalidity which underlay so many of the Warren Court's
decisions.
England's Race Relations Act of 1965 was pro-
nounced "intolerable" by the American Civil Liberties
Union, and American libertarians generally have supported
some variation of the clear and present danger doctrine
as a criterion for evaluating the legitimacy of legislation
touching on speech, apparently feeling more comfortable
when the onus of justification is one the government.
Old Holmesian statements about "all speech being an incite-
ment," and Justice Douglas's insistence in Terroiniello
that the "... function of free speech ... is to
invite dispute," reflect a consensus among American
libertarians that speech is supposed to be provocative.
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Obscenity
United Kingdom
The inclusion of drugs and violence under the
rubric "obscene" makes the notion of obscenity cover all
attempts to deprave and corrupt subjects in the United
Kingdom, and in the final analysis the concept is really
an attempt to pun3 even though the parti-
cu] not be illegal. The
theocratic base of the concept is as evident in England
as it is in the United States, and the charge of obscenity
would have greater clarity, if less legitimacy, if it
were labelled "enticement to sin."
As Lord Reed noted in his dissent in the Ladies
Directory Case
,
English judges usually give no help to
the jury in defining such terms as "deprave" and "corrupt,"
and the concept of obscenity in the United Kingdom is not
only more variable than the concept in the United States
because it is more inclusive, but also because the jury is
under the guidance of fewer judicial rules about what the
pivotal terms are supposed to mean. In this context, the
American Supreme Court may be a "super-censor" because
lower court judges cannot figure out how to apply th*,- Roth
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standards, but at least Roth has more certitude than the
English judges' attempt to clarify the nature of the
offense by quoting dictionary synonyms. Another factor
to consider is that the latitude vague phrases give to
the decision-maker is probably used for more libertarian
purposes, or is at least used more consistently, when
handled by a review court rather than by a jury.
United States
The Supreme Court's rulings in Ginsberg and
Stanley have moved the complex "Roth-plus" formula to cover
primarily what I have labelled as invasions of "public
privacy" rather than an attempt to control mere possession
of prurient material. Even though "pandering" is far
removed from the original definition of obscenity, it is
probably a better concept to indicate the court's feeling
about the true nature of the "problem" of obscenity. Like
the English concept of corrupting public morals,
"pandering" reflects a displeasure about those who
establish a career out of meeting the unsavory needs of
the community. Even though the wares of the panderer
might not be connected to illegal behavior, the "sordid
business" emerges as still objectionable. In the future.
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temptation may not emerge as a greater evil than the sin,
but the doctrine that temptation must take place without
intruding on the public sense of privacy will probably
continue far into the future. Attempts to shut off the
flow of pornography to the consumer will probably diminish,
but modes of solicitation, since they make use of the
simple existence of a community, will be subject to regu-
lation. Both the product and the consumer, being basically
private matters, will be less important than the producers'
behavior in the public marketplace with unsolicited
intrusions on the consumer's privacy receiving criminal
penalt ies.
General Approach to
Liberty
The English desire to create an environment in
which minds can meet for purposes of exchange rather than
confrontation and the widespread belief xn legal sanctions
against speech which threatens not only order but decorum,
reflects a commitment which emphasizes communication
through speech. The desire to keep a minimum of personal
respect present on both sides during an argument is held to
be essential if the speech is to be meaningful.
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Obscenity in England, while a much broader con-
cept than here, is also much more widely accepted as a
legitimate concept. English libertarians do not challenge
the basic assumption that pornography can be prohibited.
The attack on the legitimacy of the concept itself, both
judicially and among libertarian pressure groups, is much
more common in the United States. In the deferential
political culture, criticism tends to concentrate on how
reasonably a particular power is exercised rather than on
government's authority to have such a power at all.
The differences between the British and American
approach as to civil liberties are probably also reflec-
tions of more general differences in attitudes toward
criminal law. These attitudes were contrasted by New York
Times reporter Anthony Lewis who claimed, for example,
that the right to counsel for suspects immediately after
arrest seemed "utterly strange and unacceptable to most
3legal authorities" in Britain. Lewis attributes the
differing attitudes to the greater suspicion of police
and the greater diffusion of policy-making power in the
U. S., as well as to the generally more conservative
nature of Britain's legal profession. These differences
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are also reflected in the disparity in approaches to the
criminal process by libertarians in England and America.
A case in point is former Home Secretary Roy Jenkins,
widely respected by libertarian groups for his activities
as a private member of parliament when he pushed through
the reform of the Obscene Publications Act and his acti-
vities in fighting to end capital punishment and encouraging
legal reform in abortion and homosexuality. But he is
also a supporter of measures which probably would not
be well received by the American Civil Liberties Union.
He was in favor, for example, of eliminating unanimous
jury verdicts for criminal convictions? the fingerprinting
of all Englishmen; and opposed to the privilege against
self-incrimination being used to avoid giving testimony.
Institutional Influences
Written Guarantees
The fact that prior restraint seems to be more
acceptable to legislatures, courts, and libertarian groups
is perhaps a manifestation of not viewing civil liberties
as a matter of "constitutional guarantees." Having no
written list of constitutional proscriptions, the "challenge"
to authority on grounds of "unconstitutionality" or
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ultimate "illegitimacy" must focus on practices and
irs;.ieroentation of policy, rather than grants of authority
themselves. Americans, along with a deep tradition of
viewing government as restrained by a written document,
have constant reference to a convenient decalogue of
things government "can't do." The enumeration of specifics
in the Bill of Rights, in conjunction with a written
constitution designed to issue restraints against authority
as well as grants of authority, a historical fear of con-
solidated political power, and a people historically sus-
picious of the idea of government, acts in a general way
to infect all policy with a presumptive invalidity.
Having written constitutional guarantees of basic rights,
in addition to being an important device in popularizing
the dialogue about civil liberties, is also partly
responsible for the adversary-conflict approach of Americans
to civil liberties. An early "suspicious polity" tended
to institutionalize measures which helped to sustain and
nurture suspicion of authority. The English have "expec-
tations" that basic rights will not be abridged by govern-
ment, but a belief that their expectations will be met.
Americans have written "guarantees" that basic rights
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will not be abused, but fear that the guarantees will
not be honored.
Fragmented power
Diffusion of political power in the United States,
while theoretically a device for restraining the use of
power, in most instances leads to diversity of legislation
rather than responsible legislation; and in both the areas
of seditious and obscene speech a dimension of the Supreme
Court's liberalizing effect has been to remove control
over these areas from the states. A unitary form of
government is by no means immune from parochial influences,
however
.
In both Britain and the United States, libertarians,
sometimes as a second choice, have sought to centralize
control over obscenity in the hope that national standards
would at least be preferable to numerous provincial cri-
teria. However, English libertarians also complain about
consolidation of power, accountability, etc. in 1965
the NCCL suggested that the Home Office was too complex
a body to handle so many problems affecting individual
liberty, and claimed that the Home Secretary's responsi-
bilities were so broad that he was "effectively protected
from a personal review of all his work."^
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Role of the Bench
English courts did not significantly truncate any
of the legislation we have analyzed, with the possible
exceptions of the Quarter Sessions' attempt to formulate
a "reasonable audience" rule in Jordan, and Judge Stable's
instructions to the jury in the " Philanderer's case,"
English courts never made any aIterations
-by-interpretation
which narrowed the scope of statutes. Cases such as
Jordan, ward, Shaw and the Chewing Gura Co. indicate that
the power to determine the meaning of legislation rarely
benefited the defense. Judicial "creativity," which
existed in cases such as Shaw or Jordan, was invariably a
boost for the prosecution.
Obviously the range within which English courts
can maneuver and exercise judicial will as compared to
governmental will is much more restricted compared to the
United States. But while the scope for maneuvering is
almost infinitely greater for American courts, the
direction of the movement within which English courts may
operate is the opposite of the American direction. The
role of English courts as a libertarian influence in the
two problem areas we have examined is almost nil. English
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courts play a comparatively small role (in leadership
at least) in protecting civil liberties in the United
Kingdom, and given the direction of their isolated
instances of leadership, the fact that they do play a
small role is probably fortunate,
American courts have not only played an active
role in these civil liberties questions, but generally
speaking the Supreme Court and the entire federal judiciary
have been a libertarian influence. The Supreme Court's
formulas for defining obscenity, while certainly capable
of criticism on libertarian grounds, had the general
effect of reducing the number of convictions for obscenity
by establishing and tightening national standards for other
courts to apply. American obscenity law is almost
entirely the product of judicial behavior, and, in cases
such as Ginzburg , the Supreme Court demonstrated its
sovereignty in the area by judicially "legislating"
pandering into American criminal law.
While rarely striking down legislation in areas
touching on Congress's concern over subversion, the dis-
tinction between "active" and "mere membership" in the
Smith Act and various loyalty tests and review boards
drastically narrowed the scope of such practices. The
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government's desire to register members of the Communist
Party and the State Department's right to establish
restricted travel areas were, in a de facto sense,
judicially negated. The Court retreated in the face of
reactions to some decisions on abuses of legislative
investigatory power, but even here the net effect was
certainly not to extend the scope of such activity.
Political Elites and
Responsibility
Part of the explanation of the great responsibility
shown by English political leaders dealing with problems
of national security and loyalty is to be found in the
good judgment of the professional civil service. The
higher status which accrues to the civil service and the
generally higher "respectability" of government employ-
ment as well as politics itself helps to create an insti-
tutional self-respect which enhances responsibility.
The existence of an "establishment" (in the genuine
sense) in England, when coupled with a professional civil
service, gives the entire English decision-making process
an insular quality which not only acts to limit participa-
tion on specific policy, but also discourages involvement
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of the ordinary citizen in questions of education,
loyalty, etc., a fact which can have libertarian conse-
quences when the threat to civil liberties steins from
inflamed public opinion.
The negative aspect of insular decision-making,
of course, is that tracing accountability for specific
prosecutions and policy becomes very difficult. Policy
just seems to ooze from the giant amoeba called "the
Government.' But the insular quality of "establishment"
policy served the English well when confronted with some
localized pockets of hysteria about doinestic subversion.
While the lower temperature of the English people on this
kind of issue is due to cultural factors, some credit must
be given to inter-establishment ethics about the proper
ways to in engage in political warfare, since a political
party, especially the out-party, could have thought it
could have made political gains by "leading" on such an
issue, but did not do so.
Cultural Factors
In the deferential polity democracy is less a
matter of mandate from the public and more a matter of
responsible rule and control. Freedom of expression in
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this context becomes a value of Bocial interaction and
basic civility rather than a guarantee to engage in an
adversary-conflict process. Civil liberties become rules
of cooperation rather than rules of conflict.
The "deferential" culture apparently has certain
expectations about leadership. The phlegmatic approach
of the English people to political diversity also makes
them concerned about violations of understood norms of
social propriety and responsibility. Both a subversive
"witch hunt" and the anti-semitic tirade seem to conflict
with a qualitative political style which the English expect
from both those who lead in official politics and street
corner oratory. While this would obviously not apply to
the "leaders" of race riots in Blackpool, it is important
to note that even in the increasingly sensitive area of
race relations in the United Kingdom, leaders such as
Enoch Powell may be racists, but they are not in the
"populist" tradition of Lester Maddox or George Wallace,
and attempts in the American press to create this kind of
analogy reflect a subtle desire to punish the English for
past self-righteousness on this subject. Our point is not
even that such punishment is undeserved, simply that the
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"style" is radically different and reflects a deferential
polity. "Deference" makes assumptions about responsibility,
and in a curious way the responsibility exists because it
is expected, and the proposition's tendency to be self-
fulfilling strengthens the prediction of responsibility.
Civil liberties criteria in the United States,
because of the culture the governmental structure and the
greater propensity to have these kinds of questions dealt
with in a legal context, emerge as extensions of the
accusatorial legal process .
The resolution of civil liberties problems in the
context of a suspicious polity creates a generally higher
level of surveillance of individual freedoms, but, as we
have noted with reference to the set response of some
libertarians to the "red menace" hysteria of the 1950 's,
the adversary nature of this surveillance can harm the
libertarian case by making it an inaccurate statement of
denials and counter-affirmations about disloyalty to the
Bill of Rights.
Liberty and Authority
Trusting a responsible government to protect
individual freedom may involve the courage of "faith," but
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rigidly adhering to prescriptions which prohibit any
attempts to control behavior touching on expression of
opinion has its own equivalent of a "leap to faith."
The locus of this faith tends to be placed in frail hopes
for a responsible polity rather than a responsible govern-
ment and the assumption that truth will win out in the
competition of the market place. Thomas I. Cook, in the
course of arguing, in the 1950 's, that the American
Communist Party should be outlawed, attacked the weakest
link in the chain of arguments used by American liber-
tarians. One does not have to agree with Cook's conclu-
sion about the wisdom of outlawing revolutionary parties
to appreciate his recognition of the "intellectual
absolutism" of traditional American liberals and liber-
tarians which is "as real, if not as sinister, as those
5
of both heresy-hunters and heretics." The dangers of
close adherence to rules, such as a literal interpretation
of the First Amendment, or even total adherence to the
clear and present danger doctrine, is that observance of
the rule becomes an end itself, rather than an instru-
mental guide to the interests and values those rules were
designed to protect. Cook argued, for example, that
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liberalism's attempt to defend an open society by pro-
claiming absolute freedoms divorced from the reality of
their achieving an open society, is to argue for empty
secondary principles at the expense of the basic premise
of liberalism. But his more general criticism of liber-
tarian absolutism is its refusal to take cognizance: of the
non-rational elements in politics, as well as the ability
of all sorts of pressure groups to manipulate and manu-
facture public opinion. Of such liberals. Cook remarks:
Aware of the non-rational element in man,
and properly hostile to irrationalist politics,
of the possibility of whose triumph they are
perhaps unwarranted ly afraid, they yet cling
stubbornly to the rationalist principle that,
given complete freedom of expression and of
political organization, truth will indeed win
out in the competition of the market place.
Nevertheless, their overall attitude implies
doubts, and their doctrine seems in the event
to mean that freedom must be unconstrained
regardless of the consequences. We must, they
say, collectively confront possible martyrdom
though some might not bear it heroically and
few would relish its fitile suffering.^
For Cook personal self-fulfillment and other
individual conceins transcend the bonds of society, but
the rights necessary to achieve them successfully are
always in a social order which, "is both the place and the
condition of such fulfillments. ' Constitutional democracy.
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he submits, is a closed system, "secure only within its
related postulates." Liberalism and democracy require us
to "accept our lack of finality and certainty in know-
ledge/' as well as the "inescapable imperfection in social
practice.
"
Cook is pushed to the conclusion that there are
some kinds of advocacy which are "inherently subversive,"
and the standard he would use in distinguishing the
inherently subversive from the dissent which an open
society requires is the advocacy of violence. Communists
and Fascists, and to update him we would probably have to
include the more strident members of the New Left, have
no commitment to the open political process, and therefore
any attempt to participate reflects only a desire to use
the latitude of the process to undo the process. Any
standard which, like the clear and present danger doctrine,
emphasizes the immediacy of the threat and the directness
of the danger may have been appropriate when the issue was
simple breaches of the King's peace long ago, but to apply
it to a genuine conspiratorial movement in the twentieth
century is, according to Cook, to "abandon reality."
Cook's argument, it may be noted, takes the same
general form as Korstol's argument for censoring obscenity.
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The form of the argument is that rules designed to maxi-
mize liberty are not ends in themselves but are means to
achieve the purposes which motivated the rules. ^ The values
behind prescriptions about liberty are sometimes entitled
self-fulfillment, self-government, open society, etc., but
for a broad spectrum of individuals liberty is not the
fundamental goal, but a way of ensuring that other goals
can be met. For others, liberty becomes an end in itself,
or becomes the operating fundamental value, even though
one may wish that free men will do certain things and not
other things.
The entire English milieu makes the operational
principles of civil liberties controversies come closer
to the approach to democracy which views liberty as an
important, but nonetheless instrumental , value. The
American milieu encourages operational principles which
view liberty as an end in itself.
A full analysis of the things which should be con-
sidered in any choice between these two approaches to
democracy would take us deep into the subtleties of demo-
cratic theory and liberalism itself (where the t^isnsion
between those who view liberty as a primary goal and those
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view it as a secondary goal is very pronounced) , but the
only point we wish to make here is that these two strands
of democratic thought seem to describe the variance in
the English and American approaches to civil liberties.
Both cultures have rules, formal and informal, to
guide citizen, judge and lawmaker in the area of the
individual's relationship to the state and other individuals.
Both cultures take the problem seriously and, compared to
other cultures, reflect a heavy commitment to the value
of individual autonomy. But in one culture the rules emerge
as prescriptions about conflict and in the other as pre-
scriptions about consensus .
What is perhaps roost unfortunate is that the norma-
tive criteria used to approach civil liberties in both
cultures could not be somehow reversed. A dysfunctional
anomoly exists between a highly plural istics society
that expounds rules which construe democracy and free
speech as guarantees to arbitrate, and a more homogeneous
society which reflects a concern for its own unity. The
society with the most unity and common assumptions about
authority does the most worrying about unity and differing
assumptions about authority. Expectations of abuses in
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one society and expectations about responsibility in the
other tend to become curiously self-fulfilling.
These two tendencies pushed to extremes, of
course, become untenable. To oppose power simply because
it is power is a form of paranoia, just as to defer to
government in all circumstances is to engage in a dangerous
act of faith. Both the suspicious polity and the deferen-
tial polity lack a certain perspective on individual
freedom, but along diffeiing dimensions. If we assume that
cultures and governments, just as men, must err, it is
probably best to err on the side of suspicion. This is
not to make an error into a virtue, simply to reiterate
the verity of slogans about "eternal vigilance." What is
frequently misunderstood is that vigilance may be the
price of liberty, and the price may be well worth it, but
like all prices, vigilance can get caught in an infla-
tionary spiral which devalues the currency of thought.
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